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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores patterns of institutional change in the Russian forest sector 
and examines the process of nascency and development of both formal and informal 
institutions. It argues that development of the Russian forest sector has been path-
dependent and significantly influenced by informal institutions, which the recent 
reform carried out by the state also failed to transform. Using the case study of the 
forest sector, the dissertation (1) identifies major drivers of post-Soviet institutional 
change, and (2) compares different patterns of agency (particularly state forest reform 
and non-state ‘private modernisation’ projects). The thesis explores opportunities for 
institutional path-creation in the Russian forest sector and concludes that the major 
drivers of change in today’s Russian forest sector are: i) local ecological agency, and 
ii) the changing global (political, economic, ideological) environment. It is argued that 
roots of the problems of the recent forest reform lie in the lack of agency within 
(mostly federal) state structures and local communities. 
The dissertation argues that although non-state forms of governance (such as 
certification and model forests) have proved to be more powerful and effective than 
state initiatives in overcoming ‘path-dependent’ institutional embeddedness, their 
ultimate results are severely limited by and highly dependent on evolution of state 
agencies and more generally on the nature of relationships between state authorities 
and society. 
At the conceptual level, the research adopts the institutional (NIE) framework and 
combines it with classical sociological literature (on the problem of structure vs 
agency), as well as with a historical perspective (path-dependence vs path-creation). 
Moreover, it emphasizes the importance of ecological dimension of analysis for 
understanding societal change.   
As for its policy relevance, the research challenges the recently popular and overly 
optimistic view on the role of civil society and non-state governance in institutional 
modernisation. It encourages policy makers to study national history and to build 
upon existing initiatives taking into account the path-dependent environment and 
informal institutional embeddedness of implemented projects. 
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‘Have a look at hundreds and thousands of questions concerning our domestic and 
everyday routine — what a pandemic looseness, what unsettled views, what a lack of 
habit at work! Russia is being deforested by landlords and peasants with such a 
frenzy. One can be certain that this timber is sold for a tenth of its price, will the 
supply last long enough? Our children will hardly be grown up when there will be ten 
times less wood in the market.  What is going to happen then? Maybe the day of 
doom. And in the meanwhile, just try to mention curtailing forest destruction rights 
and what will you hear? On the one hand, there will be the state and national 
necessity, and on the other hand infringement of property rights, i.e. two opposite 
ideas... Someone has made a joke in a modern liberal way that every cloud has a 
silver lining and that if one destroys all Russian forests, there will be at least one 
benefit, namely that corporal punishment with the rod will be finally abolished, for 
district courts will have nothing to whip guilty peasants with. This is certainly a good 
consolation, but hard to believe, though: even if there will be no forests at all, there 
will always be enough rods for whipping anyway – one will import those from 
abroad.’ (Dostoyevsky, 1989: 253) 
 
‘Government is still the only European in Russia.’ (Pushkin, 1836) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historical Context 
Reform of the forest sector is currently high on the agenda in the Russian domestic 
policy. The scale of ever more aggravating problems has become apparent not only to 
NGOs and companies, but also the Government. The reasons for change in the 
Russian forest policy are of an economic, political and, to a far lesser extent, 
environmental nature.  
Russia is the most forest-rich country with about 25% of world forest resources and 
over 200 years history of forest management. However, Russia uses under one quarter 
of its forest resource potential today. Most of accessible forests are deeply exhausted 
as a result of intensive exploitation in the twentieth century (Odintsov, 2007: 157-
160). 
The serious economic issues are the low competitiveness and low efficiency of the 
forest sector. The average forest revenue for one cubic meter of timber is five to ten 
times lower than in developed forest countries (Roshchupkin, 2008b: 3-12). The 
amount of harvested timber from one hectar of forest-covered land is 0.2 cubic meters 
in Russia, whereas in developed countries the same indicator is 16 times higher 
(Odintsov, 2007: 162). As a result of inefficient use of forest resources, Russia 
accounts for only 3% of world production of commercial timber. The value of forest 
sector products (per one cubic meter of harvested timber) amounts to 1.8 thousand 
rubles, which is three to five times less than in developed forest countries (Ibid.: 168). 
Russia’s timber industry focuses, to a great extent, on raw-material export: 26% of 
harvested wood is exported as raw timber, whereas 56% is processed by industry and 
18% is used by local population and on social needs (Roshchupkin, 2008a: 12). Since 
the 1990s, Russia has become substantial net importer of paper. Forests are not 
reproduced sufficiently. Due to excessive logging and inappropriate forest 
management, the area of mature and overmature forests decreased by 66.1 million 
hectars during the last 30 years (the total stock is about 870 million hectars) 
(Alekseyev, 2008: 6). The level of illegal logging amounts to 10-15% (Roshchupkin, 
2008b: 3-12; Kotlobay et al, 2007: 4). In some regions of Russia (the Caucasus and 
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the Far East), illegal logging is estimated at 50-70% (Environmental Management in 
Russia..., 2004: 34). 
These problems have kept down the sector’s role in the economic development of 
Russia, which contrasts with its enormous potential1 in a country where forests cover 
45% of the total area (Roshchupkin, 2008a: 1). The share of the forest industry of 
Russian GDP is less than 2%.  The forest industry produces under 3% of the total 
industrial output of Russia2.3 
Apart from economic issues, there is a challenge to ensure environmentally- and 
society-friendly development. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century 
that timber began to be looked upon as a marketable commodity in Russia. Before 
then, forests had been looked upon more as pasture lands and localities for the 
gathering of honey, firewood etc. After the emancipation of serfs in 1861, landowners 
began a policy of reckless forest exploitation in order to cover their losses caused by 
the reform (Miller, 1967: 274). Traditionally, Russian forests have been an important 
part of everyday life and environment – rather than a quantified source of national 
income.  
The forest sector has traditionally provided significant employment. Most industrial 
forestry settlements reached the peak of their development in the 1970-1980s. Since 
the 1990s, forestry communities have been increasingly challenged by administrative 
reforms combined with market transformations (Sodor and Jarvela, 2007: 10). In the 
1990s, the Russian forest sector directly accounted for over two million employees 
                                                 
1
 See IIASA analysis of the Russian forest sector problems (financial, personnel, juridicial, social, 
technical, and environmental); papers by Carlsson (2000), Carlsson, Lundgren, Olsson (2000), Nilsson 
(2000), Nilsson and Shvidenko (1997), Shvidenko (2003), Piipponen (1999).  
2
 In 1987, the share of forestry, mechanical wood industry, and the pulp and paper industry was seventh 
of all sectors in Russia with 5.62% of total industrial output (Nilsson and Shvidenko, 1997: 33). By 
1993, domestic production of wood products (the output of logs, lumber, plywood, reconstituted wood 
boards, and pulp and paper products in roundwood equivalent) had plunged to 57 percent of its 1989 
level (Russia: Forest Policy During Transition, 1997: 43). 
3
 However, these issues may have remained in the shadow if it were not for the political will of federal 
authorities (e.g. speeches of V. Putin in 2002 and 2006, Putin’s visit to leskhozes in Petrozavodsk, 
followed by organisation of the Council for Development of the Forest Complex under the Government 
of the Russian Federation, 2007). 
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(Nilsson and Shvidenko, 1997: 34). Since the dissolution of the USSR, the number of 
employees in the forest sector has been steadily decreasing, caused by a drastic fall in 
production, as well as by a massive technical upgrade of the sector (Shvidenko, 2003). 
In 2006, the number of employees in the forest industry sector was almost 800 
thousand. Due to the ongoing forest sector reform, there has been a decreasing trend 
since then (Odintsov, 2007: 168). 
One of the reasons for the high social significance of the forest sector is that 
companies in the Soviet forest sector were not just central institutions providing 
employment, producing goods and services, but also offered a large variety of social 
assets and social infrastructure for their employees and often the local population 
(Nilsson and Shvidenko, 1997: 34). Since the First World War, the state acquired 
large areas of forest reserves to meet the nation’s increasing need for timber products. 
It was state policy to establish forestry settlements. In such settlements, wood 
procurement was the primary source of livelihood for most people. However, in 
contrast with its role in the bigger centres, the state never played a large role in 
helping to develop rural communities. Throughout the history of many settlements, 
timber companies organized electricity, telephone services, the water system and the 
road network. (Järvelä, Södor, and Tarasov, 2004) Social responsibility for its 
workers has become an important part of companies’ work. Since the 1990s, the 
responsibility for providing social infrastructure and social welfare has passed from 
the former state enterprises to local municipalities, which are still often too weak to 
take full responsibility. So, today, companies still have to compensate for what public 
policy fails to provide (Sodor and Jarvela, 2007: 16). 
Since the early 1990s, the Russian forest sector has been undergoing a transition from 
a top-down control-and-command system to a market economy. The structure of the 
forest sector was affected by privatisation of the forest industry, liberalisation of 
prices and the gradual opening of borders to international trade. However, the Russian 
forest management and utilisation system has inherited a lot of elements of the Soviet 
system. The state is the owner of forest land in Russia4 and forestry planning is 
administered by the state (state companies for forest management - lesoustroitelnye 
predpriyatiya). 
                                                 
4
 Forest Code of the Russian Federation 2006, Article 8 
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The post-1991 liberalisation of the economy caused very heated debates about forest 
ownership in Russia. Different legal frameworks worldwide take different stands 
towards forest property rights. The Russian legal system and in particular forest 
legislation have traditionally been designed according to the German civil law pattern, 
and the trend towards a big role of the state was only strengthened in the Soviet 
period. However, due to changing political situations and power relations, these issues 
have re-emerged on the agenda. 
In the post-Soviet era, it is not only the state that initiates change. Private companies, 
NGOs, as well as supra-governmental organisations have started to play a noticeable 
role and introduce new institutions of corporate responsibility, forest certification, 
model forests, foreign forest management practices and visions of sustainability. The 
results of both state and non-state activities aimed at reforming the forest sector are 
debatable and yet to be seen. 
It is this tight connection of the forest sector with other areas of socio-economic, 
political and cultural life that makes it necessary to explore the nature and patterns of 
societal transformation if one is to understand changes in the forest sector.    
Theoretical Context 
Since institutional changes in the forest sector are inextricably linked to the general 
socio-economic and political trends in Russia5, it is valuable to provide the context of 
theories of societal change. These are theories which, often under the general 
framework of ‘agency and structure’, consider the interaction of individuals, different 
social groups, and the state. The role of these entities in the process of societal change 
is analysed using different analytical frameworks. Some emphasize the role of 
individual action (Weber), others focus on economic (Marx), ideological (Durkheim), 
political, power and discursive (Habermas; Bourdieu; Foucault) structures that shape 
individual action. Some later theories tend to integrate these two perspectives on 
                                                 
5
 Such as the Big Bang reforms implemented in the early 1990s on the advice of Harvard and Chicago 
economists, which included radical price liberalisation and mass privatisation at a ‘breathtaking pace’ 
(Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny et al, 1993: 180) with the aim of depoliticising the economy – the model 
promoted by Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny, Sachs et al (see e.g. Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny et al, 1993; 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
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agency-structure relations (Granovetter; Becker; Mahoney and Snyder; Hodgson). 
However, the ‘structure-agency’ paradigm of major Western sociological models, if 
taken alone, due to its ahistoricity and generality, cannot provide explanations for 
complex interaction of agency and structure. Hence, an institutional framework is 
applied. Theories that analyse change specifically in terms of institutions usually work 
either with the concept of path dependence (North (2005); Ostrom (2000); Pierson 
(2000); Greener (2005)) or path creation (Crouch and Farrell (2004); Ebbinghaus 
(2005); Schneiberg (2006)). The concept of path dependence identifies the sources of 
persistent ineffective institutions. The path creation perspective helps to go beyond 
deterministic conclusions.  
The above mentioned theories are based on several approaches. Within the political 
economy approach, the focus is on power relations of political and economic actors in 
society. Herein, some theories advocate a special role of the state as a pool of 
resources and a possible driver of change (Chang (1997, 2002); Evans, Rueschemeyer 
and Skocpol (1985); other theories promote the growing importance and potential of 
non-state governance (Leach and Scoones (1999, 2003); Edwards and Hulme (1995, 
1999); Edwards (2001); Clark (2001); Scott (1990); Vira and Jeffery (2001); Agrawal 
and Gibson (1999); Cashore, Auld, Bernstein and Newsom (2007)). These theories 
address the questions: Where do the structural obstacles to institutional change come 
from? Who initiates the process of institutional innovation and why?  
Despite its power, the institutional perspective is not necessarily able to provide 
insights into interaction of humans and nature, one of the major reasons being the 
highly economistic and individualistic nature of many recent institutional studies 
(e.g., the New Institutional Economics). Environmental approaches (e.g., human 
ecology and political ecology) recognise the inextricable link between the social and 
the natural in the process of institutional change. 
The above mentioned frameworks of embedded agency (structure vs agency) and path 
dependence (or path creation) are useful for understanding the ongoing processes in 
the Russian forest sector. However, to my knowledge, these concepts have not been 
used to analyse forest reforms in Russia yet.  
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Perceptions of the Russian case sometimes differ in the West and in Russia itself. 
Therefore, it is necessary to compare Western and Russian views on institutional 
change. We believe that a comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic and political 
reality in Russia that encompassed the above mentioned approaches may contribute to 
a clear understanding of the challenges of modernization that the forest sector is 
facing today. 
Research Question 
The main research question of the thesis is: How and why do institutions change in 
the Russian forest sector?  
This question is answered by examining the process of development of formal and 
informal institutions, with a specific focus on how institutional innovations come into 
being, what prevents certain institutions from coming into being, and what makes 
certain factors determinant for particular trajectories of development in the forest 
sector. 
In order to address the main research question, this study aims to provide a 
comprehensive description of major social, economic, political and environmental 
processes in the Russian forest sector today as a result of both the state forest reform 
and various actions of non-state actors, as well as an analysis of obstacles to 
institutional change. We consider in separate sections the following parallel 
processes: 1) forest reform carried out by the state since 20006; 2) model forests and 
3) voluntary forest certification – the latter two advanced mostly by NGOs and private 
companies. The first two chapters provide the conceptual and analytical framework 
and refer to the relevant sociological and institutional theories. The research question 
is placed within the regional and historical context. Major development patterns of the 
Russian forest sector are set out. The discussion moves from general sociological and 
                                                 
6
 On the 17th of May 2000, the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin signed the decree № 
867, which dissolved the Federal Forestry Service (Rosleskhoz) and the State Committee for 
Environmental Protection, and delegated their functions to the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia.  
According to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 12th 2008 № 724, the 
Ministry of Natural Resource of the Russian Federation was transformed into the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation. Control of Specially Protected Natural Areas of 
federal importance was delegated to the Ministry. 
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institutional analysis of structure, agency and natural environment to the Russian case 
and the case of forestry in particular – history of the Russian forestry and state-society 
interaction (as a larger context for studying forestry development).  
In chapters five through seven, the recent institutional development is studied; data 
collected during fieldwork in different parts of Russia is presented and analysed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: LOCATING ENVIRONMENT IN SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY 
To understand how institutions change in the Russian forest sector, one needs to turn 
to theories of societal change. There are two important points one should make here. 
First, society provides a broader socio-economic and political context for changes in 
the forest sector. Development of the forest sector is closely linked to social, political 
and economic changes in the country. The latter are, in turn, predetermined, to a great 
extent, by the nature of interaction between individual and society. Traditional 
sociology is able to provide deep insights into environmental issues and problems of 
natural resource management, for it helps understand human behaviour and the 
incentives behind it. The analysis below starts with classical sociology and different 
approaches to the opposition ‘individual–environment’, where, roughly speaking, the 
individual stands for agency and the environment for structure.  
Second, the interplay of human actors and the social environment is necessary but not 
sufficient, due to its anthropocentrism, to fully explain changing interactions between 
humans and nature (Hardin, 1998: 683). One needs to make a move from the 
‘sociology of environment’ to ‘environmental sociology’ and include nature into the 
system ‘individual-environment’. One needs to use classical sociology as a platform 
and move further from environment in a strictly sociological sense to environment as 
‘ecology’ (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997: 22). The notion of environment needs to 
be extended to include both the social and the natural components. The ‘individual–
social environment’ framework of analysis needs to be replaced by the ‘individual–
social environment–natural environment’ paradigm (for studies that link issues of 
society and forestry see e.g. Leach (2008); Fairhead and Leach (1997); Leach, Mearns 
and Scoones (1999); Sivaramakrishnan (1995); Eckersley (1992); Johnson and 
Forsyth (2002)). This ‘societal-environmental dialectic’ is a complex one, for nature 
appears both as an ‘actor’ shaping social environment and individuals and also as 
‘environment’, which is being affected by individuals and social norms. Individual, 
nature and society co-evolve and present interdependent parts of one whole.  Analysis 
of changing nature resource management has to take into consideration the fact that 
physical environment, social organisation and individual behaviour interact in a 
reciprocal way. 
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In the chapter below, we shall follow how traditional sociology (within different 
schools of thought) reflects on issues of structure and agency and also how it is 
elaborated to encompass societal-environmental relations. Authors and schools are 
discussed in the following order: We start with Max Weber, Karl Marx and Emile 
Durkheim - as the fathers of modern social thought - and then move on to later 
theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Juergen Habermas and Michel Foucault. Lastly, we 
consider theories that attempted to integrate the perspectives of the above mentioned 
researchers. 
1.1 ‘Methodological Individualism’ 
One of the most prominent social theorists who emphasized the dichotomy ‘society-
individual’ and discussed the degree of and limitations to individual freedom and 
ability to have one’s own motives and make independent decisions, was Max Weber. 
Max Weber introduced the framework of ‘interpretative understanding’, or 
‘methodological individualism’. Within this framework, an individual is regarded as 
part of various social systems and collectivities, such as states, state bureaucracy, 
associations, business corporations, foundations, etc. In this sense, Weber certainly 
admits the existence of social structure:  
‘The subjective interpretation of action must take account of a 
fundamentally important fact. These concepts of collective entities ... have a 
meaning in the mind of individual persons, partly as of something actually 
existing, partly as something with normative authority. ... Such ideas have a 
powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on the course of action of real 
individuals.’ (Weber, 1978: 14) 
An individual is opposed to social collectivities, and Weber’s emphasis is rather on 
individuals. The above mentioned collective social entities are regarded as ‘modes of 
organisation’ and outcomes that result from ‘particular acts of individual persons’.  
‘Action in the sense of subjectively understandable orientation of behaviour 
exists only as the behaviour of one or more individual human beings. ... both 
for sociology in the present tense and for history, the object of cognition is 
the subjective meaning-complex of action.’ (Weber, 1978: 13) 
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Individuals are considered as the only agents of action (Weber, 1968: 13). Society is 
regarded as a process of human interaction, where human beings act in a maximising 
behaviour.  
Weber’s perspective was applied later on by researchers to different areas of societal 
development and had a particularly significant impact on environmental sociology 
and studies of societal change as related to natural resources. Raymond Murphy 
(1994, 2002) established a neo-Weberian environmental sociology (‘ecology of social 
action’), which represented a ‘trend away from systems sociology to human-agency 
sociology’ (Murphy, 1994:  688).  
‘Environmental problems created by humans constitute a poignant 
illustration of spontaneous human actors unintentionally unleashing 
dynamic processes that trap them, namely, the systemic processes of nature.’ 
(Murphy, 2002: 74)  
Following Weber, Murphy admits the causal significance of non-social factors for 
social processes and gives an important place to ‘creative voluntary action in 
determining outcomes’ (Murphy, 2002: 73). Murphy extends Weber’s theory of social 
action to analyse cultural change in relation to environmental problems.  
According to Weber, ‘action is social insofar as its subjective meaning takes account 
of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course’ (Weber, 1978: 4).  
‘Social action ... may be oriented to the past, present, or expected future 
behaviour of others ... The others may be individual persons, and may be 
known to the actor as such, or may constitute an indefinite plurality and may 
be entirely unknown as individuals’. (Weber, 1978: 22) 
Murphy elaborates on this definition of social action and uses it to explain the turn of 
societal thinking towards environment:  
‘In practice, however, the needs of future generations have not been taken 
into account in this generation’s own consumption. Those needs have not 
promoted saving, in particular of the environment, by the present generation. 
Up to now, humans have been oriented only to present and past humans. ... 
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Social action does not have to be oriented only to immediate others in space 
or in time. It can also be oriented to future others...’ (Murphy, 2002: 87-88) 
Another interpretation of Weber’s work in relation to natural environment has been 
offered by Melissa Leach, Ian Scoones and James Keeley. They argue that Weberian 
perspective on society provides an insight into existing weaknesses and difficulties of 
natural resource management. They argue that a new, in essence Weberian approach, 
should be applied to make the community-based natural resource management more 
effective. 
‘Actors involved in the policy process – whether field-level extension 
workers or senior officials in ministries – are seen to have a degree of 
discretion and choice in their actions, although their actions are perceived as 
occurring within socially embedded networks and cultural settings.’ (Keeley 
and Scoones, 2003: 34) 
They criticise structural and functionalist approaches and emphasize ‘actors, action 
and agency’.  Communities are considered as ‘people who actively monitor, interpret 
and shape the world around them’, although they are constrained by structures, rules 
and norms around them. Actors are believed to have the potential to ‘change the 
system and perhaps, in time, remake new rules’ (Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 1999: 
230-231). It is argued that in order to improve community-based natural resource 
management, policies should move away ‘from generalized community support’ 
towards ‘far more explicit partiality’ and recognising differential interests of 
individual actors (Ibid: 241). 
While the Weberian framework serves to study the role of individuals, the 
structuralist approach brings to light the context of action and limitations of agency. 
1.2. Structuralism 
Materialist Structuralism 
Karl Marx employs a structuralist approach and puts an emphasis on the social 
environment of individuals and socio-economic structure as a source of 
transformation. Relations of production are argued to constitute ‘the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
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superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness’ 
(Marx, 2003: 425). For Marx, economic structure of society, material production and 
material conditions (‘the social being’) predetermine the nature of individuals and 
their actions (the ‘consciousness of men’). Social life is considered to be nothing else 
but a material production process (Marx, 1977, 2003). 
‘… if it is man as already living in some form or other of society … then it 
is necessary to begin by describing the specific character of this social man,  
that is the character of the community in which he lives because its 
production – the process that enables him to earn his living – already 
possesses a certain social character.’ (Marx, 2003: 629) 
Marx leaves no room for human agency and argues that individuals are by no means 
free to choose a particular form of their society, but rather ‘enter into definite 
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will’ (Marx, 2003: 425). The 
structure, i.e. socio-economic system of material production, determines all. 
According to Marx, it is not individuals but social classes (wage-labourers, capitalists 
and landlords (Marx, 2003: 386, 544)) that exist:  
‘The individual and isolated hunter or fisher ... belongs to the insipid 
illusions of the eighteenth century.’ (Marx, 2003: 380) 
The social reality, as interpreted by Marx, is not a sum of individual wills and 
personalities, but rather a primarily economic structure with institutions that constrain, 
shape and predetermine individual human interests and incentives. 
The place of nature in the Marxist work is not an unambiguous one. On the one hand, 
Marx describes nature as something to be appropriated by men and as merely a means 
of production and satisfaction of men’s needs (Marx, 2003: 383, 629-630). 
‘That man’s physical and intellectual life depends on nature merely means 
that nature depends on itself, for man is a part of nature. … Life itself 
appears merely as a means to life.’ (Marx, 2003: 89-90) 
On the other hand, Marx recognises the inextricable link and material exchange 
between nature and human beings, dependence of men on nature:  
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‘The worker can create nothing without nature, the sensuous exterior world. 
It is the matter in which his labour realizes itself, in which it is active, out of 
which and through which it produces.’ (Marx, 2003: 87) 
Hence, the relationships between environmental studies and Marx’s work are diverse. 
At one extreme, there are environmental sociologists who agree that Marx’s thought 
is anti-ecological and indistinguishable from Soviet practice and ideology and 
exploitation of nature and distance themselves from Marxism. Murphy (1994) points 
to the ecological problems of socialist countries in the 1950s to 1980s as evidence for 
the fact that the essence of Marxism has been the disregard of the environment and a 
posture of dominion over the natural world. 
At another side of the spectrum, environmental sociologists have an affinity to 
Marxism. It is caused partly by the fact that environmental sociology and Marxism 
both tend to be critical of prevailing capitalist institutions and social arrangements. 
Partly, it is caused by the circumstance that both frameworks are materialist – they 
both emphasize that understanding of human life requires uncovering of material 
substratum of societies (Dunlap, Buttel, Dickens et al, 2002). Another uniting factor is 
that Marx placed alienation of the worker not only from the product of one’s labour 
and from the act of production inside labour, but also alienation from nature, at the 
centre of his theory (Marx, 2003: 90; Dickens in Dunlap, Buttel and Dickens et al, 
2002). Capitalism divided practical knowledge (including knowledge of nature) from 
abstract knowledge, placing the latter in the hands of scientists and managers and, 
thus, marginalising popular knowledge (Dickens in Dunlap, Buttel and Dickens et al, 
2002). 
Moreover, Marx stands as a significant contributor to ecological perspective. An 
article focussing on Marx’ ecological contribution and advocating the relevance of 
Marxist theory for environmental sociology was written by Foster (1999). Foster 
argued that Marx’ views (‘historical-environmental-materialism’) took into account 
the coevolution and ‘metabolic relation’ of nature and human society and that Marx’s 
theory of metabolic rift offered important foundations for environmental sociology: 
‘Neglected but crucial elements within Marx’s social theory offer firm 
foundations for the development of a strong environmental sociology. [In 
his later work, Marx] provided his systematic treatment of such issues as 
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soil fertility, organic recycling and sustainability... and in which we find the 
larger conceptual framework, emphasizing the metabolic rift between 
human production and its natural conditions.’ (Foster, 1999: 370) 
Foster sought to demonstrate that Marx provided a ‘powerful analysis of the main 
ecological crisis of his day’, namely the problem of soil fertility within capitalist 
agriculture, the antagonism of town and country, and the necessity of ecological 
sustainability.  
Idealist Structuralism 
Similarly to materialist structuralists, Emile Durkheim also accepts the opposition 
‘individual–society’. For Durkheim, the dichotomy of structure and agency reflects 
the dualism of human nature and its social conditions. However, unlike materialist 
structuralists, Durkheim regards human beings as bio-social beings and differentiates 
between two aspects of their psychic life: the personal (human body with its passions 
and egoistic tendencies); and the impersonal (ideas, rules of morality and concepts 
shared with a plurality of people and obligatorily imposed by society upon the 
individual) (Durkheim, 2005: 36 - 39). For Durkheim, society is a reality ‘sui 
generis’, which, due to its collective nature, has characteristics that are different from 
those of individuals that constitute this society: 
‘As the association is formed it gives birth to phenomena which do not 
derive directly from the nature of the associated elements. ... Social facts are 
in a sense independent of individuals and exterior to individual minds.’ 
(Durkheim, 1974: 94-96) 
Durkheim emphasizes that society is more than the sum of its parts and has its own 
nature and interests, which may differ from interests of individuals that constitute the 
society. He develops an argument that social facts are not reducible merely to 
individuals or their psychology.  
At the same time, Durkheim acknowledges that ‘individuals are the only active 
elements’ (Durkheim, 2005: 35) in social life and that an individual is an ‘autonomous 
centre of activity’ (Durkheim, 1972: 195). Durkheim views the historical development 
of human society from traditional to modern as a process of ‘individuation’, i.e. 
 16 
gradual development of individual rights, ideas, and personality (Ibid: 195). 
Nevertheless, individual action continues to be structured by the social environment: 
the consciousness of individuals is ‘of social origin’; it is penetrated and produced by 
the society (Durkheim, 2005: 35). The ‘conscience collective’ is not completely 
eradicated, but rather transforms into other ideals, such as the ‘cult of the individual’. 
The individual remains ‘in some respect himself the product of the state’, for the state 
institutes rights of the individual (Durkheim, 1972: 196). 
Emile Durkheim brings the political aspect of societal structure (‘political society’ 
and the state) into the debate. According to Durkheim, an important factor of the 
individual–society interaction is the political regime and the form of government, 
namely whether the ‘government consciousness’ is isolated from or close to the rest of 
the society:  
‘The closer communication becomes between the government consciousness 
and the rest of society, and the more this consciousness expands and the 
more things it takes in, the more democratic the character of the society will 
be.’ (Durkheim, 1986: 59) 
Durkheim’s understanding of sociology and his notion of ‘social facts’, whereby ‘the 
determining cause of a social fact must be sought among antecedent social facts’ 
(Durkheim, 1982: 134-135) (and hence the implied refusal to relate social reality to 
any other factors, be it individual consciousness or bio-physical phenomena), put his 
work in opposition to environmental sociology. Durkheimian sociology contributed 
rather to a socio-cultural deterministic approach. 
Nevertheless, some researchers regard the views of Durkheim as insightful for 
explaining human-natural relations. Thus, Durkheim’s theory found further 
development in the work of William R. Catton, one of the most influential 
Durkheimian environmental sociologists, and Frederick H. Buttel, who argued that 
Durkheim’s work (in particular, Division of labour in Society) to a great extent 
provided basis for macrosociological analysis of the relationships between societies 
and their natural environment (Catton and Dunlap, 1978; Dunlap, Buttel, Dickens et 
al, 2002). 
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‘Constructivist Structuralism’   
Pierre Bourdieu proposes not so much an economic or political (as Marx and 
Durkheim do), but rather an anthropological perspective on society and constructs a 
theory of social space. 
‘The social world can be represented as a space (with several dimensions) 
constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution 
constituted by the set of properties active within the social universe in 
question, i.e. capable of conferring strength, power within that universe .... 
Agents and groups of agents are thus defined by their relative positions 
within that space.’ (Bourdieu, 1985: 723-724) 
He distances himself from Marxism and insists that ‘there has to be a break with the 
economism that leads one to reduce the social field, a multi-dimensional space, solely 
to the economic field, to the relations of economic production’ (Bourdieu, 1985: 723). 
Bourdieu argues it is not social classes that exist, but rather social space, in which 
agents are distributed according to their economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 
1989: 21).  
Bourdieu argues that reality should be understood not only as substances (individuals 
and groups), but also as, often unseen, relations (Bourdieu, 1989: 15). He defines 
social groups on the basis of their habitus, which, unlike social positions and 
practices, cannot be observed directly. Habitus is a certain ‘logic of practice’, which is 
learned by actors unconsciously and guides their future behaviour. For Bourdieu, 
agents are self-interested, strategic actors who ‘construct their vision of the world’, 
but under structural constraints (Bourdieu, 1989: 18). He considers the ‘structure-
agency’ dichotomy in a dialectical way, where both elements have equal weight. 
Objective structures form the basis for subjective representations of agents, and at the 
same time, subjective representations ‘must also be taken into consideration 
particularly if one wants to account for the daily struggles, individual and collective, 
which purport to transform or to preserve these structures’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 15).  
Bourdieu refers to his work as ‘constructivist structuralism’ or ‘structuralist 
constructivism’ and shows that external structures are internalised in the mental 
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structures of agents and, hence, in their behaviour; whereas interactions of actors are 
externalised into the social relationships in the field (Bourdieu, 1989: 14). 
Bourdieu analyses the process of social change in terms of ‘symbolic power’ (i.e. the 
power of world-making through words) and ‘symbolic struggles’. Differences in the 
‘symbolic capital’ of actors form a basis for ‘symbolic struggles’: ‘both the individual 
struggles of everyday life and the collective, organized struggles of political life’. 
These are struggles for the ‘production and imposition of the legitimate vision of the 
social world’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 22; Bourdieu, 1985: 723). Objective relations of 
power reproduce themselves in relations of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1989: 21). 
The problem of social reproduction is placed at the forefront of Bourdieu’s research. 
Agents act in order to reproduce existing structures. So, a social change would imply 
not only change of the objective ‘structure’, but also change in actors’ habitus, their 
cultural capital, behaviour preferences and ways in which power is produced. 
Bourdieu’s approach to the structure-agency problems was later employed to the 
study of mankind–nature interaction. Thus, Paul McLaughlin (2001) made an effort to 
develop a framework that would integrate structure, agency and environment. 
‘An ecology of social action’ ‘merges organizational ecology and resource 
mobilization theory’s insights into structure-environment interactions with 
constructivists’ attention to agency, language, culture and power. The 
concept of a socially constructed adaptive landscape is put forward as a 
central metaphor for linking the ecological and constructivist traditions.’ 
(McLaughlin, 2001: 12) 
Whilst analysing the ‘co-evolving cultural understandings, organisational forms, and 
resource constraints’ (McLaughlin, 2001: 24), the author aimed to merge the 
structuralist tradition of Marx and Durkheim with the subjectivist paradigm of Max 
Weber. 
James Keeley and Ian Scoones (2003) draw on Bourdieu’s theory of practice and 
agency to study environmental policy change. They reject the more structural 
frameworks traditional for political economy literature with its focus on interest 
groups and ‘policy communities’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 31). They argue that 
‘expressions of agency through repeated practice may result in both intended and 
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unintended outcomes’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 34). The latter has serious 
implications for policy-making, for it questions the possibility of ‘predictable, 
rational and linearly planned intervention or policy-making’ (Ibid: 34).  
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and symbolic power was also applied to studies of 
conflicts around natural resources (see e.g. Sivaramakrishnan (1995) on Indian 
colonial forestry). The notions of symbolic struggle and symbolic power served as 
tools to explain the dialectical relationships between cultural constructions of nature 
and historical circumstances in which human agents are placed; ‘articulation of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses’ of forests (official discourse and 
discourse of resistance) (Sivaramakrishnan, 1995: 33); relations of power and how 
they lead to creation of different systems of meanings and certain ideologies, as well 
as how these ideologies are then turned into ‘hegemonic structures’. 
While structuralism deals with limitations of individual agency, several other major 
theories (as elaborated below) draw attention to the close interrelation of structure and 
agency. 
1.3 Theory of ‘Communicative Action’ 
A new, political step in the subjectivism–objectivism, or structure–agency debate 
found reflection in the writings of Juergen Habermas. Habermas rejects the above 
mentioned dichotomies and ‘conceives of society simultaneously as a system and as a 
lifeworld’ (Habermas, 1989: 165-166). The structure is represented by the state, and 
the lifeworld is what Habermas calls the ‘public sphere’, or a ‘sphere of non-
governmental opinion making’, a ‘sphere of private individuals assembled into a 
public body’, a space for critical discussion open to everyone (Habermas, 1974: 52). 
‘The public sphere as a sphere which mediates between society and the state, in which 
the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion...’ makes possible the 
democratic control of state activities (Ibid: 50). The state and the public sphere do not 
overlap, but rather confront one another (Ibid: 49). The public sphere is a way to 
counterbalance the state power through mass media and free critical discourse.  
Habermas puts an emphasis on the human factor and calls for a transformation of the 
very nature of power in society. He insists that power should be acquired through 
‘communicative action’ (Habermas 1974; 1975), in conditions when proceedings have 
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been made public. At the centre of analysis are the concepts of an ‘individual’s 
competence in speech and action’, ‘ideal speech situation’ and rationality (Habermas, 
1975: 294). Habermas proposes communicative action and self-governance as a non-
oppressive method of social change instead of revolutions and class struggle. This 
mode of social change is only possible if institutions do not manipulate the individual, 
but rather are shaped by open public discussion.  
It is noted that the very concepts of public sphere (as a space outside of control of the 
state) and public opinion emerged only in the XVIII century. This culture replaced the 
previous European form of publicity: representation of authority performed by 
monarchs and nobility (Habermas, 2005: 7; Habermas, 1974: 50). Habermas 
emphasizes how certain historical conditions (different stages of capitalist 
development) can trigger formation of the new discursive public sphere, where 
communicating citizens are engaged in a rational-critical discourse, and, thus, change 
the role and potential of individual.  
However, certain conditions can result in deterioration and distortion of the public 
sphere in an industrially advanced mass democracy in the form of the social welfare 
state: commercialisation of mass media, consumerism, passive attitude, blurring of 
boundaries between private and public (‘mutual infiltration of public and private 
sphere’ (Habermas, 2005: 141)), the lifeworld and the system. Habermas admits that 
today the public sphere is weak, and the structure is predominant. The outcome of the 
battle between structure vs individual agency (‘between critical publicity and one that 
is merely staged for manipulative purposes’ (Habermas, 2005: 235)) is unknown yet. 
Habermas’ critical theory and his defence of the competent and independently 
thinking individual has been a basis and inspiration for a whole civil society debate 
later on, as well as numerous studies of democracy and the relationship between state 
and society. The latter discussion about society and state finds significant elaboration 
in the works of Mark Granovetter and Gary Becker.  
Granovetter, the ‘father’ of the social embeddedness concept, stresses the importance 
of finding an appropriate middle ground between two exteme views on drivers of 
human behaviour, namely rationality and freedom of decision-making on the one 
hand and embeddedness of decisions within social relationships on the other.   
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‘Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do 
they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular 
intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts 
at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of 
social relations.’ (Granovetter, 1985: 487) 
Along the same lines, Becker notes that the concept of an independent, rationally 
thinking individual can be useful for the analysis at the micro level, whereas macro 
analysis of group behaviour should take into account limitations of the rational choice 
and structural factors, such as ‘technologies and other determinants of opportunities, 
equilibrium in market and non-market situations, and laws, norms, and traditions’ 
(Becker, 1993: 402). Herewith, Becker emphasizes several crucial factors for the 
analysis of institutional development: individual as a relatively independent agent; 
available technological and material resources; pre-existing formal and informal 
institutions that are already in place; and current economic situation. 
The theory of communicative action has been extensively applied to the studies of 
environmental policy and development; authors (e.g., see Skollerhorn 1998; Mathews 
1996) have argued about which political regimes are most adequate for addressing 
environmental issues, and many of them agree that ‘democracy in some form’ is ‘our 
best hope for true environmental sustainability’ (Mathews, 1996). 
Habermas’ work has been criticised by ‘green’ political theorists for its 
anthropocentricity and ‘instrumental rationality’ (see e.g., Eckersley 1990, 1992, 
2004). Robyn Eckersley draws attention to the anthropocentric / ecocentric cleavage 
within emancipatory thought (Eckersley, 1992: 26 - 32) and urges to put emphasis on 
the natural world not in instrumental sense (‘i.e., as the medium for human labour, the 
ground of human activity, and the means of human self-realization’), but as a value in 
itself  (Eckersley, 1990: 740).  
Eckersley (2004) builds on the work of Habermas and explores how the democratic 
constitutional state could be transformed in ways that maintain an optimal relationship 
among civil society, the state and the public sphere. Eckersley regards ecological 
crisis of the modern world as a ‘crisis of participation’ (Eckersley, 1992: 179) She 
insists on a socially and ecologically inclusive approach to democratic decision 
making, or a ‘critical political ecology’ (Eckersley, 2004). 
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1.4 ‘Power Analytics’ 
Michel Foucault proposes a different framework to analysing the nature of society and 
its dynamics. Foucault suggests that the analysis should be not in terms of structure 
versus agency, but focussing on the notion of power, which explains the close 
interrelation of structure and agency, as well as mechanisms of reproduction of 
structure. The exercise of power is defined as the ‘way in which certain actions may 
structure the field of other possible actions’ (Foucault, 1982: 208). Power is analysed 
‘as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the 
form of a chain’: ‘it is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth’ (Kelly, Foucault, Habermas, 1994: 
36). It is conceptualised as a network that is deeply rooted in society and traverses all 
layers of society and all situations of communication. Power relationships represent, 
in a way, societal structure, which defines political, economic and institutional layout.  
‘Power is employed and exercised through a netlike organisation. And not 
only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the 
position of simulatneously undergoing and exercising power. They are not 
only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its 
articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its 
points of application.’ (Ibid: 36) 
This means that power relations (as structure) shape actors’ ability to choose between 
alternative types of behaviour. Importantly, power is considered to be not so much a 
repressive and censoring force, but rather a productive mechanism, which produces 
discourse, desire and knowledge: ‘truth power/knowledge’ (Foucault, 1975).  
At the same time, Foucault stresses the agency, which produces and maintains these 
structures of power. It is micro-powers that are exercised in daily life and run through 
the whole societal body, rather than power of state apparatuses, ideologies or any 
other forms of power. Foucault believes one must ‘eschew the model of Leviathan in 
the study of power’ (Kelly, Foucault, Habermas, 1994: 40), since power is not 
localised in the state (Foucault, 1975). Hence, in order for societal changes to take 
place mechanisms of power ‘outside, below and alongside’ the state apparatus must 
change first of all (Foucault, 1975). 
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Foucauldian theory has found reflection in later studies of environmental policies. 
Thus, James Keeley and Ian Scoones use Foucault’s concepts of discourse and power 
and consider environmental policy making as a discursive phenomenon, and 
individuals as subjects of policy making.  
‘Interests are socially constructed; political conflicts look different 
depending upon where you stand and they change as discourses shift. 
Likewise, actors’ agency makes sense only within the context of broader 
narratives and frames of reference.’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 39) 
They argue for a more inclusive environmental policy making process, which would 
give more weight to marginalised voices and make their discourses and narratives 
more powerful (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: 179). 
Political ecology has seen a significant influence of Foucauldian thought. Thus, Tim 
Forsyth (2003) formulated a new agenda for political ecology on the basis of 
Foucault’s social analysis and his concepts of discourse, knowledge and power. 
  
‘Ecological discourses form important structuring devices for environmental 
politics, as well as opposition between state, society and economy.’ 
(Forsyth, 2003: 271) 
 
Forsyth called for more attention to the connection of politics and environmental 
‘truths’, to the ‘hidden politics within the scientific discourses of ecology’ (Ibid: 271). 
He argued that a ‘greater public participation in the formulation of environmental 
science’, rather than ‘simply the access to science’ would help separate politics from 
environmental reality, and to understand how discourses of environmental 
degradation are influenced (Ibid: 271, 278-279). 
1.5 Integrative Approaches and a ‘Resource Model’ 
The recent literature aims to integrate the above discussed approaches (objectivist and 
subjectivist). Researchers tend to unite in their rejection of the dualism 
‘methodological individualism’ vs ‘methodological collectivism’ as reductionist 
approaches (e.g. see for an overview Hodgson, 2004).  
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‘What is required is a framework within which the transformation of both 
individuals and structures can be explained. ... Their co-evolution must be 
examined, without conflating one into another.’ (Hodgson, 2004: 39) 
However, in practice, it is not a simple thing to do. Mahoney and Snyder (1999) 
address the conceptual difficulties of achieving a synthesis of the ‘voluntarist’ (with 
emphasis on choices and strategies of key actors) and ‘structural’ (with emphasis on 
class, sector, world-systemic political economy features) perspectives. 
‘An integrative approach should employ the methodological and theoretical 
building blocks of both. Integrative approaches are defined by use of both 
subjective evaluations of actors and objective conditions as primary causal 
variables; a focus on temporally proximate and remote factors; a 
methodological concern with case-specific and general causes of regime 
change; and an emphasis on multi-level explanations that span micro and 
macro levels of analysis.’ (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999: 10-11)  
It is argued, however, that integrative models often fail to specify the causal weight of 
agential and structural variables and therefore ‘privilege agency and structure 
indiscriminately’ (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999: 21; 24). Besides, integrative models 
often rely on a ‘correlational model’ of causality.  
‘In a correlational model, explanation is achieved by showing an event to be 
a type of occurrence associated or regularly conjoined with specified factors, 
conditions, or state of affairs…’ (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999: 23) 
Instead of the agency- or structure-focused models, Mahoney and Snyder offer a 
‘resource model’, wherein structures are considered as resources and human agency 
as ‘the capacity to appropriate and potentially transform structural resources in a 
self-conscious, reflexive manner’ (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999: 24-25). This framework 
highlights that structure simultaneously enables human agency (by providing tools 
actors use to pursue their goals) and constrains human agency (‘not by obstructing, 
but by making available a finite repertoire of tools for action’, ‘by delimiting the 
range of possible projects’) (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999: 24-25). In the resource 
model, structure and the available range of tools can be potentially modified and 
improved (Ibid: 25). It is emphasized that actors are able to choose how to use 
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structural resources and potentially improve these resources ‘in response to changing 
situations’ (Ibid: 25).  
A ‘resource’ approach is also taken by the Russian Novosibirsk sociological school 
(e.g., Shabanova, 2006): institutions in a society are regarded as a result of agents’ 
activities, who have 1) different interests, and 2) different volume and structure of 
resources (limitations). So, actors are considered not as homogenous or equal, but 
rather as subjects who differ according to resources available to them. The resources 
may include: economic (such as income, savings, professional qualifications, etc), 
political (ability to influence the change of formal-legal rules, choice of state policies, 
etc), administrative (favourable attitude of state officials who issue licences, impose 
bans, make decisions on preferences, government contracts, carry out audits, etc), 
coercive (formal and informal, such as opportunities to use resources of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, or private protection agencies) cultural (business ethics, inclination 
to innovations, responsibility, working culture, legal awareness, value of economic 
activities for the population, etc), and social (goodwill, image in a non-business 
community, inclusion into professional associations and social networks). 
This ‘resource’ model represents a generalisation of previous writings. Thus, as we 
have shown above, Becker (1993) argues basically the same. The model of Mahoney 
and Snyder is better formulated. It highlights the role of all the technological, 
economic, social, political factors and institutional environment as resources. And 
importantly, this model acknowledges the ability of human actors, although being 
affected by those resources, to purposefully transform those. 
Conclusion  
 
The debate about the mode of societal change is to a great extent a debate about the 
opposition of an acting individual and environment (or structure of the world one 
lives in).  The debate starts with a rough dichotomy ‘individual-society’, where 
individual stands for agency, whereas society or state stand for structure that 
constrains agency. The ‘voluntarist’ position (Weber) is that collectivities and social 
structure result from individual action. The ‘structural’ position is that economic 
structure and mode of production (Marx), socially shared ideas and beliefs 
(Durkheim), practices and habitus (Bourdieu), state and political regime (Habermas), 
 26 
power relations and discourses (Foucault) determine individual behaviour. Later on, 
the debate develops to combine these approaches and offer an integrative perspective 
on agency-structure interdependence (Granovetter; Becker; Mahoney and Snyder; 
Hodgson). One arrives at the notion of relatively independent agency: on the one 
hand, the range of possible behaviour patterns of actors is shaped and constrained by 
the available ‘structural’ resources; on the other hand, actors are able to modify and 
improve those political, economic, cultural, technological, etc resources. Structure and 
agency co-evolve. The question ‘How do structure and agency co-evolve?’ is, 
however, left to further studies.  
 
Elements of social thinking such as the concepts of ‘individual’, ‘society’, ‘practice’, 
‘action’, ‘discourse’, ‘social space’, ‘power’, etc have been predominant in the area of 
environment, including research into developments in the forest sector. We believe 
that an integrative approach, which combines micro- and macro-levels of analysis, has 
a potential for providing insights into societal transformation. Therefore, we attempt 
to analyse the core elements of structure (including the state, political and socio-
economic practices, power relations and structure at the level of ‘mentality’), and 
identify sources of potential agency (e.g. amongst non-state actors), i.e. how 
individuals and organisations become engines of change, and how these affect the 
dynamics of structure in the forest sector in Russia. 
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 CHAPTER TWO: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Why Institutions? 
Societal change cannot be explained merely in terms of ‘structure versus agency’. 
This framework leaves unattended some big questions, namely: How do structure and 
agency interact and co-evolve? Under what conditions do agents have an incentive 
and are capable of changing the existing structure and improve its performance? What 
particular individuals or groups, among all members of a society, are in a better 
position to change structure and how do they get into that position? We need a better 
definition and deeper understanding of structure, how it emerges from interactions of 
individuals and through what mechanisms it affects human behaviour. This is where 
an institutional, multidisciplinary perspective may provide valuable insights. See, for 
instance Baland and Platteau (1997) and Ostrom (2000), who address the potential of 
agency and attempt to identify key factors that affect the likelihood of successful 
collective action7.  
 
Over the last three decades, the institutional perspective has been developing mostly 
within a framework of the new institutional economics (NIE). The NIE research has 
mainly focussed on two issues: the determinants of societal structure (‘institutions’, 
i.e. formal and informal rules that shape human behaviour) (Williamson, 2000) and 
impact of institutions (via property rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Libecap, 
1994) and transaction costs (Coase, 1937)) on economic performance and well-being 
(Alston, 2008). 
 
In relation to natural resource use and environment, Gary Libecap’s work on the 
institutions of property rights has been very influential.8 Libecap examines how 
                                                 
7
 Elinor Ostrom (2000) challenges the view of Mancur Olson (2001) and defends the ability and 
propensity of actors to cooperate in certain institutional, cultural and biophysical contexts. The results 
of Ostrom’s institutional studies, unlike purely structure-agency research, have important practical 
policy implications: ‘Increasing the authority of individuals to devise their own rules may well result in 
processes that allow social norms to evolve and thereby increase the probability of individuals better 
solving collective action problems.’ (Ostrom, 2000: 154) 
8
 In theoretical and empirical literature, four main property rights regimes are discussed in relation to 
natural resource management: no property (open access); common property; state property; and private 
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different property rights are contracted for, how they define the key actors and impact 
on the performance of an economy and resource use. First, ‘property rights 
institutions structure incentives for economic behaviour’. Second, ‘by allocating 
decision making authority, the prevailing property rights arrangement determines 
who are the actors in the economic system’ (Libecap, 1994: 10). In this respect, two 
issues should be mentioned. First, Libecap considers private, voluntary solutions to 
environmental and natural resource issues:  
 
‘The analytical framework is a very microoriented one. It focuses on the 
political bargaining or contracting underlying the establishment of change of 
property institutions, and it examines the motives and political power of the 
various parties involved.’ (Libecap, 1994: 10) 
 
In this sense, Libecap, similarly to other NIE researchers (see e.g., Williamson, 2000; 
Menard and Shirley, 2008), employs an individualistic approach and puts human 
actors with their incentives, intentions, bounded rationality, ‘capacity for conscious 
foresight’ (Williamson, 2000: 601), opportunistic behaviour, mental models and 
different aspects of cognition at the centre of research. The impact of institutions on 
agency has been left largely unregarded. As it has been rightly noted, although the 
NIE scientists claim to adhere to individualist methods, ‘methodological 
individualism is never actually achieved’ (Hodgson, 2004: 22), for ‘the strict and 
narrow methodological individualist has a problem of potentially infinite regress: 
attempts to explain each emergent layer of institutions always rely on previous 
institutions and rules’, which also need to be explained by previous institutions (Ibid: 
21).  
The second issue that needs to be emphasised with regard to Libecap’s and a number 
of other NIE studies is their strong focus on ecomomic concepts and perspectives. The 
                                                                                                                                            
property (for an overview see e.g., Kissling-Näf and Bisang, 2001). There is no consensus on any 
property system per se as a better one than the other regulative systems: the choice of property regime 
must be based on the characteristics of the natural resource under consideration (see e.g. a discussion in 
Bromley 1990). What researchers do agree on is the importance of secure and well-defined property 
rights, no matter what they are (e.g. Deacon, 1999; Alston and Mueller, 2003; Libecap, 1994; Anderson 
and Libecap, 2005; Deacon and Mueller, 2006). 
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NIE researchers analyse institutions and their determinants mostly by the tools of 
economic theory and such concepts as efficiency and distribution (Williamson, 2000: 
595 - 611). The NIE does not abandon the neoclassical economic theory, and works 
around scarcity and competition (Menard and Shirley, 2008). In the words of 
Williamson (2000), the NIE has been primarily concerned with economics of property 
rights / positive political theory (‘formal rules of the game’), as well as transaction 
cost economics (‘play of the game’). It is also well connected to the neoclassical 
economics / agency theory. However, it leaves the ‘social embeddedness level’ of 
social analysis very underdeveloped and considers it as given (Williamson, 2000). 
The ‘social embeddedness level’ comprises informal rules of the game, customs, 
religion, traditional power relations etc. The multiplicity of institutional relations that 
people are engaged in at any time has not yet been taken into account by institutional 
economists properly. As Bowles and Gintis (1993) argue, social science should go 
back from economics to ‘political economy’. The authors emphasize that recent 
studies have focused on the ‘difficulties involved in policing and enforcing the actual 
process of market exchange’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1993: 83). However, ‘there is no 
market, for example, in the quality of work for most occupations. Similarly, there is no 
market in the non-observable risk-taking behaviour of managers. Williamson’s 
assertion that the institutions emerging from a competitive process will be efficient or 
‘transaction cost minimizing’ is equally unsustainable’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1993: 
97). Similarly, Hodgson (2001) argues that it is not only ‘provisioning institutions’ 
(i.e. those ‘directly related to the production, distribution, acquisition and protection 
of the means of everyday life’ (Hodgson, 2001: 308)) that matter and define human 
agency, but also ‘culture9 and other factors’ (Ibid: 309).  
‘Individuals act out their lives in a multiplicity of overlapping institutions, 
perhaps conforming to pervasive cultural attributes.’(Hodgson, 2001: 308) 
These issues have only started to be addressed by historians, social scientists and 
some institutionalists, such as DiMaggio (1997) (analysis of culture and its 
implication for logics of action), Coleman (1987), Putnam (2004) and Dasgupta and 
Serageldin (2001) (studies of social capital, social networks and trust); Bowles and 
                                                 
9
 ‘Culture refers to traits that are prevalent in an entire group or community; while institutions are 
systems of rules that can span multiple, or divide individual, cultural groups.’ (Hodgson, 2001: 297) 
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Gintis (1992), Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999) (issues of power relations among 
economic agents, how power affects the meaning of institutions for different actors; 
and the role of political philosophy in analysing economic relationships); Nee and 
Ingram (2001) (analysis of social networks and their role in production of norms). 
These institutions, which have been mostly neglected by the NIE, define, to a great 
extent, the level and quality of agency and collective action in society. 
Importantly, the narrow focus of new institutionalists on economics makes them 
overlook a number of issues related to the interaction of humans and nature. As it has 
rightly been pointed out, ‘efficiency is consistent with a variety of economic 
transactions that are ethically unacceptable’ (Bromley, 1985: 793). 
For the above mentioned reasons, it is clear that the NIE framework can be used as a 
basis for further studies of social change, however, it needs to be strengthened with a 
comprehensive research of social, cultural, political and historical (path-dependent) 
‘embeddedness’ of human agency. The NIE needs to allow space for ecological 
concepts and perspective.  
The institutional perspective is particularly relevant to the study of forest management 
(see e.g. the studies of Bromley (1985); Deacon and Mueller (2006), who explore the 
significance of political-economic institutions for different types of human behaviour 
in the area of natural resource use10; Gibson, McKean and Ostrom (2000), who 
analyse the ways local institutions modify the effect of factors thought to be the 
driving forces of deforestation11), and especially so in the case of Russia. Since 
reforms of the forest sector have not been successful so far, one needs to find a 
leverage to improve the situation. One needs to understand the causes of failures, 
                                                 
10
 Deacon and Mueller (2006) examine two cases of countries that both used to be rich in forest 
resources – Norway and Nigeria – to demonstrate the effect of different systems of governance on 
resource use. They relate institutions of property rights, rule of law, democratic representation, political 
stability etc to behaviour of economic and political actors (e.g. rent-seeking, violent conflicts, 
inclination to conserve resources etc) and, consequently, to different outcomes for natural resource 
management (e.g. underprovision of public goods, wasteful resource management) and their condition. 
11
 ‘Rare is the market, technological, demographic, political factor that affects individuals without first 
being filtered by local institutions ... The variation of local institutions ... discourages the view that 
template forest policies are likely to work when imposed on a country as a whole.’ (Gibson, McKean 
and Ostrom, 2000: 4 -5) 
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whether it is about lack of agency (e.g., low level of people’s activity or deficit of 
leadership) or about some structural and institutional hindrances (e.g., excess of 
natural resources; location of resources; available technology; current economic 
situation; structure of the state machine; traditions of forest use; existing forest 
management institutions etc). It is important to identify major sources of agency, 
whether these lie with the state, central government, regional governments, 
bureaucracy, individuals, corporate sector, forest-based industry, contractors, 
communities, the judiciary, non-governmental organizations, conservationists, 
academics, or any other stakeholders. 
It is essential to identify decisive structural institutional factors. Structural factors that 
may possibly determine the range of choices available to individuals and the 
respective transformation of forest management institutions are varied and multi-
level. It is not only about factors mentioned above. In the Russian case, particularly in 
the light of the radical political transformations of the last twenty years, significant 
attention has also to be given to the bearing of politics on forest resource management 
and development of resource management institutions. The question of the state is 
particularly relevant to Russia, since ‘the state was organized there before society, 
and it is the state that has organized society’ (Durkheim, 1986: 60-61). Political 
regime and distribution of power between individuals, state, and different societal 
groups shape particular forms of forest management, degree of public participation, 
etc. 
2.2 Western Political Economy Perspective 
2.2.1 Path-Dependence Theory 
The questions we shall ultimately be looking at in my study are the following: what 
factors influence institutional change12? Why do ineffective institutions persist? 
In the previous chapter, we referred to the social embeddedness concept, as well as 
the structure - agency debate. In the next two sections, let us examine ‘structure’ in 
more detail, namely the role played by socio-economic, political and cultural 
                                                 
12
 For an overview of such studies see, for example, Kleiner, 2004. 
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resources. Path-dependence13 theory serves as a counter to those forms of economic 
theory which posit that interactions between economically rational actors will lead to 
efficient outcomes (North 2005; Pierson 2000) and provides explanation of the widely 
observed phenomenon of persisting suboptimal and inefficient patterns of behaviour.  
A classical definition of institutions belongs to Douglas North, namely institutions as 
‘rules of the game in a society’ (North, 2005). North (2005) explains the occurrence 
and persistence of ineffective institutions through the ratio of benefits to costs and 
changing relative prices of preferences. North’s ideas were later elaborated in 
numerous path dependence studies (for an overview and criticism see Ian Greener, 
2005; Ebbinghaus, 2005). It was demonstrated (Page and Bednar (2006)) that it is not 
only the set of past institutional choices that matters, but also the order in which 
institutions arose. 
The role of path dependence in societal development has been widely elaborated by 
the prominent institutional economist Geoffrey Hodgson (2001). He addresses ‘the 
problem of historical and geographical specificity’ (Hodgson, 2001: 24), which limits 
the explanatory power of general social theories. Hodgson insists that ‘there are 
different types of socio-economic system, in historical time and geographic space’ and 
‘substantially different socio-economic phenomena may require theories that are in 
some respects different’ (Ibid: 354). 
The path dependence theory is blamed for potentially being highly deterministic and 
unable to offer guidance as to how changes of path-dependence may be modelled 
(Crouch and Farrell, 2004: 11) to explain ‘bounded innovation’ (Thelen, 2003). The 
research agenda has changed, and issues of path creation shifted the focus from path 
dependence. Path dependence theory in itself addresses neither the question of 
endogenous capacity for change, nor of how path-dependent development trajectories 
                                                 
13 The concept of path dependence was originally used to describe technological change - how the 
initial choice of technologies limits future options and innovations (Rosenberg, 1994). However, 
organisational and social path dependence have not been sufficiently elaborated yet. The NIE scholars 
have stressed the importance of treating technological and organisational innovation in a combined 
manner (Williamson, 2000).  
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interact with exogenously changing environments (Crouch and Farrell, 2004: 5-6; 
Ebbinghaus, 2005). 
Therefore, the traditional theory of institutional path dependence is extended. It is 
argued that paths may be broken by actors in their efforts to respond to changed 
circumstances. The idea of hidden or dormant alternatives within repertoires already 
available to actors is put forward (Crouch and Farrell, 2004)14. Sources of institutional 
change include not only ‘exogenous shocks or the transposition of logics across 
national systems’, but also endogenous resources. Established paths are ‘littered with 
elements of alternative economic orders and abandoned or partly realised 
institutional projects’, which represent resources for endogenous transformation and 
off-path organization (Schneiberg, 2006). There is sufficient historical evidence that 
alternative paths and fundamental instistutional transformation within a short time 
frame are possible (Schienstock, 2007; Crouch and Farrell, 2004).  
The theory of path dependence has been applied to the case of Russian post-Soviet 
economic development by Hedlund (2005), who argues that history particularly 
matters in the Russian case. He demonstrates that the roots of post-1990 economic 
problems should be sought not only in the Soviet system, but also in Tsarist history. It 
is the path-dependence paradigm that can bridge the gap between the New 
Institutional Economics and empirical studies of the post-Soviet Russia. 
Path-dependence approach has been applied to several studies of forest management 
(Mueller and Alston, 2007). However, this approach has been used only sporadically 
on Russian material. To my knowledge, there are no comprehensive studies of path 
dependence in the Russian forest sector. 
2.2.2 The Role of the State 
In order to understand what resources for institutional transformation are available, 
one needs to examine potential agents of change. In the post-Soviet period, when 
                                                 
14
 For similar research and conclusions see Garud and Karnoe (2001) (In: Path Dependence and 
Creation) and their model of entrepreneurs as embedded path creators: ‘they reject the conventional 
idea of entrepreneurs and innovators as completely original, even exogenous forces; entrepreneurs 
develop along the paths provided by history, but attempt mindfully to depart from it’ (In: Crouch and 
Farrell, 2004: 20). 
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Russian society plunged into liberalisation and welcomed freedom of speech and a 
market economy, there arose a new powerful layer of actors, namely non-state actors. 
However, due to a strong path dependence of Russian society and overwhelming role 
of the state in the pre-1917 and Soviet Russia, the position of state agencies remained 
strong. This prompts one to consider Western studies about the role of state and non-
state actors in institutional development. 
In his seminal work Whither Socialism, Joseph Stiglitz (1994) addressed the 
relationship of market and state in the society, particularly in transitional economies. 
He studied the ‘failures of the neoclassical model’ (Stiglitz, 1994: 197) and pointed 
out that the optimal ratio of market to the state varies depending on the institutional 
set-up and is strongly related to the informational deficiencies in the society.  
It is argued that the state and non-market political and economic phenomena, although 
being largely disregarded by the recent scientific research15, have a great impact on 
institutional diversity in societal systems. This view has been advocated by H.-J. 
Chang who proposed the ‘institutionalist political economy’ (IPE) approach as an 
alternative to the neo-liberal theory of the market and the state.  
‘The Neo-Liberal economists have found it difficult to admit that there are 
many ways for the state to intervene other than through taxes / subsidies and 
public ownership ... The international differences in the mode of state 
intervention is a major source of [institutional] diversity’ (Chang, 1997: 27)  
Institutionalist political economy rejects the assumption of market primacy, brings the 
political aspect back into economics and applies the political economy logic to the 
analysis of the market and the state. Besides, it ‘is also an institutionalist approach, it 
emphasizes the temporal priority of institutions over individuals, and sees institutions 
as not simply constraining individual behaviour, but also as being ‘constitutive of 
individual motivations’ (Chang, 2002: 557). Thus, the IPE allows us to obtain a 
deeper insight into complex market–state–institution relations and into the 
institutional diversity of capitalism.  
                                                 
15
 For an overview of theories of the state see e.g. Hill (1997). 
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The state is perceived not only as a complex element of ‘structure’, or resource, but 
also as an actor (Skocpol, 1985, 2008; Nordlinger, 1981). The state is the ‘continuous 
administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to 
structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also 
to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well’ (Skocpol in Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 7). Skocpol puts forward two analytical strategies 
for bringing the state back in to a prominent place in the studies of socio-political 
change:  
‘On the one hand, states may be viewed as organizations through which 
official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals... On the other hand, 
states may be viewed more macroscopically as configurations of 
organization and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics 
for all groups and classes in society’. (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 
1985: 28) 
The first approach has been developed by the bureaucratic politics literature (Allison 
and Halperin, 1972), which looks at functions and histories of different state agencies; 
how policy emerges from contests between different parts of the state, micro-level 
trade-offs and heterogeneity of bureaucracies. For instance, Lipsky (1983) emphasises 
the critical role of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (i.e. ‘public service workers who interact 
directly with citizens in the course of their jobs’) in the policy process. These ‘street-
level’ bureaucrats have a great impact on people’s lives, for it is them who make 
many redistributive and allocative decisions, who exercise wide discretion in 
decisions about citizens and who have relative autonomy from organisational 
authority. They interpret or ignore instructions, deal with overlapping and 
contradictory directives, and take the initiative in areas where there might be a policy 
vacuum (Lipsky, 1983). 
The second approach to analysis of the state is reflected in the theory of state 
autonomy and state capacity (Skocpol, 1985). State16 autonomy stands for a high 
degree insulation of state structures from specific societal pressures, as well as 
                                                 
16
 Whereby the state is understood as a ‘set of organizations through which collectivities of officials 
may be able to formulate and implement distinctive strategies or policies’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer and 
Skocpol, 1985: 20-21). 
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furthering the nation’s general interests. Different governmental systems may have 
‘‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ tendencies towards autonomous state action’ (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 14). However, ‘state autonomy is not a fixed 
structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go’ (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 14). 
The notion of state capacity is used to signify the ability of the state to change the 
behaviour, and oppose the demands of non-state actors, as well as to pursue specific 
kinds of policies:  
‘There is no reason to assume a priori that the pattern of strength and 
weaknesses will be the same for all policies. One state may be unable to 
alter the structure of its medical system but be able to construct an efficient 
transportation network, while another can deal relatively easy with getting 
its citizens around but cannot get their illenesses cured.’ (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 17) 
Overall, social science regards the state both as an impersonal structure (i.e. as a 
resource to be used by actors) and as a separate actor whose tools and power over 
other agents may vary. Understanding these aspects of state–society–individual 
interrelation is crucial for identifying paths of institutional change. 
2.2.3 The Role of Civil Society 
The nature and role of civil society has been one of the most debated since the work 
of Juergen Habermas (1964, 1975) on the democratic public sphere and 
communicative action; the work of Robert Dahl (1971) on pluralism in policy 
making, as well as studies of the social capital since 1980s (for an overview see 
Putnam, 2004). 
Recent studies have been inspired by global changes of the boundaries between the 
state, civil society and international organisations, as well as emerging opportunities 
for multi-level governance and ‘global citizenship’ (Berkhout, Leach and Scoones, 
2003: 26; Edwards, Hulme and Wallace, 1999: 119). 
Among the most well-known advocates of the civil society movement are Michael 
Edwards and David Hulme. They see an enormous potential for NGOs: ‘society 
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matters, social institutions count, and citizens make a crucial difference to the health 
of the polity and to economic success’ (Edwards, 2001: 1). It is believed that civil 
society can countervail ‘the expanding influence of markets and the declining 
authority of states’; the power may shift from workers to consumers; the erosion of 
national boundaries and development of information technology are providing more 
opportunities for cooperation of civic organisations (Edwards, Hulme and Wallace, 
1999: 119). 
It is emphasized, however, that NGOs themselves must be radically reformed. Civil 
society is characterised by dependance on donors and their subjective preferences as 
to who to support (‘picking winners’); poor level of cooperation and trust among 
NGOs because of competition for resources; low trust to civic groups in the local 
context, as they are associated with foreign interests; and poor accountability 
(Edwards, 2001: 3-4; Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 227; Clark, 2001: 25-26). 
Another direction of civil society research is associated with the name of James Scott 
and his work on domination and resistance. Unlike sociologists before him, Scott 
focuses on what he calls ‘infrapolitics of subordinate groups’, ‘a wide variety of low-
profile forms of resistance that dare not speak in their own name’, the ‘hidden 
discourses’ (Scott, 1990: 19), i.e. not on visible forms of struggle, through political 
campaigns, NGOs, demonstrations, rebellions, mass media conflicts, etc, but rather on 
resistance without protest and without organisation, on daily and often unseen 
struggles, which are ‘like infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum’ (Ibid: 
183). Scott uses the term ‘hidden transcript’ to characterise ‘discourse that takes 
place ‘offstage’, beyond direct observation by powerholders. The hidden transcript is 
thus derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and 
practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript’ 
(Ibid: 4). Scott shows that power relations in a society are more complex than one 
might think and that ‘hidden transcripts’ (which contain critique of power ‘behind the 
back of the dominant’) are produced not only by the weak but also by powerful 
groups (Scott, 1990: xii). 
2.2.4 Non-State Governance for Natural Resource Management  
Civil society and various forms of multi-level governance are particularly fiercely 
debated in relation to environmental issues and natural resource management. In 
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contrast to the state-centred perspective, neo-liberal theories of non-state local and 
global environmental governance have emerged (e.g., ‘glocalisation’ theory of 
Hempel, 1995).  
Non-state governance systems appeared largely as a response of leading 
environmental groups to the ‘crisis of global governance’, ‘crisis of public 
accountability’ and the failure of the world’s governments to reach or implement an 
agreement on global conventions, such as a binding global forest convention 
(Humphreys, 2006). The new governance mechanisms in which non-state actors are 
central are believed to deliver better results in facilitating institutional change and 
sustainable forest management.  
‘NGOs and business are producing new rules that are then adopted by public 
authorities as public standards. In some respects, the state is now a taker, 
rather than the maker, of standards.' (Humphreys, 2006: 215) 
These non-state forms of governance can be roughly divided into three kinds: those of 
civil society including local community-level governance, transnational community 
governance, and business-driven forms of governance, such as forest management 
certification schemes. 
Debates about the potential of state versus non-state actors in forest resource 
management are ongoing. However, recently there has been a distinct trend towards 
favouring community forest management regimes and bottom-up strategies in many 
contexts (see e.g., Pagdee, Kim and Daugherty, 2006; Ribot and Larson, 2005). This 
new perspective on efficient natural resource management emerged on the 
international political agenda in the 1990s. It has attempted to replace the ‘formerly 
dominant conception of environmetal management as a technological process best left 
to professionals’ (Zimmermann and Schmithuesen, 2002: 108). This trend was, to a 
great extent, set by the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the Aarhus Convention of 1998, 
which promoted a participatory approach to environmental decision-making. This 
trend in natural resource management reflects the spreading worldwide belief in 
democracy as a precondition for sustainable development. 
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Participatory Resource Management 
There is an increasing understanding that sustainable development ‘should be based 
on local level solutions derived from community initiatives’ (Leach, Mearns and 
Scoones, 1999: 225). The new ‘participation’ paradigm is largely based on Weberian 
subjectivism and belief that individual actors are ‘capable and ‘knowledgeable’, able 
to devise their own strategies (Geiser, 2001: 20). Top-down projects, it is argued, 
‘have limited potential for transforming existing patterns of social interaction and 
resource use, because they do not relate adequately to local priorities’ (Vira and 
Jeffery, 2001: 1). Community and participation-based natural resource management 
schemes are often preferred by theorists, since they benefit from ‘traditional 
knowledge of the resource’ and ‘existing social structures’ (Vira and Jeffery, 2001: 
1).  
‘It is becoming increasingly clear that local communities both filter and 
ignore the central government’s rules. They also add their own rules, 
generating local institutions – rules-in-use – and patterns of activity that can 
diverge widely from legislators’ and bureaucrats’ expectations.’ (Gibson, 
McKean and Ostrom, 2000: 3)  
There is an extensive body of evidence that individuals voluntarily organise 
themselves in order to create and enforce rules that protect natural resources (Bromley 
and Feeney, 1992). This idea that natural resource management may be more effective 
if one holds negotations between different parties and if decisions are made at the 
lowest appropriate level resulted in a major policy trend of decentralisation and 
devolving control over natural resources from government agencies to user groups 
since late 1980s. The participatory framework of development has been promoted by 
multilateral and bilateral donors in their interactions with national governments (Vira 
and Jeffery, 2001: 1). Many governments have implemented programmes (termed 
community-based resource management or joint management, etc) that shifted 
responsibility and authority from state to non-governmental bodies (for an overview 
see e.g. Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). 
Practical realisation of community-based natural resource management has 
encountered several difficulties, which is related to the complexity of the very notion 
of community and how communities function in reality.  
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First, the concept of community is poorly defined by policy makers. Community 
stands for a ‘small spatial unit’, as well as a ‘homogeneous social structure’ and 
‘shared norms’ (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 629-649). In reality, communities are not 
homogenous entities: ‘gender, caste, wealth, age, origins and other aspects of social 
identity divide and crosscut so-called ‘community’ boundaries’ (Leach, Mearns and 
Scoones, 1999: 230). Besides, every community is different hence the idea of the 
possibility of a universal theory of the commons and applicability of same policies to 
different contexts is rejected (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006: 164; Vira and Jeffery, 
2001: 4). 
Communities develop in a non-linear way. Both social and ecological history plays a 
role in their current dynamics (Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 1999: 230-232). Success 
of non-state governance schemes may require certain preconditions, such as the 
existence of certain institutions or characteristics of the community itself (Meinzen-
Dick and Knox, 1999; Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, 2000). 
Some researchers now take a very cautious stand towards participatory approaches to 
natural resource management. It is argued that the concept of participatory resource 
management can be abused in practice (Geiser, 2001: 28). Certain actors may use the 
concept of participation and sustainability as a tool to ‘reinforce their claims over 
resources’ (Vira and Jeffery, 2001: 5-6). 
A second weakness of participatory approaches to natural resource managament is 
related to the fact that ‘participatory strategies are embedded in a wider network of 
social, political and economic processes’ (Vira and Jeffery, 2001: 12). This implies 
that the ‘adoption of participation involves changes in established practices, and this 
may not be possible without supporting changes at other levels within the system’ 
(Vira and Jeffery, 2001: 12). Single agencies may not simply be able to confront 
established political and socio-economic structures on their own. Political feasibility 
and chances of an institutional change are high only in cases where elites are likely to 
gain from that change (Conroy et al, 2001: 176). This suggests an important 
implication for natural resource management, namely the necessity to carefully 
consider power relations between actors. Existing patterns of power relationships may 
reproduce themselves, despite adopting the participatory rhetoric (Vira and Jeffery, 
2001: 16). 
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Limitations of community-only management schemes make one consider joint natural 
resource management regimes, where responsibility and costs are shared between 
different actors, including local communities and state agencies (Leach, Mearns and 
Scoones, 1999: 237). 
Non-State Market-Driven Governance 
In relation to non-state business-driven forms of governance, particularly in the forest 
sector, a non-state market-driven (NSMD) governance theory has been recently 
developed by Cashore, Auld, Bernstein and Newsom at Yale University with Errol 
Meidinger (2002a, 20002b), and Maria Tysiachniouk at the CISR (St. Petersburg, 
Russia). They elaborated how NSMD governance is distinct from other forms of 
private and public authority17. In the forest sector, NSMD governance is manifested 
by different forest certification schemes.  
Forest certification is believed to be able to compensate for a number of omissions of 
the state governance, since it offers mechanisms to provide the following: 1) 
inclusiveness of a broad range of stakeholders in standard development; 2) strength of 
environmental and social standards; 3) quality of auditing [and thus an instrument for 
effective control and a compliance mechanism]; 4) broad supply side participation 
and demand side penetration (Gulbrandsen, 2004: 83).   
A number of concerns have been raised recently, even by those promoting the NSMD 
theory. Non-state governance has proved to have its own serious limitations and to 
pose some threats. Neoliberal policies, through deregulation and increased private 
                                                 
17
 ‘The most critical feature is that governments do not create or require adherence to these rules... A 
second feature of NSMD governance is that its institutions constitute governing arenas in which 
adaptation, inclusion and learning occur over time and across a wide range of stakeholders.... A third 
key feature is that these systems govern the ‘social domain’ – requiring profit-maximizing firms to 
undertake costly reforms that they otherwise would not pursue. That is, they pursue prescriptive ‘hard 
law’, albeit in the private sphere. This distinguishes NSMD systems from other arenas of private 
authority, such as business coordination over technological coordination, which can be explained by 
profit-seeking behaviour... Another key feature of NSMD governance is the existence of verification 
procedures designed to ensure that the regulated entity actually meets the stated standards... This 
distinguishes NSMD systems from many forms of corporate social responsibility initiatives that require 
limited or no outside monitoring.’ (Cashore, Auld, Bernstein and McDermott, 2007: 161-162) 
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sector investment in forests, are argued to have contributed to deforestation 
(Humphreys, 2006: 214-216). Among dangers that corporate social responsibility and 
voluntary certification schemes pose is their potential incentive to subordinate 
environmental sustainability to profit (despite their ability to contribute to standard-
raising) - ‘commodification of nature’ (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006: 312).  
Disempowered groups continue to have little opportunity to participate in 
governance:  
‘In a world of weak states, deterritorialized action, and concentrated power, 
corporate interests and multilateral organizations can control and reframe 
environmental action as a means to legitimize their model of development’ 
(Ibid: 314). 
The ability of certification systems to address enduring problems of the forest sector 
(where governments have proved ineffective) is also questioned by Cashore, Egan, 
Auld, and Newsom (2007); Cashore, Auld, Bernstein and McDermott (2007). Such 
systems, although having somewhat raised forest management standards, have thus 
far failed to address some of the most pressing and persistent forestry issues. The real 
implementation and realization of a number of aspects of forest certification vary 
across regions and local contexts (Gulbrandsen, 2004: 96).  
This makes researchers return to the idea of a restoration of a broader range of state 
functions and establishment of powerful publicly accountable bodies that would 
regulate forest use jointly with non-state actors for the common good (Humphreys, 
2006: 234-235). Such schemes as certification do not work other than in conjunction 
with traditional approaches, that is, public policy (Cashore, Auld, Bernstein and 
McDermott, 2007). 
The bottom line of many recent multi-partner governance studies is ‘The state is dead, 
long live the state!’ (e.g., Agrawal and Lemos, 2007). Along with the inevitably 
increasing weight of non-state actors, a strong and well-functioning state is essential 
to define property rights, reduce externalities, and to provide infrastructure and 
legislation to ensure greater competition as well as freer access to information (Ibid: 
43-45).  
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The complexity and multiscalar character of many pressing environmental problems 
does not allow for a one-plane (either state or market) solution to existing issues. It is 
emerging hybrid modes of environmental governance across state–market–
community spheres, such as comanagement [between state and community], public-
private partnerships [between state and market], and social-private partnerships 
[between community and market] that promise positive long-term outcomes for 
natural and social systems. The question of potential state versus non-state (or rather, 
joint state and non-state) contribution to sustainable forest management remains open. 
Despite the fact that the above mentioned institutional theories have offered many 
insights into societal change, they are anthropocentric and, therefore, cannot explain 
many natural environment-related issues. In order to understand the development of 
the forest sector, one needs to turn to an environmental perspective of analysis as 
well. 
2.3 Western Environmental Perspective 
2.3.1 Environmental Sociology 
It is sometimes argued (e.g., Buttel, 2002; Gross, 2002) that classical sociological 
tradition immediately engages with issues related to the relationship between modern 
societies and natural environments they inhabit, and, therefore, is most valuable for 
guiding investigations of environmental problems. Most prominent environmental 
sociology scholars of the late XXth century have been strongly influenced by classical 
sociological theory. Indeed, ‘environmental problems are, after all, people problems, 
for humans cause the problems, are affected by these problems and are ultimately 
responsible for creating solutions to them’ (Dunlap, Buttel, Dickens et al, 2002: viii). 
In this general sense, sociology contributes to a better understanding of human-natural 
relationships. 
However, overall, major sociological theories have focused on other concepts and 
conflicts, such as social class, power, industrialisation, democracy, bureaucracy and 
so on. Except in separate papers (Gross, 2002), sociological theory has failed to 
appreciate the role of the natural environment. Society in relation to ecology began to 
be comprehensively studied only in the 1970s, when sociologists started to recognise 
the importance of environmental issues and initiated research related to the natural 
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environment. The ‘new ecological paradigm’ emerged (Catton and Dunlap 1978, 
1980), which criticised  previous sociological studies for their ‘human-exemptionalist’ 
paradigm, i.e. the idea that humans are exempt from the natural laws by means of 
technology, societal organisation, culture, and so forth. The new, ecological, direction 
of thought intended to stress the importance of an ecological direction to analysis and 
combine it with other disciplines, such as political and economic sociology, and 
demography. Researchers began to realise that the ‘embeddedness of human society in 
nature’ and that ‘ecosystem-dependence is crucial for understanding social action’ 
(Murphy, 1994:  691). One started to explore issues of environmental movements, 
environmental policy formation, politics and power, reciprocal impacts of 
environment and society, local environmental knowledge systems, etc. The claim of 
this new sociology was that ‘reality is both a social construction and a construction of 
nature’ (Murphy, 1994:  704). 
‘Humans construct their sense of reality and their understanding of it. They 
exert an effect on nature by manipulating it according to their goals, and in 
the process unleash unexpected forces of nature and new forms of social-
natural interaction, which affect social action.’ (Murphy, 1994:  704) 
2.3.2 Human Ecology 
One of the most significant conceptual shifts of the institutional paradigm in the 20th 
century was the shift to human ecology (since the 1920s) and political ecology (since 
the 1970s). The importance of including physical environmental and biological 
variables into societal models was realised. The central concept of human ecology 
framework is ‘tragedy of the commons’, the concept introduced by Garret Hardin. 
Hardin argued that the only solution of the problem of growing population and 
concomitant overuse of natural resources is ‘fundamental extension of morality’ 
(Hardin, 1968: 1243) and institutional transformation, which would have to inevitably 
limit individual freedom. In Hardin’s words, human ecology is a ‘conservative’ and 
‘subversive’ science: it aims to conserve natural resources, which is often possible 
only through destruction of traditions, political practices or social privileges (Hardin, 
1985: 469). 
‘A ‘managed commons’ describes either socialism or the privatism of free 
enterprise. Either one may work, either one may fail: ‘The devil is in the 
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details’. But with an unmanaged commons, you can forget about the devil: 
As overuse of resources reduced carrying capacity, ruin is inevitable.’ 
(Hardin, 1998: 683) 
Hardin emphasizes that one has to move away from ‘unmanaged commons’ and 
look into possible ways to organise ‘managed commons’. Human ecology is about 
human and natural interaction and mutual influence. It is about ‘better ways to 
live in balance with the environment’ (Hardin, 1998: 683) in a very broad sense. 
Hence, the human ecological shift in institutional studies called for an even 
broader interdisciplinary synthesis and for integration of ecology, 
environmentalism, health care, economics, population studies, law, political 
science, ethics, geography, psychology, and sociology. 
After Hardin, human ecology framework has been elaborated by a number of schools 
and academics (e.g. the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) 
Research Network; University of Alberta; etc). A significant contribution has been 
made by Elinor Ostrom. Ostrom argues that there can be no universal conclusions 
about the tragedy of the commons, and that the managed commons can be successful. 
She addresses the problem through a study of a wide diversity of institutional 
arrangements that individuals have used to overcome tragedy of the commons 
scenarios (Becker and Ostrom, 1995; Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, 2000). 
The focal point of Ostrom’s and her colleagues’ study is the interaction of natural 
resources and communities at the local level. It is argued that microinstitutional 
solutions and indigenous voices are ‘the remedy for renewable-resource scarcities’ 
(Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, 2000: 57). Ostrom emphasizes the need ‘to shift 
attention away from market- or state-oriented policies as the only two alternatives to 
achieve development or environmental conservation’ (Ibid: 57).  
The emergence and performance of forest institutions at the local level are analysed as 
a function of two sets of factors. The first set refers to the attributes of a resource, 
such as feasible improvement; indicators; predictability; spatial location, terrain, and 
extent (Ibid: 230-233). Thus, for a common property regime to become successful, 
‘the boundaries of the resource must be clear’ (Ibid: 44). 
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The second set of prerequisites refers to attributes of the users of the resource 
including salience; common understanding; discount rate; trust and reciprocity; 
autonomy; prior organizational experience; local leadership; the size of the group and 
the heterogeneity of users (Ibid: 230-233). Users need to have ‘the right, or at least no 
interference with their attempt, to organize… [and] to modify their use rules over 
time’ (Ibid: 43-51). 
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework of Ostrom aims to 
offer a unifying approach for analyzing institutional change. Ostrom seeks to ‘dig 
below the immense diversity of regularized social interactions in markets, hierarchies, 
families, sports, legislatures, elections, and other situations to identify universal 
building blocks used in crafting all such structured situations’ (Ostrom, 2005: 5-6). 
These universal components of the situations human actors face are believed to be 
organized in many layers. In order to analyse these multilevel complex systems, 
Ostrom suggests using Koestler’s (1973) concept of the holon: ‘nested part-whole 
units of analysis’ (Ostrom, 2005: 11), and analyses the holon ‘action arena’ with two 
other holons in it: ‘participants’ and an ‘action situation’. 
However, Ostrom enquires not only into the universal components of all social 
systems, but also into the ‘deeper structure in the grammar of institutions’ and ‘the 
types of rules used to create structure’ (Ostrom, 2005: 8). It is suggested that 
institutional changes occur ‘within a meta set of rules at a collective choice or 
constitutional level’ (Becker and Ostrom, 1995: 123-124). 
‘The meta set of rules may assign different advantages to various 
participants in the rule-changing process. Those with the most voice in 
collective-choice processes may refuse to support a change if they do not 
benefit themselves from the change in rules.’ (Ibid: 123-124) 
This means that in order to explain institutional change, one needs to analyse the 
distributional effects of proposed rules and how these effects relate to the meta 
rules used for making and changing rules. Factors that predetermine institutional 
development are: the relations between the community of individuals involved 
(‘participants’ with their interests and intentions), the natural resource and the 
meta rules for changing rules (‘action situations’).  
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2.3.3 Political Ecology 
Another framework for analyzing the society-nature nexus, termed ‘political ecology’ 
goes back to the 1970s and neo-Marxism. Similarly to human ecology, contemporary 
political ecology looks at the interchanges between nature and local culture, the 
symbolic and the material, ‘the relations between the human society, viewed in its bio-
cultural-political complexity, and a significantly humanized18 nature’ (Greenberg and 
Park, 1994: 1). However, it places a bigger emphasis on power, political economy, 
state, corporate and transnational actors and their influence on environmental policies, 
conflicts and ideologies. Political ecology is meant to substitute classical political 
economy (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997: 22). Martinez-Alier studies ‘ecological 
distribution conflicts’ and environmental movements in relation to international 
development (Martinez-Alier, 2002: 17 ff). He places the environmental struggles of 
the poor against multinational corporations at the focus of attention and disproves a 
common belief that the poor are not concerned with environmental issues. Political 
economy ‘transforms and is transformed by individuals and nature. Nature and 
society are both socially constructed to significant degrees, yet both are determined to 
some extent by what may be glossed as system-like constraints that are neither 
deliberate nor inadvertant products of human purposive activity’ (Greenberg and 
Park, 1994: 1). 
Besides, political ecology attempts to focus both on the local and the global. Its future 
is seen as local ‘ethnographies of nature’ adjusted in accordance with the 
globalisation effects (Biersack and Greenberg, 2006). 
Along the lines of major current theories of societal change, political ecology attends 
not only to constraints of structure but also to indeterminacies of agency and events 
(Biersack and Greenberg, 2006: 4-5). It blends insights from studies of culture, 
history, power relations and nature, but also leaves room for spontaneous individual 
action. 
A significant contribution to political ecology has been made by Arturo Escobar. His 
work ‘acknowledges the constructedness of nature while suggesting steps to weave 
                                                 
18
 The term ‘humanized nature’ is used to highlight that it is the ‘by-product of human 
conceptualizations, activities and regulations’ (Biersack and Greenberg, 2006: 4-5). 
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together the cultural and the biological on constructivist grounds’ (Escobar, 1999: 1). 
Escobar argues that nature has to be understood both as an independent ‘biological 
body’ and also as constructed by humans, a ‘product of culture’ (Ibid: 2-3).  
‘Nature is differently experienced according to one’s social position… it is 
differently produced by different groups or in different historical periods.’ 
(Ibid: 5) 
Within this framework, Escobar analyses conservation of biological diversity as a 
cultural and political discourse, which has been shaped recently by such new social 
actors as NGOs and local ethnic movements (Escobar, 1998: 53-54). Escobar 
differentiates between three major regimes of nature, which coexist, overlap and co-
produce each other in societies: ‘organic nature’ of communities, ‘capitalist nature’ 
of plantations and ‘techno-nature’ of biodiversity and biotechnology researchers and 
entrepreneurs (Ibid: 5-15).  
Despite the fact that political ecology has generally focused on capitalism as the 
reason of environmental degradation and the opposition of society and NGOs against 
industrial or state interests (along Habermasian lines), it has also provided a deeper 
analysis of a broad range of discourses and their complex relationships. 
The above mentioned theories and frameworks have been designed ‘in the West’. One 
can rightfully argue how much of this is based on Western history, way of thinking 
and reality. How many of these concepts and theoretical constructions are applicable 
to the Russian case and how much do they really help explain issues in the Russian 
forest sector, where major Russian ideas, discourses and reforms come from? In order 
to have a fuller picture, one needs to take into consideration theories of societal 
change, as well as human-nature interaction produced in Russia. 
2.4 Russian Perspectives 
One may enquire whether theories created in the West can adequately describe 
developments in Russia, especially in the light of the heavy Soviet legacy and the 
radical post-1991 transformations. We believe it is necessary to present an ‘insider’ 
perspective on the recent, ongoing and future institutional changes. In particular, it 
appears worth examining institutions that have come to the forefront now, over 15 
years after the reform. 
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In this chapter, we shall consider two types of studies of institutional change in 
Russia. The first type of works deals with structural limitations and factors of 
institutional transformation. The second type attempts to formulate mechanisms of 
institutional dynamics and construct models that included agency as one of decisive 
variables. 
In the 1990s, difficulties of economic reforms encouraged Russian researchers to 
revive the work of Douglas North on institutions. The path-dependence theory has 
been constantly elaborated since then. The question ‘Why are inefficient institutions 
sustainable?’ has been applied to the post-Soviet development and answered in 
different ways. One of the most influential concepts has been the ‘institutional lock-
in’ (i.e. persistent inefficient norms of behaviour, e.g. corruption), introduced and 
developed on the Russian material by Victor Polterovich (Polterovich, 1999). While 
drawing on ideas of D. North and W. Arthur, Polterovich explains entrenchment of 
such institutions through the concept of the‘costs of institutional transformation’ and 
several mechanisms, such as effect of coordination, effect of coupling, 
‘sopryazheniye’, and cultural inertia (Polterovich, 1999: 8-11). Overall, Polterovich 
differentiates between three groups of factors that influence institutional emergence 
and development: ‘fundamental’ (available resources and technology; macro-
economic characteristics of the system), ‘organisational’ (laws and instructions that 
are in force) and ‘societal’ (expectations and stereotypes of social interaction) 
(Polterovich, 1999: 6). All these factors are of ‘structural’ nature and do not provide 
much insight into path creation processes. 
Factors that limit institutional change and limitations of such changes have been 
analysed in the framework formulated in the early 2000s by Svetlana Kirdina of the 
Novosibirsk sociological school - the institutional matrices theory. It is mainly based 
on structural functionalism and evolutionary theory paradigms. The theory of 
institutional matrices mostly refers to the theories of K. Polanyi, D. North, K. Marx, 
and East-West cultural opposition. According to Kirdina, an institutional matrix is a 
system / an aggregation of interrelated ‘basic institutions’ in the areas of economics, 
politics, and ideology (socially important ideas and values) (Kirdina, 2001, 2008). 
Society is represented as a structure, or system, where political, economic and 
ideological spheres support and determine one another. The importance of 
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consideration of intrinsic connectedness of the whole and its parts is emphasized for 
any change efforts. 
On the basis of historical observations and empirical research, Kirdina put forward a 
hypothesis about two types of institutional matrices, namely X-matrices and Y-
matrices. An X-matrix is formed by institutions of redistributive economy, unitary 
political order and communitarian ideology with the priority of ‘We’ over ‘I’. An Y-
matrix is formed by institutions of market economy, federative political order and the 
ideology of subsidiarity, i.e. the priority of ‘I’ over ‘We’.  
‘In real-life societies, X- and Y-matrices interact, with one of them 
permanently prevailing. Dominant institutions of the prevailing matrix 
define the nature of society and serve as the framework of performance for 
complementary institutions from the other matrix.’ (Kirdina, 2008: 3)  
According to Kirdina’s classification, institutions of the redistributive economy in the 
X-matrix include: ‘supreme conditional ownership’, redistribution (accummulation, 
coordination, distribution) as a means to transfer goods; cooperation as the main 
mechanism of interaction between economic agents; employed labor as the basis of 
the labour system; and cost limitation as an effectiveness index in the economy. 
Parallel institions in the market economy of the Y-matrix are: private ownership; 
exchange (buying - selling); competition; contract labour; and profit maximization 
(Kirdina, 2008: 4). Political institutions of the unitary political order include: 
administrative division of the state; the governance (and decision-making) system 
being a vertical hierarchical authority with the centre on the top; interactions for 
decision making taking the form of a general assembly and unanimity; governing 
positions are filled by appointment; and the feedback mechanism in the society is 
appeals to higher levels of hierarchical authority. Again, parallel institutions of the 
federative political order of the Y-matrix are: federative structure; self-government 
and subsidiarity; multi-party system and democratic majority; election; and law suits 
(Kirdina, 2008: 4). In the ideological sphere the opposites are: driver of social actions: 
collectivism vs individualism; normative understanding of the social structure: 
egalitarianism vs stratification; prevailing social values: order vs freedom. Russia is 
assumed to have the X-matrix as a dominant one. 
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In our opinion, while analysing the structure of the Russian society in a systematic 
manner, this theory is very useful for understanding interrelationships between 
institutions in the Russian society. We find the analysis of interdependent political, 
economic and ideological spheres quite helpful. However, the institutional matrices 
theory is to a great extent deterministic. It helps to understand why certain institutions 
persist in the Russian society. However, this theory is very general when it comes to 
the most difficult question, namely how to change certain institutions. Kirdina argues 
that the type of institutional matrix ‘only determines a “passage” of the social 
evolution, it does not eliminate the processes of permanent modernization of the 
institutional environment, which are both spontaneous and controllable in character’ 
(Kirdina, 2001).  
Olga Bessonova proposed another structural-evolutionary theory of institutional 
development in Russia, namely the theory of ‘razdatok’, or ‘deal-out economy’. 
‘Russian economy of the Soviet period was not a product of the interruption 
in the natural development towards the market, nor an experiment in 
planning, but it was a logical result of the evolutionary development of 
economic relationships in Russia.’ (Bessonova, 1994: 37)  
Bessonova argues that economic relationships in Russia, the Soviet Union and the 
post-Soviet Russia have certain common specific features. Bessonova does not refer 
to Western theories or concepts, such as non-market economy, quasi-market 
economy, or bureaucratic market, to explain the Russian specificity. Instead, she 
applies concepts borrowed from the original Russian discourse and language. 
According to her theory, the Russian economic system is an economy of the razdatok 
type and has its own development laws and a certain institutional system. The 
‘institutional core’ of the razdatok economy consists of the institutions of ‘razdacha’ 
(deal-out / give-away / gifts from the ruler), ‘sdacha’ (tribute to the ruler / treasury, 
gavel), ‘obshchestvenno-sluzhebnaya sobstvennost’ (communal service/duty-related 
property), and the institution of ‘administrative complaints’ (administrativnaya 
zhaloba). The mechanisms of ‘sdacha-razdacha’ are contrasted with the mechanisms 
of ‘buy and sell’ (Bessonova, 2008: 112). 
Complaints are seen as a mechanism replacing the price regulation of the economy, a 
form of feedback in the razdatok economy. The ‘critical number of certain 
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complaints’ serves as a basis for decision-making about distribution of resources. The 
related phenomena are the dependant’s psychology and the ‘give me’ syndrome 
(Bessonova, 1994: 40-41). 
The concept of ‘sluzhebniy trud’ (service work) (introduced by Bessonova), i.e. a 
form of labour / work that is obligatory, is contrasted with the contract labour. Such 
institutions determine the structure of society, which is divided into ‘sluzhilye lyudi’ 
(people in state service, state officials and military) and ‘podatnoye naseleniye’ (tax 
paying population), the latter providing means and resources for the former (Ibid: 43). 
Bessonova argues that institutions of non-razdatok coexist with (replace or 
complement) razdatok institutions, and ‘the complex interaction of these two types of 
relationships manifests itself either in coflict, or partnership of the two, or one 
becomes a shadow of the other’ (Ibid: 46). In the razdatok economy, there is still 
some room for institutions of market trade and private entrepreneurship, however only 
in the area that is not covered by the state management, or in situations when razdatok 
institutions are in crisis (Bessonova, 2008: 126-127). Bessonova divides the Russian 
history and the history of the Russian razdatok economy into institutional cycles, 
which consist of main and transition periods. During the ‘main’ periods, institutions 
of the razdatok economy function in a balanced way. During ‘transition’ periods, the 
institutions of private property and commodity-money relations become prevalent. 
Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, there appears to be a strong link between the IAD 
framework of Ostrom and the theories of institutional matrices and razdatok economy 
of Kirdina and Bessonova. All three frameworks attempt to identify basic, 
fundamental institutions in the society, which, in the words of Kleiner (2004), form 
the ‘institutional gene pool of the economy’ (Kleiner, 2004: 11)19. These institutions 
will be historically and culturally predetermined and form a core structure (including 
core elements and core rules), upon which further institutional development occurs. 
                                                 
19
 This concept appears close to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as ‘embodied history’. ‘The habitus […] 
ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of 
schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their 
constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms.’ (Bourdieu in 
Contemporary Sociological Theory, 2005: 278) 
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While Ostrom is looking for underlying universality of behaviour patterns, attempts 
‘to find a way of expressing the most basic rules that generate action situations’ and 
to ‘illustrate that the generic rules used to constitute a market come from the same set 
of generic rules used to constitute a legislature, a hierarchy, a self-organised 
resource governance system, or any of a wide diversity of situations’ (Ostrom, 2005: 
185), Kirdina and Bessonova also search for generic rules that determine the overall 
institutional picture, although in only one particular, national (Russian) context. 
Another feature that is common for these frameworks is that they work with the 
institutional set-up of societies or even factors that determine the institutional genesis. 
However, they do not offer any models that elaborated on exact mechanisms of 
institutional dynamics. Both theories remain within the limits of structural 
determinism. 
A dynamic model, which emphasizes not only structure, but also the role of agency in 
the process of institutional change, was offered by Vladimir Gel’man. Gel’man 
analysed the politics of informal institution building in Russia and demonstrated his 
model on the case of institutions of electoral governance. ‘What are the determinants 
for the dominance of informal institutions in contemporary Russian society?’ is the 
question asked by many researchers. While the above mentioned theories refer to the 
structural explanations for the dominance of informal institutions in the Russian 
politics and economy, Gel’man goes further and argues that it is not only ‘the legacy 
of the past’ or ‘revolutionary breakdown’ which led to the decline of rule enforcement 
because of reduced or total lack of state capacity (Gel’man, 2004: 1022). Structural 
factors, as well as characteristics of the state (‘weakness’ of the state, degree of state 
autonomy, and state capacity), are recognised to be important, although not sufficient, 
part of the explanations of the persistence and dominance of informal institutions.  
‘Actor-oriented analysis of the politics of institution building in Russia 
might be a valuable addition to studies of structural factors in the dominance 
of informal institutions. This analysis might be based on the framework of 
historical institutionalism (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992), which is 
concentrated not on path dependency but on ‘critical junctures’ of 
institutional changes and their limits. The ‘legacy of the past’ is considered 
here as one but not the only ‘point of departure’ on the path-contingent 
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chain of interrelated causes and consequences of institution building. 
Somewhat similar explanatory models have been used in studies of regime 
change (Karl, 1990), including post-communist politics (Johnson, 2001; 
Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie, 2003).’ (Gel’man, 2004: 1025-1026) 
The process of institutional change is described as a policy cycle, where a political 
system moves from one equilibrium, via disequilibration caused by exogenous 
factors, to another. Actors’ behaviour is determined by their interests, ideologies (in 
the broad sense of ‘cognitive schemes’), and uncertainty (which causes information 
deficit and undermines rational actions). Structural factors have an indirect impact on 
institution building. The ‘legacy of the past’ to some degree influences actors’ 
ideologies, ‘while a low degree of state autonomy contributes to policy 
implementation, especially in the case of the selective use of sanctions’ (Gel’man, 
2004: 1035 - 1036). 
Having analysed why institutional changes of the 1990s and early 2000s in Russia 
caused the dominance of informal institutions, Gel’man makes assumptions 
concerning possible future institutional development of Russian politics.  
‘It is too early to say to what extent informal institutions may contribute to 
the stability of Russia’s political regime or undermine it. But if one focuses 
exclusively on Russia’s domestic political environment (as yet, the 
international impact on it is relatively negligible), it is unclear what the 
potential sources of a possible movement toward the rule of law will be. The 
constellation of political actors, their interests and ideologies, as well as 
restoration (even though partial) of state capacity in Russia, is unlikely to 
prompt such a move. Thus, ‘informal institutionalisation’ deserves to be 
viewed not as a temporary ‘defect’ of post-Soviet democracy (in the sense 
of deviation from the ‘right’ way of development) but rather as a long-term 
principal feature of Russia’s political regime.’ (Gel’man, 2004: 1036)  
Gel’man talks about the ‘principal features’ of the Russian institutional set-up that 
will not be overcome in the foreseeable future, and thus in a way returns to the 
structuralist framework. 
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The theories considered above belong to the political economy paradigm. It would be 
wrong, however, to assume that the environmental perspective was absent in the 
Russian social thought. One of the most important Russian thinkers of the early 20th 
century, Vladimir Vernadsky, developed a theory of the biosphere, which advocated 
the inextricable mutual connection of human beings and natural environment. He 
termed this unity of all life forms on the Earth as the ‘living material’ (‘zhivoe 
veshchestvo’), of which the mankind is just one part. All living bodies are mutually 
connected with their material and energy environment through nutrition and breath. 
Moreover, Vernadsky regarded history, social movements and world wars as a ‘big 
geological and not only historical process’ (Vernadsky, 1993). 
However, Vernadsky noted the growing impact of human activity on the natural 
environment. He described this process as the transformation of biosphere into 
noosphere, i.e. the world of the new ‘geological force’ – the human mind (Vernadsky, 
1944). 
‘The face of the Earth – the biosphere – is being drastically changed 
chemically by human beings consciously and, mainly, unconsiously. 
Mankind changes the physical and chemical surfaces of land and water.’ 
(Vernadsky, 1944) 
According to Vernadsky, in the new world, where the human mind will be dominant, 
there will be two distinctive processes. The first inevitable process will be the 
progress driven by purposeful human mind and transformation of the mankind from 
heterotrophic into autotrophic beings, i.e. human beings will learn to produce food 
artificially rather than from living organisms. The second process that should take 
place is the growing importance of preservation of the natural environment for future 
generations (Vernadsky, 1944, 1993). 
What reflection did the teaching of Vernadsky find in the Soviet time? In the USSR, 
the nature–people relationship was dominated by the discourse of economic progress 
and taming / subjugation and colonization of nature. The prevailing type of 
development was an extensive and resource-intensive. Nature was supposed to serve 
the political and economic goals of the state (Okhrana prirody Rossii, 2003: 14). The 
Soviet state considered nature on the one hand as an enemy, something wild, 
senseless and alien, something to be rebuilt in accordance with the new collective 
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needs of the Soviet society, and on the other hand as ‘storehouse’ of natural resources 
that can be used without limit (Bolotova, 2006; Okhrana prirody Rossii, 2003: 14). 
This transformation of nature was supposed to reflect the transformation of the Soviet 
people: ‘While changing nature, the man changes himself’ (Maxim Gor’ky, 1930 in: 
Bolotova, 2006). 
Therefore, the discourse of nature–local community–traditional practices was almost 
non-existent. This has certainly had a significant impact on the people-nature 
interaction in Russia today. 
One has to draw attention to a caveat here that protection of natural resources did not 
contradict the Soviet ideology and was therefore allowed to the extent it did not 
obstruct extensive development of the Soviet economy (Okhrana prirody Rossii, 
2003: 14-15). Conservation became a priority of Soviet forest management after the 
war. From 1949 to 1973, class I forests20 grew from 2% to 48% of the total forest 
area, while industrially exploitable forests shrunk from almost 98% to just over 50%. 
After 1973, class I protected forests grew by only 5% (Eikeland, Eythorsson and 
Ivanova, 2004: 288). Since 1975, environmental protection and rational use of natural 
resources have been a separate section in the state plan of the economic development 
of the country (Somov, 1976: 2). There was a strong discourse of a complex use of 
forest resources and the ‘preservation of the ecological balance of forest 
biogeocenoses’ (Somov, 1976: 7). The Soviet Union had a unique system of strict 
reserves, created specifically for protection of natural ecosystems and where even 
recreation facilities were not allowed. The scientific and ideological basis for such a 
system of strict reserves was created as early as before the Revolution (see Shtil’mark, 
1996). In 1951, this system was drastically curtailed (88 reserves out of 128 in the 
USSR were closed) due to the extensive type of development and growing demand 
for timber and other natural resources (Okhrana prirody Rossii, 2003: 17). 
Conclusion 
The Western perspective on institutional transformation can be described as two 
broad general conceptual paradigms that complement each other. The first one is a 
                                                 
20
 Class I areas were protected for the purpose of landscape conservation and for climatic reasons. In 
these areas, only selective sanitary cutting was allowed. 
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political economy paradigm, which embraces debates about various socio-political 
and economic factors shaping the processes of institutional path dependence and path 
creation. Major debates are concerned with the role of state and non-state actors as 
sources of institutional change and transformation of natural resource management. 
Due to weaknesses of both purely state and market models of institutional change and 
natural resource management, hybrid models have gained significant support recently. 
Recent experience in natural resource management worldwide has a number of 
complex implications for successful environmental regimes. 
The second paradigm brings nature (environmental variables) in and embraces the 
human ecology and political ecology approaches. The environmental paradigm 
examines the mutual interdependence of the social and the natural in the process of 
institutional change at the local, national and global levels. The environmental 
paradigm is in some sense an extension of the first, political economy paradigm and 
appears more suited to address issues of nature resource management. 
As to the Russian perspectives on institutional change, many studies that look at the 
post-Soviet development are structurally deterministic and path-dependence based. 
They give significant attention to the role and nature of the state. They examine 
structural factors that have made the post-Soviet transformation process very painful 
or not successful at all. ‘Positively’ inclined studies with an emphasis on agency and 
possible ways of path creation (the ones that are available) are also sceptical of the 
possibility of change in the near future.  
Despite the fact that Russia is a country of unique natural resource endowment, 
historical circumstances prevented the environmental direction of institutional studies 
from developing into any significant school of thought yet. One mostly explores 
relations between individual, societal groups and the Russian state. It is 
administrative, political and economic, rather than natural, resources that are 
generally perceived as relevant for institutional development in the Russian context at 
the moment.  
Russian perspective on natural resource management and institutional change (e.g. the 
concept of a ‘deal-out economy’) appears very materialistic, which strongly contrasts 
to ecological thinking of a number of Western schools.  The following chapters will 
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attempt to trace this feature through the history of Russian forestry and identify how 
this mode of national thinking affects current development of the forest sector. 
In order to find the answer to our research question - how and why do institutions 
change in the Russian forest sector? - the ideas presented above need to be further 
tested on the Russian material. In the following chapters, we shall juxtapose Russian 
practices with Western ideas about institutional development. What potential do 
market institutions have in the Russian context? Are they able to replace the state? 
Are the current problems of the forest sector caused by the ‘excessive’ intervention of 
the state or by its poor capability or by something else? How do market and state 
institutions interact? How much room is there for participatory forest management? 
Are ‘liberal’ institutions transplanted to the Russian forest sector in the post-Soviet 
period identical to the ones in the Western world? What implications does their 
implementation on the Russian ground have? What are major drivers of institutional 
change and innovation in the Russian forest sector? 
The above review of institutional theories provides a starting point for understanding 
the nature of the Russian state, its relation to the Russian society and development of 
nature resource management. 
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
‘Russia is the most stateless, the most anarchic country in the world. The Russian 
nation is the most apolitical nation that could never even organise its own country… 
The Russian soul wants a sacred sociality, and a chosen-by-God authority… State 
authority has always been extrinsic, not intrinsic to the stateless Russian nation; it was 
not created from within [the society], but sort of came from the outside.’ (Berdyaev, 
2004: 274) 
3.1 Conceptualising the Russian State  
Pre-1917 and Soviet Studies of the State: Perspectives from Within 
It is useful to locate interaction between societal stakeholders and the state in the 
forest sector by placing it in a larger analysis of the Russian state. 
As early as in 1884, Georgy Plekhanov was warning that the socialist revolution in 
Russia ‘may lead to a political deformity similar to the Chinese or Peruvian empire, 
i.e. to a renewed Tsarist despotism with a communist underlining’, for ‘the rule of the 
people is possible only when the people is disappointed enough in the autocracy of the 
Tsars’ (Plekhanov, 1884: 306). 
In 1919, in his lecture ‘On the state’, Vladimir Lenin defined the state as a ‘special 
apparatus for systematic violence and subjection of people to violence’, as a 
consequence of the disintegration of society into classes and exploitation of one 
person by another (Lenin, 1984: 480).   
‘The state is a machine for oppression of one class by another... The form of 
this machine varies. In the slave-owning state, there is a monarchy, 
aristocratic republic or even a democratic republic’ (Lenin, 1984: 483-484).  
As the quote shows, Lenin associated the state with exploitation and class struggle. 
Therefore, he argued, the proletariat had to take away the state machine from the 
capitalists, in order to then use it as a ‘cudgel’ and ‘slam’ any kind of exploitation 
(Ibid: 484). 
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‘And when there will be no more possibilities for exploitation in the world 
and no more land owners or owners of factories... only then shall we scrap 
this machine. Then, there will be no state and no exploitation.’ (Lenin, 1984: 
491) 
So, the new, post-1917 state was proclaimed a tool in the class struggle, in order to 
build a socialist, i.e. class-less, society later.  
Several years later, in 1936, Joseph Stalin announced that the Soviet society had 
become ‘society without antagonistic classes’ and that there were two mutually 
friendly classes, namely the class of workers and the class of peasants (as well as a 
secondary layer of intelligentsia), and state management of society (‘dictatorship’) 
belonged to the working class. Under such social order, the role of the socialist state 
was said to consist in administrative-economic, military (defence from the capitalist 
environment) and cultural-educational functions (Stalin, 1936). 
Around the same time, in 1930s, Leon Trotsky wrote:  
‘Under no other regime than the Soviet regime did bureaucracy achieve such 
degree of independence from the ruling class... One cannot but admit that it 
[the Soviet bureaucracy] is more than bureaucracy. It is the only and in the 
full sense of the word privileged and ruling layer in the Soviet society.’ 
(Trotsky, 1937) 
Trotsky considered the Soviet society to be different from any other society. This 
society was dominated not by workers or peasants, but by bureaucrats, whose power 
had particularly grown in the Soviet years. 
In 1922, Pitirim Sorokin wrote:  
‘The October Revolution set its task as destruction of the social pyramid of 
inequality (both in terms of property and rights) and annihilation of the class 
of exploiters and thus the class of exploited. And what did we get? - A 
simple rearrangement. At the beginning of the revolution, the old 
bourgeoisie, aristocracy and privileged-ruling layers were removed from the 
upper levels of the pyramid. And vice versa, one lifted individual ‘dwellers 
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of the social underground’ from below to the top. ... But has the pyramid 
itself disappeared? Not at all.’ (Sorokin, 1994: 19) 
Thus, Sorokin suggests that the society that evolved after 1917 was a heirarchical 
society, with a strong social differentiation and a similar structure to the one that 
existed before. 
In 1937, Nikolay Berdyaev wrote that the new Soviet bureaucracy had become a new 
privileged class, who could exploit the popular masses and was stronger than the 
Tsarist bureaucracy (Berdyaev, 1990). This societal trait was not new to Russia and 
built on the previous, pre-1917, trends of development. Berdyaev emphasized that by 
the end of the 19th century, Russia had become a Tsardom ‘with a strong 
bureaucracy and a very thin and fragile cultural layer’; ‘classes have always been 
weak in Russia and subordinated to the state, they were even built by the state 
authority’  (Berdyaev, 1918: 231-232).  
This view advocated by Sorokin and Berdyaev, namely that the state bureaucracy was 
the dominant class in the Soviet society, was fundamentally different from the 
Marxist standpoint, which persisted from the 1930s until the late 1980s as the official 
concept of the social structure of the country and was based on the three-part formula 
of Stalin (working class, the peasants and the people’s intelligentsia) (Baitin, 1973; 
Shevtsov, 1971).  
‘State power is the social force of the dominant class (of the whole society 
in a developed socialist society). Only the availability of such force allows 
the latter to gain a foothold in the society as a dominant class. The force 
itself – the state power – is inevitably the highest, single-ruling and 
absolute.’ (Shevtsov, 1971: 13) 
The state was considered a servant of the dominant class, with the potential to become 
the servant of the whole society. It was also recognized as the only legitimate 
authority and having a power monopoly in the society. 
Pre-1917 and Soviet Studies: Perspectives from Outside 
Karl Wittfogel develops a theory of an orientally despotic state and describes post-
Mongol pre-1917 Russia as a ‘marginal Oriental society’ (Wittfogel, 1957: 5). 
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Wittfogel describes the course of Russian history as Westernisation prior to 1917 and 
anti-Westernisation thereafter. He insists on the non-European, Tatar, character of 
Russian political tradition21 and refers to the Soviet state as ‘an industry-based system 
of general (state) slavery’ (Wittfogel, 1957: 438-441). 
Maurice Dobb argued that the Russian state was the ‘product of a class system, and 
was in fact the instrument of the class which at the particular time was the ruling 
class’ (Dobb, 1928: 29).  
‘There would tend to crystallise a bureaucratic ‘white-collar’ caste, greedy 
of privilege, tinged with superiority and tending to reproduce in its dealings 
with the mass of the workers the old relation between master and servant…’ 
(Dobb, 1928: 29-30) 
Dobb noted that the strengthening bureaucratic apparatus transformed into an 
oppressive societal layer that pursued its own ends and, in this respect, did not differ 
much from its predecessor ruling ‘caste’. 
Voline explored the nature of the Bolshevik state in the 1920s and wanted to 
‘transform the economic and social bases of society without having recourse to a 
political state, to a government, or to a dictatorship of any sort’ (Voline, 1954: 7). In 
his opinion, the Bolshevist state was not a ‘proletarian’ or ‘workers’ and peasants’’ 
state, but totalitarian.  
The ‘primary concern of the Bolshevik party in power was to nationalize all 
the activity and all the life in Russia’ (Voline, 1954: 189-190).  
The state was ‘the only real owner of all the riches of the country’, whereas the 
worker was ‘a modern slave’, who could be punished or rewarded by the ‘lord’ – in 
accordance with worker’s behaviour (Ibid: 192, 197). The immense powerful 
bureaucracy was created – to support Stalin, ‘its idol, its ‘Tsar’’ (Ibid.: 190). 
                                                 
21
 This view was disputed by a number of researchers. E.g., Arnold Toynbee (1948) did not agree with 
Wittfogel and maintained that Russian concepts had Byzantine origins. In Richard Pipes’ view (1995), 
the Russian political tradition was Hellenistic. 
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The work of Richard Pipes shows that Muscovy differed from every state in Europe in 
that there was no concept of private property in Muscovy, and that everything was 
regarded as the property of the Grand Duke. The only organised social groups who 
could stand up against the state and challenge its power monopoly were nobility and 
bureaucracy (Pipes, 1995: 137), because ‘by enforcing the patrimonial principle, i.e. 
by effectively asserting its claim to all the territory of the realm as property and all its 
inhabitants as servants, the crown prevented the formation of pockets of independent 
wealth or power’ (Ibid: 249). The situation persisted in the Soviet years, when 
Russia’s officialdom only grew in numbers, and the ‘patrimonial’ system remained 
immune from pressures from below (Ibid: 112, 281). 
‘While repeating the essentials of the West European periodicity, the 
Russian economy was more state-bound at every one of its stages… It is the 
extent of state involvement that made it different from Western Europe.’ 
(Shanin, 1985: 124-127)  
In his work, Shanin shows that before the Revolution Russia went through the stages 
of economic policy similar to Western European ones (mercantilism, liberalism and 
neo-protectionism), but with a particularly significant extent of state power and state 
economy. (Ibid: 124-127) 
Barrington Moore analyses the nature of the Soviet state and notes that support of 
popular masses or societal consensus were ‘definitely not crucial’ for the Soviet 
‘totalitarian dictatorship’ (Moore, 1966: 2). 
 
‘For about the past twenty years Soviet society has been one enormous 
bureaucracy. The state has swallowed society. The behaviour of nearly 
every adult male during his working hours is heavily determined by his 
place within this bureaucracy…’ (Ibid: 2) 
 
The society has been ‘bureaucratised’, organised and subsumed by the state and its 
‘all-embracing administrative system’ (Ibid: 3): 
‘The peasant, the soldier, the worker, the artist, and the scientist play their 
roles in accordance with a web of decisions that ultimately originate in, or 
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are approved by, the Presidium (formerly the Politburo), the highest organ 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.’  
 
The Party Presidium became a major and ‘indispensable’ instrument of connecting 
actions of Soviet citizens with one another. The Soviet state had a threefold system of 
control: ‘the Party, the instruments of violence, and the Soviet apparatus’ (Ibid: 8). 
Instruments of violence included secret police and the military forces. The Soviet 
apparatus composed three elements: ministries administering economic activities; 
agencies that checked up on the economic performance of other ministries; and the 
hierarchy of soviets. These tools were used by the Soviet state ‘to enforce its 
decisions and to focus the energies of the Soviet population in the desired directions’ 
(Ibid: 8). 
  
‘The Soviet system of centralisation is continually breeding its opposite in 
the form of groups within it that become involved in a network of protective 
evasions. These groups build walls around themselves that are at least 
temporarily impervious to Moscow’s demands.’(Moore, 1966: 21)  
 
So, the state system and society are in a state of conflict. The state system puts steep 
demands ‘on its servants’, which causes individuals to unite in alternative groups for 
protection. At the same time, the state regime realises this tendency and tries ‘to sow 
suspicion among the population’ and ‘to destroy all social bonds except the ones that 
it has itself created’, in order to destroy all independent foci of power and to 
manipulate the population. State-‘organised terror’ results in ‘the partial atomisation 
of Soviet society’, ‘the break-up of friendship groupings’ and ‘the isolation of the 
individual’ (Ibid: 158). 
 
Even peasants, who traditionally, through revolts and upheavals, were able of 
influencing the state and exercising leverage on state policies, and ‘provided part of 
the impetus behind a series of reforms that were transforming Tsarist society’, 
became powerless after the Revolution (Ibid: 72). In the 1930s, ‘the economic 
independence of the peasant was destroyed… power to shape all the major economic 
decisions was secured by the dictatorship’ (Ibid: 73). At the same time, possibilities 
of manipulating the state system and Soviet society were ‘rather unevenly distributed’ 
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among individuals and depended not just on their personality, but also on their 
position within the system (Ibid: 162). 
 
State organisation and the state’s relationship to the international environment and 
domestic forces are the focus of Theda Skocpol’s analysis (1997, 1999, 2008). She 
considers the state as ‘autonomous power,’ an ‘administrative and coercive 
machinery embedded in a militarised international states system’ (Skocpol, 1999: 
292). She argues that the most striking feature of the Soviet state was ‘the 
predominance of a Party-state complex ever so much larger and more dynamically 
powerful within society than the tsarist regime had been’ (Ibid: 226). State 
administrative apparatus was constantly expanding and ‘also capable of 
accomplishing more in society’ than the Tsarist autocracy (Ibid: 227). The reason for 
this was that the Communist regime ‘sought to link the executive at the centre closely 
with the masses’ and to integrate all people into the Party-state system through 
representative and mass-membership organisations, such as local soviets, trade 
unions, cooperatives, etc; whereas under the Tsar, social groups (zemstvos, the 
Church, local communities) were isolated from, even though subordinated to the state 
(Ibid: 229). On the one hand, the Soviet state was formally very inclusive and had 
strong ties with its society members. On the other hand, the state subsumed the 
society, in order to totally control it. 
 
The Soviet state made ‘extraordinary’ use of ‘administratively organised coercion 
and terror as techniques for ruling its citizens and for purging and controlling its own 
official cadres’ (Skocpol, 1999: 230). Since the 1930s, the Soviet system was 
‘pronouncedly inegalitarian’, and some administrative officials became ‘privileged 
and authoritarian’ (Ibid: 229). The ‘domestic elite’ used the state apparatus and 
applied terror against ‘other parts’ of society (Ibid: 231). This made the state 
‘partially autonomous’ within society, although still ‘stronger and more autonomous’ 
compared to the old regime state. (Ibid: 284, 285) 
 
‘In sum, the Soviet system that crystallised after 1928 was at once more 
formally equalitarian and popularly inclusive and more rank-ridden, 
effectively authoritarian, and coercive than the prerevolutionary absolutist 
and aristocratic system.’ (Skocpol, 1999: 230-231) 
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The population, peasants and workers were ‘more directly incorporated into national 
politics and state-run projects’. At the same time, the Revolution strengthened the 
state and made it ‘more centralised, bureaucratic, and autonomously powerful at 
home and abroad’ (Ibid: 285).  
 
Joel Migdal (2001) also explores the process of state-society interaction. However, he 
comes to the conclusion that the interaction of societal groups and the state is ‘a 
continuing process of transformation’ (Migdal, 2001: 57), where both the state and 
society ‘are constantly becoming’ (Ibid: 57) and change their structure, goals, and 
rules. The separation between state and society is not complete. State and society 
interpenetrate, mutually constitute one other and form a ‘mélange in which multiple 
sets of rules struggle for predominance’ and social control (Ibid: 57). To emphasize 
this interrelation, Migdal uses the term ‘state in society’ (Ibid: 42). 
 
Despite the states’ endeavours in ‘defining collective consciousness’ and the 
‘reinvention of society’ (Ibid: 262), states are ‘often severely constrained by their 
domestic environments from achieving an independent reordering of society’. They 
are ‘hemmed in - indeed transformed’ by the societies in which they operate and their 
internal forces (Ibid: 56).  
 
Not only internal elements of the society, but also ‘global factors outside of the state’s 
control’ limit the state and work ‘to thwart or modify the emergence of a state-drawn 
collective consciousness’ (Ibid: 262). Various social formations, including ‘ethnic and 
other sub-national groups, civil society, the global economy, and so on… have 
established authority, or at least have tried to’. (Ibid: 263) These struggles and 
engagement of the state with society have been transforming both society and the 
state (Ibid: 56; 263). Moreover, they have led to ‘contending coalitions that have cut 
across both and blurred the lines between them’ (Ibid: 263). It is within these 
dynamic institutional arrangements that Migdal considers the Soviet state:  
 
‘Nowhere, not even in Stalin’s Soviet Union, has a society with its own 
authority disappeared entirely.’ (Ibid: 260)  
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The Soviet state was unable to exercise the necessary influence on societal groups in 
order to create a centralized and integrated society. 
Conceptualising the New Russian State 
The post-Soviet Russian state is characterised as having a low degree of ‘state 
autonomy’ (or ‘state capture’) (Gel’man, 2004; Libman, 2004), i.e. the demarcation 
line between public authority and private business is very blurred. Relationships 
between state and non-state actors are selective (Afanasyev, 2006: 95-96). The state is 
privately used as a coercive tool and administrative resource in the struggle between 
different business and power groups. (Libman, 2004; Bocharov, 2005) 
‘Intervention of the state in the economy is still carried out by civil servants 
on behalf of the state, however ever more often for the sake of their private 
selfish interests. The derelict administrative authority is used as an initial 
condition for the purchase of property rights and their consequent 
redistribution.’ (Gredin, 2003: 3) 
Functioning of the state machine is largely shaped by the conflict of interests that state 
officials find themselves in. The legal system and authority of the state are 
‘privatized’ (Gredin, 2003; Afanasyev, 2006), or ‘captured’ (Libman, 2004). The key 
role in capturing the state belongs to civil servants, especially ‘siloviki’ (security 
officials) (Volkov and Privalov, 2008: 5)22. Civil servants and politicians start to 
control businesses in order to individually appropriate profits – the situation also 
referred to as ‘business capture’ (Libman, 2004).23 
Dynkin (2004: 64) notes that as a result of historical circumstances, there are only two 
forces capable of acting as agents of modernisation in Russia: the state and big 
business. And since there is no hope for any other actors to become motor of change, 
it is necessary to harmonize interests of big business and the state as the only potential 
agents of modernisation in Russia.  
                                                 
22
 The Russian case is referred to as ‘nomenklatura capitalism’ (Sakwa, 2007: 314) or ‘bureaucratic 
capitalism’ (Volkov and Privalov, 2008: 3). 
23
 For more studies about poor state capacity and state capture in Russian regions today see e.g. Sutela 
(2005), Shlapentokh (2003). 
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Unlike in the Soviet studies mentioned above, the post-1991 Russian state is 
characterised as weak, inefficient and failing or even practically non-existent in a 
number of socio-economic spheres, hence causing the strengthening of informal 
institutions, growth of importance of personal connections, social networks and 
clientelism (Afanasyev, 2006: 121-122). As a guarantor and a producing state, the 
Russian state failed. Its authority ‘stretches only to some administrative and coercive 
actions and attacks on certain economic agents’ (Gredin, 2003: 3). Despite quite 
common statist, paternalistic thinking of many Russians, the strong state is substituted 
by a patronage system with ‘weak institutional braces’ (Afanasyev, 2006: 106).  
‘Feudalism’ and ‘patrimonialism’ have re-emerged as terms to describe the new 
Russian state. (Ericson, 2000; Afanasyev, 2006; Kondratyeva, 2006) It is argued that 
the way technology is organized in the post-Soviet Russia has a systemic structure 
that is reminiscent of the feudal system. Thus, Russia is argued to have a strong 
hierarchical structure of society, based on ‘personal allegiance and patronage, ties of 
trust and reciprocity’, ‘personal loyalty supported by a sworn oath with reciprocal 
responsibilities’, and where superiors hold juridicial and economic rights and the 
responsibility to provide ‘justice, protection and other public goods to their 
subordinates’ (Ericson, 2000: 6). The rights and privileges are highly correlated with 
the position within the hierarchy. 
The State as a ‘Feeding Bowl’ 
Despite often being inefficient, the state tends to be dominant over its people which 
helps explain the dearth of public participation, civic responsibility, and economic 
independence. Within the path dependence framework, Kondratyeva (2006) analyses 
the common attitude to state authorities and power and suggests that many institutions 
and practices in Russia can be explained through the concept of the authorities as a 
‘feeding bowl’. The ‘feeding’ function of authorities, it is argued, has been decisive in 
many respects under the Tsarist and Soviet regimes24. It is argued that relationships 
                                                 
24
 During the Tsarist period, the feeding function of authorities would manifest itself in a gift from the 
Tsar at the dining table, or allocation of land, labour and other resources at the pleasure of the ruler. 
(Kondratyeva, 2006: 34, 38) Such ‘feeding’ practices were stable at least until the late 19th century. 
The stability of such practices is associated with several specific features of the Russian history: 1) lack 
of mechanisms in the society that would allow society’s participation in state affairs; deficit of law-
based state bodies 2) low productivity of agriculture and poverty of the population; 3) mixture of 
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between people in Russia are special, in that ‘all members of the community are in a 
way family members and dependent on the head of the household’25 (Kondratyeva, 
2006: 160). And it is the ‘master’ who distributes social resources between different 
layers of society to a great extent on the basis of personal or family connections 
(Kondratyeva, 2006: 161). This model of state–society relationships precluded several 
institutions and practices from developing in Russia, such as public participation in 
formulation of state policies, civic responsibility, and economic independence. 
‘Power-Property’ 
The phenomenon of state capture has been described in detail by Nureev (2006) by 
means of the concept ‘power-property’26. Nureev was the first post-Soviet researcher 
to draw a parallel between the oriental despotism (Asian method of production) and 
socialism (Nureev, 1976, 1990)27. Power-property is understood as a phenomenon 
                                                                                                                                            
administrative and judicial service until 1864; 4) serfdom as a source traditional practices of patronage 
and personal dependency (Kondratyeva, 2006: 59-60; 156).  
As to the Soviet period, the feeding function of authorities was reflected in the existence of special 
shops and canteens for state officials, especially for higher party and state officials, separate 
distribution of deficit goods between governmental officials, and within social classes (e.g. according 
to their ‘contribution to the industrialization’), hidden privileges, and so on (Kondratyeva, 2006: 110). 
In fact, at least after Stalin’s death, the ‘feeding hand’ belonged not so much to an individual ruler, but 
to various groups of bureaucrats (Kondratyeva, 2006: 154). 
After 1960s, the same model of relationships spread widely in the economy outside the Kremlin - 
among companies. In order to attract the best human resources, companies started to offer significant 
social packages: big companies would have their own hotels, hospitals, sanatoria etc for their 
employees (Kondratyeva, 2006: 154).  
 
25
 Patrimonial state in Weberian terms 
26
 The term was coined by Vasilyev (1982) and elaborated by Semyonov (1980). 
27
 During the Soviet years, there were two discussions about the Asiatic mode of production, one of 
which took place in the late 1920s to early 1930s, and the second in 1960s to early 1970s. Both 
discussions were forcibly interrupted, for such discussions could provide a key to understanding the 
Soviet regime (for an overview of these discussions see Semyonov, 1993).  The official view was 
expressed by Nikiforov in 1970s: ‘Wittfogel in a libellous way extrapolates his conclusions about the 
oriental despotism on socialist countries, on the state sector in modern developing countries...’ 
(Nikiforov, 1975: 186) 
Comparative studies on the similarity of the so called Soviet socialism and the Asiatic mode of 
production were carried out by such Russian authors as Vasilyev (1994), Nureev (2001), Semyonov 
(1993), Shafarevich (1974), Shkaratan (1991, 2000), and Gaidar (1997). The similarity of these 
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that arises ‘when official functions are monopolised in the society and when power 
and domination are based not on private property as such but on a high position in 
the traditional hierarchy and prestige’ (Nureev, 2006: 1). These official functions, 
which are then monopolised, include functions of distribution of the national product; 
exchange; conditions of production (infrastructure, production experience, knowledge 
etc); control and management of production. Monopolisation of these functions is 
later reinforced by ownership of resources. 
Nureev traces the development of the institution ‘power-property’ throughout Russian 
history and shows a strong path dependence of the Russian state in this regard. The 
Russian political and economic system has seen the struggle of two institutional 
property systems: power-property and private property. Major differences of power-
property from private property include the following: property is public and 
employment-related; civil servants are main power holders;  the system of incentives 
is based on administrative coercion and control (rather than individual incentives to 
increase personal welfare); the main mechanisms of property rights transfer are 
reciprocal exchange and redistributive exchange (rather than free market exchange); 
property rights are intentionally blurred, poorly specified by civil servants in order to 
receive rent and as a basis for corruption; a minor role of the law and courts. 
Further analysis of close ties between power and property in the Russian society was 
carried out by Radayev and Shkaratan (1991), who define the social order in Russia as 
‘etatcratism’ (power of the state), the main feature of which is the total 
bureaucratisation of state institutions who usurped property – with an absolute 
absence of civil society. Shkaratan (2000, 2004) demonstrates that this ‘etatcratic’ 
social order, based on power-property, being predominant in the Soviet time, persists 
in the post-Soviet Russia as well.  The social differentiation does not have a class 
character, but is determined by ranks of the power hierarchy. The ‘power-property’ 
relations only ‘acquired a private property shell, but remained in essence the same’ 
(Shkaratan, 2004: 3). In the course of reforms, the bureaucracy ‘retained their 
controlling position in power and transformed into upper quasi-bourgeoisie’ (Ibid: 5). 
                                                                                                                                            
societies have become a common place in the literature now, however there are still questions about the 
nature of such similarity (see e.g. Pimenov, 1999: 59). For an overview of these discussions about 
affinity of the Soviet and Asiatic despotic regimes see Pimenov (1999) and Semyonov (1993). 
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So, in the post-Soviet Russia, society transformed into a different form of bureaucratic 
quasi-capitalism, but remained intact. 
Similar analysis of the ‘power elite’ has been made with regard to the post-World War 
II United States by C. Wright Mills. Thus, Mills noted the ‘tendency of business and 
government to become more intricately and deeply involved with each other’ and the 
increasing impossibility of separating these two realms from one another (Mills, 1956: 
274).  
‘The power elite has been shaped by the coincidence of interest between 
those who control the major means of production and those who control the 
newly enlarged means of violence.’ (Ibid: 276) 
There is no ‘genuine civil service of skill and integrity, independent of vested 
interests’ – under a ‘weakened and formal’ democratic system (Ibid: 276). Power, 
wealth, and ‘celebrity’ have been accumulated in the ‘strategic command posts of the 
social structure’ (Ibid: 4). 
The relationship between state and society has become a widely discussed issue in the 
post-Soviet Russia. Tatyana Zaslavskaya28 explains difficulties of post-Soviet reforms 
through the nature of relationship between state authorities/elites and society. The 
reformative potential of a society is determined, first and foremost, by attitudes and 
actions of elites (including the upper layer of state bureaucracy) (Zaslavskaya, 2001: 
16). It results in the low likelihood of liberal-democratic transformation and 
development of the rule of law in Russia. Actors interested in realisation of these 
scenarios are mostly at the ‘micro- and meso-levels’ of society and therefore exercise 
no significant influence on the choice of the trajectory, whereas high-level 
bureaucracy is mostly interested in authoritarian, conservative-statist or oligarchic 
scenarios of development (Zaslavskaya and Shabanova, 2001: 22-23). There is no 
                                                 
28
 One of the key Soviet and Russian sociologists, as well as the founder of the influential Novosibirsk 
Sociological School 
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social ‘macro-subject’ interested and powerful enough to carry out democratic 
reforms. The ruling elite are not used to having a dialogue with the society.29  
‘No polity has been created that is a reflection of society and that could 
adapt political structures to changing social needs, creating preconditions for 
evolutionary institutional change.’ (Zon, 2007: 5) 
The society is regarded as strongly opposed to the state. Social institutions do not 
come into being as a result of constant society-state interaction, and therefore do not 
meet society’s demands. 
Mezhuev (2000), Pivovarov and Fursov (2001) analyse the gap between the state and 
society through a generalised concept of power. They show that state authorities have 
been ‘the only socially significant subject of the Russian system’. They define Russian 
authorities as ‘monosubject’ and ‘remote’ (monosub’ektnost i distantsionnost’). They 
trace the roots of this system back to the Tartar Mongol Yoke and argue that it was 
the Horde that imposed the principle ‘power is everything, population is nothing’ onto 
Russia. (Pivovarov and Fursov, 2001: 50) They argue that in Russia, there is no 
society (obshhestvo) (in the sense of community with diverse interests) beyond the 
authorities – there is only the people (narod) – a faceless, homogenous and voiceless 
ethnic or confessional (faith based) community (Mezhuev, 2000: 82). 
‘The law, which embodies the idea of a contract, despite the seeming and 
ostentatious homage to it, has not become an antithesis to the boundless 
power…’ (Mezhuev, 2000:  83) 
At the same time, Kordonsky (2007) argues that there is no opposition of society and 
state in Russia. Conflicts in the Russian society are not between society and the state, 
but between estates / classes of the corporative state (FSB against police, prosecutor’s 
office against finance officials, academia against church etc).  
In Russia, there is no society in the traditional political-science meaning: Russian 
society is formed by the state. The whole politically active society is made up of the 
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 For more analysis of post-Soviet reforms in the light of society-authorities confrontation see 
Shelokhaev, 2000; Diligensky, 2000. 
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remnants of the old apparatus. There are no other communities, other than those 
formed by the previous apparatus. There is only a civil society that is artificial in the 
sense that NGOs are totally dependent on foreign funding. These communities, a civil 
society based on the remnants of Soviet structures or ‘grant’-society, are not 
sustainable without the state but rather subsumed by the state (Kordonsky, 2007). 
Similarly, Kosova (2008) refers to the Russian state as penetrating all spheres of 
social life and, thus, crowding out civil society: there arises simply no need for 
horizontal partnership links. If one defines civil society as a developed network of 
formal institutions that limit natural expansion of authorities and does not allow 
dominance of authorities over society, then there is no civil society in Russia, for 
there are no formal universal means that could prevent a civil servant from realising 
any decision he sees as proper. The only force that could do that is the authority above 
that civil servant. In other words, all means of restricting the expansion of the 
authorities lie within the authorities themselves. In the modern Russian society, the 
main principle of social interaction is not cooperation or search of compromise, but 
power / coercive politics (silovoe davlenie).  
‘A simple Russian individual continues to exist in an atomised social space, 
where he is face to face with the authorities – without a supporting or 
protecting collection of horizontal links. And, one should note, he is 
comfortable like this and does not want to change the situation. He does not 
need horizontal partnership links. He is quite happy with the ‘vertical of 
power’ (vlastnaya vertikal)’ (Kosova, 2008). 
An alternative view on the post-Soviet society has been expressed by Ruth Mandel 
and Caroline Humphrey (2002), who stress the diversity and significance of ‘socially-
constituted practices’ (Mandel and Humphrey, 2002: 4) and the ‘market in everyday 
life’ (Ibid: 1). ‘Market’ is regarded as a new ‘regime of power’ (Ibid: 13), which has 
come to largely replace state institutions (Ibid: 9). Their study takes an 
anthropological approach and explores ‘the ways people now engage with their 
market replacements, and deal with the gaps where there are no replacements’ (Ibid: 
10).  
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The Rule of Law 
The nature of the Russian state is often explained through dominance of informal ties 
and poor law enforcement - ‘unrule of law’ (Gel’man, 2004) ‘legal nihilism’ (Zon, 
2007), and ‘cynicism about law’ (Kurkchiyan, 2003). Kathryn Hendley refers to the 
‘dualistic legal state’ (Hendley, 2006): formal and informal normative systems run 
parallel to each other; formal law is not completely irrelevant, but its relevance is 
confined to certain segments of the market; recourse to formal law is only one of 
available options (Pistor, 1999; Hendley, 2006, 2007). Formal law is enforced 
selectively, i.e. the government uses formal sanctions in an instrumental manner to 
reward loyal actors or punish disloyal ones (Paneyah, 2002). This situation finds 
reflection in the popular Russian proverbs ‘Law is like a shaft of a cart, it points 
wherever you turn it to’ (Zakon chto dyshlo – kuda povernut, tuda i vyshlo) 
(Afanasyev, 2006: 120); ‘Law does not *have an effect*, but *is applied*’ (Zakon ne 
deystvuet, a primenyayetsya) (Paneyah, 2002: 158). 
These characteristics of the state are strongly interrelated with persistence of such 
informal institutions as clientelism; ‘statist’ psychology, i.e. the habit to blame 
authorities for all failures; deficit of social capital, trust and public institutions 
(Ledeneva, 1998; Afanasyev, 2006); and low demand for law among consumers of 
the public good (Solomon, 1997; Gibson, 2003).  
‘Both law and law-enforcement agencies are greeted with a skepticism that 
has been bred for decades — if not for centuries — by the experience that 
extralegal motives often influence decision making and that law is chiefly an 
instrument of those in power...’ (Pistor, 1999) 
Due to a distrust of formal law, Russians ‘rely much more on informal 
mechanisms’ – individual networks of trust, relationships, private security 
services, and so on (Ibid).  
The discrepancy between legal and everyday norms results in the situation where 
reference to law is problematic in the eyes of actors. Reference to law becomes not a 
common way to resolve conflicts, but rather the last method to punish an infringer of 
informal conventions. The law, being excessively severe, becomes not a framework 
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for interaction, but a resource of one party (Paneyah, 2002: 156 – 157; Hendley, 2002: 
144). 
A strong system of informal institutions that do not always correspond to formal 
institutions causes conflicts of legal cultures in Russia and is considered the main 
obstacle to reforms in Russia (Bocharov, 2005). It is argued (Ibid: 185) that Russian 
laws that guarantee private property rights do not correspond to traditional legal ideas 
and are therefore not perceived by majority of the population as legitimate, hence 
making the state a ‘criminal state’. At the same time, some ‘criminal’ practices, such 
as corruption, represent deep traditional practices and norms in Russia. 
Similarly, Kordonsky (2007) emphasises the necessity to analyse Russian society and 
state through the prism of informal institutions and abandon some usual Western 
conceptions as inadequate for explaining Russian reality. Thus, Kordonsky refers to 
the concept of civil society and argues that civil society in Russia is very ‘unusual’. 
There are few organised, institutionalised forms of civil society in Russia. Far more 
popular is an alternative form of civil society, namely that of ‘blat’ (favours), 
corruption and connections ‘outside of the state’ and ‘in opposition to the state and its 
modernisation attempts’ (Kordonsky, 2007: 2). This form of civil society is a reaction 
of the population to numerous radical reforms introduced by the state, an effort to 
neutralise them and adapt to them. 
The prevalence of informal institutions over the formal institutions in Russia, or 
‘informal institutionalisation’ (O’Donnell, 1996), encouraged researchers to 
acknowledge the specific, ‘abnormal’ (Rosefielde, 2005) nature of the Russian 
society and to abandon orthodoxy in their analysis, critique and policy 
recommendations (O’Donnell, 1996; Hedlund, 1999, 2005; Rosefielde, 2005). At the 
same time, it is maintained that in order to ‘rid the legal system of direct political 
influence’, one needs to first and foremost redefine the relationship between the state 
and the law (Pistor, 1999). 
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3.2 The Forest Sector in Historical Perspective30 
Law Making and Enforcement 
‘Throughout the 19th century, there were numerous forestry and forest 
management experiments. One would create and destroy, constantly change 
principles, install opposite systems – one after another… We have tested in 
practice everything we invented ourselves and everything ready-made we 
received from the West’31 (Zhudra, 1875: 1-6) 
 
Zhudra describes the law-making process as inconsistent, unsystematic and radical. 
He believes that this ‘absence of the system’ and ‘contradictory arrangements’ caused 
‘unsatisfactory results’ of Russian forestry. (Ibid: 5) 
‘Everyone who often deals with the current Forest statute, knows well the 
utmost irregularity in the way it is organised, as well as the fact that few of 
statute’s articles are still valid: most of them have been repealed, others – 
changed, complemented; the rest, though still untouched, lost their 
significance.’ (Forest Journal, 1871. Issue 1: 79) 
‘I had a forest on Sheksna. Illegal felling was constant, forest guards would 
be tied together and would witness the logging. 10,000 trees were cut, I 
asked for 580 roubles, the court adjudged 260 roubles; 2.5 roubles were 
collected. I sold my estate, as I could not protect it.’ (Forest Journal, 1879, 
Book 4: 209) 
This anonymous entry indicates how illegal felling was a considerable problem. The 
concerned individual was able to get a court judgement for illegal felling on the land 
but collection of the dues as well as prevention of further felling continued to be an 
obstacle so the individual sold its estate. 
                                                 
30
 This chapter draws heavily on the Forest Journal – the first forestry periodical in Russia (published 
by St. Petersburg Forest Society (initially under the Ministry of State Property) since 1833) and the 
most influential forestry journal in the 19th century. 
31
 Zhudra / Forest Journal, 1875, Issue 16: 1-6 
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Other anonymous participants of the forest sector complain that ‘fines are heavy, but 
never levied’32, ‘only every tenth violator is caught, if anyone at all’33, i.e. despite the 
severity of the law, forest violators tend to remain unpunished. 
‘It turned out that all those scientific terms, such as ‘increment thinnings’, 
‘dark and light cutting areas’, etc just cleverly masked theft – robbery, theft 
and fraud… Forest management lost every credit, and rational forestry 
began to stand for minimum opportunity for abuse for the master himself… 
All economic measures and arrangements would ignore science, nature, and 
experience, but aim at protecting forest from forester’s inclination to steal.’ 
(Yegorov, 1915: 1021-1022) 
The quote from Yegorov indicates that illegal felling was carried out by foresters, i.e. 
by people appointed by the state to protect the forest. This situation shaped forest 
legislation, namely predetermined introduction of clear cutting as a predominant 
felling method (since clear cuttings are easier to control than increment thinnings), as 
well as ideas about rational forestry. 
 
‘My brothers have 60 thousand desyatin34 of forest, but they do not know 
how to protect it… Now guards have to walk in threes, because one requires 
at least two (sic!) witnesses. The law is flawed as it requires proof of forest 
crimes.’ (Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 210) 
 
This, also anonymous, source expresses concern about protection of private forests. 
He notes that cases of illegal logging are hard to take to court, because the law 
requires steadfast proof of forest violations, which is difficult to provide.  
Landlords often considered forestry ‘unprofitable’, and therefore forests were often 
sold or converted into plough land35.  
                                                 
32
 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 209 
33
 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 201 
34
 One desyatin used to be a land square measurement unit equal to 1.09 hectares.  
35
 Journal of Ministry of State Properties, 1864, January: 113 
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‘As long as our economy was based not so much on exploitation of natural 
forces, but more on exploitation of human labour, plough land and fields – 
even the worst ones – were bound to look more lucrative than forests, where 
one could not apply free labour a lot.’ (Journal of Ministry of State 
Properties, 1864, January: 113) 
Other reasons that caused landlords to fell forests and treat them without due care 
included: inability to use forests as a pledge (because ‘it is impossible to accurately 
evaluate the vast forests and because it is difficult to control the way they are 
managed’36) and consequent shortage of credit for private forest owners37; traditional 
Russian rural institutions, such as overlapping of field strips (cherespolositsa)38. 
Among legislative shortcomings that provoked wood felling an important role was 
played by taxation system. 
‘Rational forestry can be afforded only by rich people, who have free 
capital; and such forest husbandry is run as a charity… It is necessary to 
encourage forestry through taxation system, and make it more lucrative.’ 
(Forest Journal, 1895. Issue 4: 522, 524) 
Land and forest taxes varied between different regions. Sometimes they were forestry 
supportive, but in most cases forest-destructive, since plough land and forest land 
were often taxed at the same rate39, whereas return rates on bank capital were over 
three times higher than return rates on forestry.40  
State, Society, Interactions 
Some traits of the interaction between the state and societal groups in the 19th century 
found reflection in the issue of forest protection and illegal felling. Peasant forests 
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 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 219 
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 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 219; Works of the IVth All-Russian Congress, 1879: 36 
38
 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 204-207; Abstracts from the Works of the Commission…/ Forest 
Journal. Book 1. 1879: 16-34 
39
 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 203 
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 Forest Journal, 1895. Issue 4: 522-524 
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used to be cut illegally ‘almost entirely by peasants of the same communities that own 
the forests’41.  
One of the reasons that peasants cut wood was seasonal unemployment and lack of 
skills that could be used during winter (i.e., when there was no agricultural work)42. 
The government failed to encourage other crafts and industries so peasants would ‘cut 
wood themselves and sell firewood, or sell it on the stump to lumbermen’43.  
Peasant forests were guarded by forest rangers ‘who were elected among state 
peasants for the period of three years’ (Ibid: 115), i.e. the forest ranger had to protect 
the forest from the people who hired him and on whom he depended – as an employee 
and as a member of the community.  
‘Incidents of theft and arson are very frequent; a forester was killed in broad 
daylight and in the middle of the village, the criminals were not found, 
although everyone knows them…’ (Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 202) 
Both examples show how it was society, not the state that sanctioned theft and 
tolerated impunity of forest violators. Several sources indicate that peasants ‘do not 
consider wood felling as theft’ and therefore support their fellow villagers.44 Local 
communities and the state considered forest property rights differently. The local 
population was convinced that forest was ‘not grown by the landlord, but by God’45 
and ‘should belong to everyone’46. So, any logging restrictions could also cause 
cutting ‘out of spite’:  
‘Plots are ruthlessly cut, without any need or profit, and timber is either sold 
almost for free or stays to rot.’   (Forest Journal, 1879, Book 2: 114-116) 
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 Journal of the Ministry of State Properties. Part 87. 1864, September. St. Petersburg, 1864: 6-7 
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 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 2: 114-116; Forest Journal, 1879, Book 7: 416-419; Forest Journal, 1879, 
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The population considered state bodies and judicial courts as powerless and ‘unable to 
do anything against wood felling’47.  
‘A forester, in the eyes of peasants, is a punishing person, an enemy with 
whom they are in the continuous state of war. Announcements of forest 
administration that are sent to the volost’ administration, are neatly filed 
together or put on the walls, where, surely, no one reads them.’ (Forest 
Journal, 1879, Book 2: 114-116) 
We see how peasant communities and foresters were in a state of conflict with each 
other, and that the local peasant population ignored state forest policies and 
instructions. 
An anonymous source suggests that peasants were not persuaded ‘that this or that 
forest land is under state control for their own good’, and that state forest 
management bodies were not ‘authoritative in peasants’ eyes’ (Forest Journal, 1879, 
Book 2: 116-117). 
The above evidence suggests that the rule of law was very weak in the 19th century 
forest sector, and interaction between state and non-state actors was to a great extent 
shaped by informal institutions. 
Problems of the forest sector caused debates about forest property rights. Some state 
officials in pre-1917 Russia supported private property rights and said that the 
government should not take drastic measures that might constrain private property 
rights.48 Other participants of the forest sector expressed their concern that private 
forests were in a ‘desolate condition’ (Anon. In: Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 204) 
and were ‘destroyed by the owners themselves’ (Anon. In: Forest Journal, 1879, Book 
4: 205). Private forestry is said to be pursuing the goal of ‘maximum profit, i.e. far 
from the goal of state forestry’49. 
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 Forest Journal, 1879, Book 4: 209 
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 Abstracts from the Works of the Commission…/ Forest Journal. Book 1. 1879: 20; Forest Journal. 
1871, Issue 1: 41 
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 Kuznetsov / Forest Journal, 1917. Issue 9-10: 658 
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‘Once the owner dies, the experienced forester leaves, there is a lack of 
money, and nothing is there anymore from the one-time forest that was 
nurtured with care during many dozens of years – apart from memory.’ 
(Kuznetsov / Forest Journal, 1917. Issue 9-10: 658) 
Kuznetsov argues that private forestry may suffer from financial constraints, lack of 
expert knowledge and to be ‘accidental’, ‘not notable for particular sustainability, 
continuity or consistency’ (Ibid: 658). 
In a special survey carried out among foresters from various regions, a frequent 
answer to the question of whether peasants treat forests that they were allotted with 
care, was ‘They have already cut and sold almost everything.’ (Forest Journal, 1879, 
Book 4: 214) 
‘Hardly 30 years have passed since the experiment of giving forests to state 
owned peasants, where they were allotted about seven million desyatins of 
forest. Most part of these forests were destroyed shortly thereafter.’ 
(Kuznetsov / Forest Journal, 1917. Issue 9-10: 657) 
Kuznetsov indicates his disappointment with the results of the Emancipation reform 
of 1861, after which peasants were granted the right to buy the land that they 
previously worked on, but used it wastefully. 
There is evidence50 that peasants were willing to buy out forest land which was not 
always the case with plough land, because, unlike plough land51, they would gain 
immediate and total control over forests and would not depend on administration 
anymore. However, right after the emancipation, once every state intervention in the 
exploitation of peasant forest ceased, and peasants became in this regard totally free, 
they preferred to immediately fell the wood, at least partly.  
In response to this it was argued that since the problems were fundamental and rooted 
in the very socio-economic system of the country, where local community and private 
bodies could not cope with common interest issues, measures should be radical, 
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 Journal of the Ministry of State Properties. Part 87. 1864, September: 5 
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 As they would not be able to buy the whole land plot at once, administrative control would be there 
for a long time, i.e. peasants saw no difference for them before and after ransom. 
 82 
namely all forests should be put under governmental trusteeship.52 However, there 
was no univocal conclusion on this issue. As there was no substantial evidence that it 
was the property rights structure that unambiguously caused forest mismanagement. 
 
3.3 Analytical Framework 
 
After the previous chapters explored the interactive relationship between structure and 
agency, nature and society; the specificity of state-society interaction in the Russian 
case; and pointed out how past paths of development may restrict opportunities of 
future change, this section presents an analytical framework for analysis of 
institutional change in the Russian forest sector (Figure 1). 
 
This analytical framework accounts for economic, political, social, environmental, 
cultural, and historical factors affecting institutional change in the Russian forest 
sector. The process of institutional change in the Russian forest sector is analysed 
through the prism of state-society interaction. The Figure 1 shows major links and 
interconnections between stakeholders of the forest sector, who constitute state and 
society. Some obvious legal links (e.g. between state bodies) have been omitted. The 
arrows between each pair of actors indicate the ability to influence each other’s 
behaviour.   
 
The Russian state is a complex body, which consists of federal, regional and local 
governments and forest management organs, which may or may not enter into 
conflicts and clashes with each other. It also encompasses state companies, which 
may differ in certain respects (policies, practices, role and power) from their private 
counterparts. 
 
The society is made up of local communities and activist groups, domestic and global 
non-governmental organizations, domestic and global private companies. 
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 Zhudra / Forest Journal, 1876, Issue 3: 6-7; Ponomarev / Forest Journal. 1895, Issue 2: 117-120; 
Kuznetsov / Forest Journal, 1917. Issue 9-10: 657-658 
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Institutional change of the forest sector occurs at the intersection of state–society 
interactions. However, it is also influenced by further three big sets of factors (which 
also affect society and state): 1) past practices (history of society, state, and forestry 
practice in the country); 2) global social environment (including global forest 
management practices, beliefs and demands of the global community, etc); and 3) 
global natural environment (global forest resources). 
 
All elements of Figure 1 (except ‘Past practice’) may be considered, under certain 
circumstances, as agency or structure. For instance, local community (with its 
particular customs and common practices) may limit the spectrum of state forest 
policy measures (and thus act as structure). At the same time, local community may 
play the role of an agent and drive the change (e.g., through campaigns, active interest 
in forest management, etc). Similarly, state bodies may stimulate or, on the contrary, 
stifle the development of NGOs or timber companies (through legislation, state 
programmes, budgets, administrative tools, etc). Links between other actors can be 
described in a comparable way. The nature of actors’ dialogue and interaction with 
each other, mechanisms of feedback and cooperation predetermine the path of 
institutional change in the forest sector. 
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Figure 1. Analytical Framework for Analysis of Institutional Change in the Russian 
Forest Sector 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on the theoretical literature reviewed above 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed Russian forestry in historical perspective, and the effect of past 
practices on the state and non-state participants of the forest sector today (the top 
elements of Figure 1). It analysed major issues of the Russian forestry in the second 
half of the 19th century. It revealed that there were two main problematic areas: 1) 
legislation and law enforcement, and 2) relations between social groups, as well as 
between society and the state. Existing legislation, whilst being inconsistent, 
contradictory, unsystematic and ignoring major principles of sustainable forest use, 
did not provide a necessary ground for adequate forest protection. The taxation 
system made forestry unprofitable in comparison to other economic activities and 
caused forest felling, and caused a perception of forests, as something valueless and 
not worth preserving.  
Poor law enforcement was related to the nature of state–society interaction. There was 
a conflict between society’s needs (e.g. employment) and the state’s policies. This led 
to open conflicts between civil servants / state foresters and local communities (over 
the issue of illegal felling). Locally elected forest rangers, whilst being supportive of 
and dependent on their community and at the same time being obliged to protect the 
forest, found themselves in a situation of the conflict of interests. 
Some conflicts between state and society were caused by different views on forest 
ownership and rights of forest use. Moreover, the local population did not necessarily 
consider state bodies as legitimate or powerful, and therefore could ignore state 
regulations. Forest law violations were caused both by state policies and by the 
attitudes of local communities.  
Issues of the Russian forestry were located into a wider context of state-society 
interaction. It is important to separate the state from society - as two major types of 
actors - when studying Russian forestry (in Figure 1, state and non-state actors are 
indicated on the opposite sides). Russian and Western literatures on the nature of the 
Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet Russian state were reviewed. The chapter revealed the 
special nature of the Russian society, state and history. The Soviet / Russian state is 
widely regarded as a central element in the institutional system: an apparatus of 
violence and coercion, with a dominating role of state bureaucracy.  
 86 
Some major arguments about relations of state and society were reviewed. The Soviet 
state is seen by researchers as opposing the society, subsuming and shaping the 
society, as being relatively autonomous from the society, or submerged into society 
and constantly co-evolving with it.  
The Russian state has undergone certain changes during the period of its existence: 
the extent of its autonomy and capacity is believed to have been changing with the 
rise and decline of the Soviet regime. 
The role of power distribution and elites in reforming state and society was discussed. 
Some arguments were presented about particularly strong ties between power and 
property as a characteristic feature of the Russian state and as a crucial concept 
(power-property) for understanding the class structure and developments in the 
society. 
Different analytical perspectives on the Russian state were presented: state as a 
complex actor; and state as a resource that is used by actors for personal ends 
(‘privatised state’, ‘feeding bowl’, etc).  
Russian researchers tend to put a lot of emphasis on the path-dependence of the 
Russian socio-economic and political development. There is a tendency to explain 
problems of the modern Russia through long-lasting traditions and social practices.  
The discussed features of the emerging post-Soviet state included ‘informal 
institutionalisation’, ‘unrule of law’, as well as intricate and selective relationships 
between state and non-state actors. 
The Russian state and society may be specific enough to make their analysis through 
the prism of Western conceptual frameworks not helpful and, therefore, calling for 
new approaches and analytical apparatus. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY  
This chapter aims to outline the methodology of the thesis and discuss its limitations. 
First, general methodological considerations are outlined. Second, the involvement of 
the researcher herself is explored. Third, the research strategy and approach, including 
the inter-disciplinarity of the thesis, are discussed. The main stages of the research 
project and the employed research techniques are presented. 
4.1 Methodological Considerations 
The nature of my research question (How and why do institutions change in the 
Russian forest sector?) predetermined my choice of methodological approach and 
techniques. The two main research questions of the thesis are ‘How and why do 
institutions change in the Russian forest sector?’ In order to answer these questions, I 
need to examine the process of and development of formal and informal institutions, 
as well as factors that prevent certain institutions from coming into being and what 
makes certain factors determinant for particular trajectories of development in the 
forest sector. Qualitative studies are particularly valuable for research that delves in 
depth into complex processes (of which societal processes and innovative processes 
are examples), exploration of interaction between policies and practices, research of 
informal or unstructured linkages and processes in communities, research on real as 
opposed to stated organisational goals, and research for which relevant variables have 
yet to be identified.  (Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 53) All of these have to be dealt 
with in my research. This research is mostly exploratory and descriptive, where a 
great role is played by the context, setting, participants’ interpretation and experiences 
- an area where qualitative research methods are believed to have a potential to 
capture more (Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 54).  The intention of the study is to aim 
at a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of institutional change in the Russian 
forest sector, instead of simple correlational statements with a limited list of pre-
defined variables. A number of concepts and phenomena that I deal with are difficult 
to quantify or precisely measure (such as characteristics of the state, interactions 
between stakeholders, informal relations in the society, etc). In this study, I listen to 
voices of different stakeholders in the Russian forest sector and analyse their vision 
and interpretation of the situation. Hence, qualitative techniques appear more 
appropriate. 
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‘Those of us who aim to understand and document others’ understandings 
choose qualitative interviewing because it provides us with a means for 
exploring the points of view of our research subjects, while granting these 
points of view the culturally honored status of reality.’ (Miller and Glassner, 
2004: 127) 
Qualitative studies intend to provide not so much objective, ‘pure’ pictures, or ‘mirror 
reflection’, of the social world obtained ‘in a sterilised context’ ‘that positivists strive 
for’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 125-126), but rather ‘access to the meanings people 
attribute to their experiences and social worlds’ (Ibid: 126). 
‘Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the 
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the 
situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers emphasize the 
value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to questions that stress 
how social experience is created and given meaning. In contrast, 
quantitative studies emphasize the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables, not processes. Proponents of such studies 
claim that their work is done from within a value-free framework.’ (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2003: 13) 
At the same time, one should not go too far in stressing the social constructedness of 
reality. In this respect, I join Miller and Glassner (2004) in their belief that it is 
possible to learn about the social world beyond the interview in analyses of interview 
data (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 126). 
All of this justifies my choice in favour of qualitative research methods. What also 
attracted me was that due to its focus on discovery, qualitative research allows for a 
significant flexibility of research design. Qualitative studies encompass a wide array 
of interpretive activities and methodological practices, which include semiotics, 
narrative, content, discourse, archival and phonemic analysis, even statistics, tables, 
graphs, etc. (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 9; Miller et al, 2004: 326) The combination of 
different methods of data collection was necessary to explore my research question. 
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4.2 Positionality of the Researcher 
I realised that the researcher’s position within the project, namely the simultaneous 
status of the insider and of the outsider, affected my ability to engage with people I 
interviewed or observed, as well as to interpret the obtained data. My position also 
had a direct bearing on responses that I was given. On the one hand, my being 
Russian and having spent most of my life in Russia made my research in certain 
respects easier (such as communicating with interviewees in their native language, 
obtaining access to certain sites and respondents, establishing research and working 
relationships with participants of the forest sector, and interpreting data). In the recent 
years, there has been a trend within sociology ‘to move from an understanding of 
social life through structures and systems to a growing appreciation of contingencies 
and uncertainties, coupled with a growing sense of cultural diversity’ (Featherstone 
and Lash, 1999: 1). As Scott Lash argues, communal knowledge is ‘hermeneutic 
knowledge and the latter is only possible when the knower is in the same world as and 
‘dwells among’ the things and other human beings whose truth she seeks. Community 
does not involve chronic problematization of the signifier, but is instead rooted in 
shared meanings and routine background practices’ (Beck, Giddens, and Lash, 1994: 
157). 
 
My Russian identity was important for gaining entry into some physical spaces 
(Russian old-style private companies, state organisations, academic institutions), as 
well as the cultural and discursive space (understanding their world views and implicit 
and ‘between the lines’ statements). Very often, interviewees were more open and 
direct with me than with foreign researchers (which I witnessed on several occasions 
when I first talked face to face to interviewees and later on approached them as 
member of a mixed group of Russian and foreign researchers). 
On the other hand, I am a student at a Western university and, hence, often perceived 
as someone ‘from a different system’ and, therefore, raising suspicion. In some 
situations, my part-time collaboration with a Russian non-state research institute also 
caused certain distrust between interviewees and myself. 
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It is also necessary to make a reservation that in the process of data collection and 
analysis, I was guided by my intuition, based on previous knowledge about history, 
culture and societal processes in Russia and situation in the Russian forest sector. 
I tried to avoid two main types of threats to validity – researcher’s bias and the effect 
of the researcher on the individuals studied (‘reactivity’) (Maxwell, 2004: 108). I 
understand that my research has been influenced by my own preconceptions and 
paradigms. As Geertz put it (Geertz, 1973: 9), ‘what we call our data are really our 
own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots 
are up to’. I was trying to reduce the potential impact of my views on respondents’ 
answers (at the preparatory stage, while designing interviews and in the course of 
interviews themselves). Similarly, caution was taken not to over-interpret the data or 
to offer any pre-determined conclusions. However, I did not strive to completely 
eliminate my personal influence on the outcome of the study, but rather to make sure I 
am honest about my position.  
‘Qualitative research is not primarily concerned with eliminating variance 
between researchers in the values and expectations they bring to the study, 
but with understanding how a particular researcher’s values and 
expectations influence the conduct and conclusions of the study.’ (Maxwell, 
2004: 108) 
Qualitative researchers seem to agree that ‘interviews are not neutral tools of data 
gathering, but active interactions between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, 
contextually based results’ (Fontana and Frey, 2003: 62).  
‘Each interview context is one of interaction and relation; the result is as 
much a product of this social dynamic as it is a product of accurate accounts 
and replies.’ (Ibid: 64) 
The interactive nature of all interviews was similarly emphasized by Holstein and 
Gubrium (2004: 140), Miller and Glassner (2004: 135).  
During my research, I acted not only as an interviewer or an observer, but also 
became an observing participant. I took part in a week-long training seminar and 
round tables on the forest certification and sustainable forestry practices in the North-
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West of Russia (organized for logging companies). I participated in a working group 
carried out in Petrozavodsk as part of the process of creating a new Model Forest in 
the Republic of Karelia (with participants from the private sector, state agencies, 
academia, local population, and NGOs). In Summer 2007, I participated in consulting 
projects for Segezha pulp-and-paper plant and Stora Enso. In May - September 2007, 
I was involved in organization of public hearings regarding forestry issues in Segezha, 
Valday and Opol’ye. So, I was actively engaged not only in understanding ongoing 
changes in the forest sector, but also in implementing them. 
4.3 Research Strategy and Approach 
4.3.1 Inter-disciplinarity of research  
Research for this dissertation is inter-disciplinary. First, institutional analysis lies at 
the intersection of economics, political economy, politics, law, sociology, psychology, 
history and possibly other disciplines. This is particularly true for studies related to 
natural resources and forestry, for forests exist and develop in political, legal, 
economical, demographical and social surroundings and are exposed to human 
influence in many different ways (Ernst (2000); Nakashizuka (2007)). Forest-related 
problems are very complex both in ecological and social terms. The necessity of 
interdisciplinary approach to forest-related issues has been demonstrated by e.g.  
Marcin (1995); Walters, Sabogal, Snook, and Almeida (2005); Berkes, Folke, Colding 
(2000). 
Second, my project is meant to encompass studies of current and earlier trends of 
development and, hence, requires different techniques that would allow analysis of 
phenomena of ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’. In order to retrieve complete (or at least as 
complete and comprehensive as possible) information about ongoing processes, it 
appears necessary to employ not only analysis of written texts (as in the case of 
historical analysis), but also more interactional methods. So, several approaches were 
blended, including archival and comparative historical analysis, participant 
observation, interviews, and textual analysis.  
However, the trend of interdisciplinary work is not one that could be found in Russian 
studies of the forest sector. I have found no other studies applying my methodological 
approach to the Russian context and to the issues I study. There have been individual 
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studies – either providing historical reviews (e.g. Shutov, 1991, 2002) or studies of a 
narrow range of current problems (e.g. Tysiachniouk 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
However, I have not encountered any studies that aimed to provide a broader picture 
and blend several approaches. 
4.3.2 Main stages of the research 
Archives 
In the study, I refer to primary and secondary sources of information. Secondary 
sources (including specialised literature, current periodical literature, and on-line 
resources) added historical depth to my analysis that would have been otherwise 
unattainable given the limited time-frame of my research.  
There were two major parts to my research related to collection and analysis of 
primary sources. The first stage was gathering and analysis of historical data. During 
the first four months of my fieldwork, I was conducting research on the historical 
development of the Russian Forest sector – mainly in the archives of the National 
Library of Russia (St. Petersburg) and the library of the St. Petersburg State Forest-
Technical Academy (founded in 1803 and later becoming the biggest library of forest 
literature world-wide). The sources studied were mostly primary sources of the 
second half of the 19th century and early 20th century. 
The second part of my research was focused on contemporary situation and the main 
tools were interviews and participant observation. This part of research consisted of 
four major steps, which were sometimes made consecutively and sometimes 
simultaneously: selecting sites and participants, establishing research relationships 
with participants of the forest sector, data collection, and data analysis. 
Sampling and Selection of Sites and Participants  
The study required a multi-sited and multi-vocal approach. Being ‘multi-vocal’ 
implied that care was taken to listen to and represent a broad range of views from 
those interviewed.  Based on the depth and breadth of interviews conducted, not every 
detail could be incorporated. However, careful and repeated coding of interviews 
aimed to ensure that principle themes were represented fairly.  
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(a) Sampling 
The sampling in my research was ‘purposive’, or ‘theoretical’ (Robson, 2002: 193). 
Purposeful, or theoretical, sampling implies that potential sites and respondents were 
considered and compared in terms of information I would be able to obtain and its 
utility for the goals of my project and theoretical constructions (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998; Glaser and Strauss, 1977). Thus, four major geographic areas were decided 
upon: Moscow (where several key NGOs are based), St.Petersburg (due to its major 
libraries with archives, forest research institutions, as well as headquarters of several 
major business players in the timber sector), the North-West (European part of 
Russia) and the Far East of Russia (Asian part of Russia) (as regions of particular 
importance in terms of endowment with forest resources and scale of forest industry 
operations, as well as two cases of different histories and different forestry traditions, 
economic development, proximity to different markets, distance to Moscow, natural-
physical characteristics, etc). The title of this dissertation points to an examination of 
forest sector in ‘Russia’. However, regions of Russia are most diverse and the 
material presented here cannot speak for all parts of the country and all stakeholders 
of the forest sector. Conducting more case studies in other regions would most likely 
have complicated the picture. However, the analysis here does not claim to provide a 
complete picture, but rather to provide an examination of the key ongoing process and 
identify some key points. So, why did I choose those regions? 
(b) North-West Fieldwork 
North-West Russia includes the Republics of Karelia and Komi and the Archangel, 
Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod, Vologda and Pskov Oblast (regions). In addition to 
these regions, the official Federal District of Northwest Russia includes the City of 
St.Petersburg, Kaliningrad Oblast and Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Russian units of 
regional administration are Republic, Federal City, Oblast (region), Autonomous 
Oblast, Autonomous Okrug (district), and Krai (district), which all have the equal 
status of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. The North-West Federal 
District has a very intensively operating forest industry sector and ranks first in Russia 
according to production of wood products. The Russian North-West accounts for the 
production of 30% of Russian sawnwood, 40% of plywood, about 40% of commercial 
timber, 50% of cardboard, and 60% of paper (Sokolov, 2005). 
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The research was carried out in the Republic of Karelia and Leningrad Oblast. The 
Republic of Karelia is one of the leading forest regions in the European part of Russia. 
According to official statistics as of 1998, the total area of the forest fund in Karelia 
amounted to 82% of the Republic’s territory, including land covered by forest (63% 
of Republic’s territory). Forest industry provides 30% of the income of Karelian 
budget (Opyonyshev, 2001). 
In the Leningrad Oblast, the share of the pulp-and-paper and woodworking industry in 
the overall industrial production of the Leningrad region amounts to 12.4%. Thanks to 
its forest resources, the province is one of the leading zones in the North-West of 
Russia in forest harvesting, woodworking and timber export (Government of 
Leningrad Oblast…). 
(c) Far East Fieldwork 
The Far-Eastern Federal District comprises nine provinces, namely the Republic of 
Sakha, Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Amur Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Magadan 
Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug. According to Russian forest standards, the majority of Russian Far Eastern 
provinces are classified as well-forested regions (Sheingauz, 2000: 134). The Russian 
Far East has long been regarded by Russian authorities as a timber resource base.  
In the Far Eastern part of Russia, I visited and studied two regions that appeared most 
significant for the forest sector and where regional timber production is concentrated, 
namely Khabarovsk Krai and Primorsky Krai. Khabarovsk Krai is the third most 
important region of Russia and the most important region in the Far Eastern Federal 
District according to its production of commercial timber. Most of this timber is 
exported. I was also attracted to this region by the changing trends in the timber trade. 
For instance, whereas in 1998, 79% of exported timber was sold to Japan and only 
about 7% to China; in 2006, 28% was sold to Japan and 61% to China. This has a big 
impact on the forest sector inside Russia, for over 90% of the Krai’s timber products 
are exported, and predominant item of export is round unprocessed wood (95-97%). 
About 18 thousand people are employed in the forest sector of Khabarovsk Krai. The 
forest sector contributes about 20% to currency earnings of the Krai (Official website 
of the Government of the Khabarovsk Krai (a)). The share of the forest sector in the 
total volume of industrial production of the Krai amounts to about 13%; its share in 
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the Krai’s revenue from industry being about 10% (in 2006) (Official website of the 
Government of the Khabarovsk Krai (b)). 
The situation in the forest sector of Primorsky Krai is in many respects similar to 
Khabarovsk Krai. Despite its significant potential, the forest sector of the Krai is in a 
condition of crisis and contributes only about 7% to the Krai’s total volume of 
production (2003) (The Programme of Development of the Forest Industry Complex 
of Primorsky Krai..., 2004: 85). It is the fourth largest source of revenue for the 
regional budget (The Programme of Development of the Forest Industry Complex of 
Primorsky Krai..., 2004: 89). The structure of the region’s forest sector is similar to 
that of Khabarovsk Krai: most of timber produced (four fifths of all timber products) 
is exported as round wood (84% of exported forest products in 2003) to Asian 
markets. About 14 thousand people are officially employed in the forest sector of the 
Krai, i.e. about 9% of the population (The Programme of Development of the Forest 
Industry Complex of Primorsky Krai..., 2004: 17). 
The geography of my research covered big cities, towns, small villages and forest 
settlements. In order to reach interviewees, I had to travel by air (ten-hour flights), by 
train and by car. Long travel distances precluded me from carrying out multiple 
rounds of interviews with the same stakeholders. The geographical factor was also 
responsible for curtailing the list of potential interviewees (in numbers and 
geographically). Some respondents were hardly accessible, particularly during the 
winter period, for instance in remote forest settlements and leskhozes, which one 
could reach only by car and only under favourable weather conditions (due to lack of 
good roads). In certain cases, I did not have a chance to visit forest settlements and 
see the situation ‘on the ground’ with my own eyes (e.g., at the Tikhvinsky 
kompleksny lespromkhoz the staff of the company refused to take me to forest 
settlements on their lease when they were visiting those for public hearings and 
consultations, which may be telling in itself). 
(d) Selection 
There were two major ways in which individual respondents were chosen. Effort was 
made to select respondents in a purposeful way. Potential respondents were usually 
directors of organisations or directors of some departments within those organisations. 
However, other candidates were also considered where they had significant 
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experience and expertise. I believe that the data collected is representative of the 
ongoing processes in the forest sector not so much because of the quantity of 
interviews, but rather because an attempt was made to talk to some key figures in the 
sector, who dispose of trustworthy information. 
Where purposeful selection was not possible, respondents and sites within the above 
mentioned regions were selected randomly, based on the principle of ‘convenience’ 
selection (consideration of costs, convenience, access, including distances, availability 
for an interview, agreement to meet for an interview). In a number of cases, selection 
of interviewees in advance was impossible due to the ‘closed’ nature of many Russian 
companies and also lack of publicly available information about them online. 
Sometimes, selection was made on the spot, once I gained access to the site through 
snowball sampling, building a network of acquaintances and following their 
recommendations on who could be useful to talk to. There was a situation, however, 
when this approach did not work. In one of leskhozes I visited, the director of the 
leskhoz (Tikhvinsky), who I had interviewed, suggested that I should not talk to 
anyone else at the leskhoz, for ‘no one would describe things better than he did’ and, 
thus, attempted to stop me from contacting other potential respondents in that 
organisation.  
I realise that random selection is most effective and valid in qualitative studies with 
large sample sizes. However, this technique is also justified for small-scale qualitative 
studies where it is important to avoid any kind of favoritism in selecting interviewees 
and particularly in a situation of restricted access to interviewees at all. (Maxwell, 
2004: 88-89) 
Appendix A includes a list of locations and respondents, in order to reference 
individual comments.  
Establishing research relationships with participants of the forest sector  
(a) Self-presentation  
An important question for me was to decide on how I were to introduce and present 
myself and my research to potential interviewees, how I should be perceived by them, 
and what kind of relationship I should establish in order to gain their trust and achieve 
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the maximum result for my study and also to make sure that respondents gained, 
where possible, from our communication. For example, in return, I sometimes 
answered their questions e.g. about how one can apply to Cambridge, etc. Some 
respondents were very happy to give an interview, for information that they 
considered relevant would become spread and made known to a non-Russian 
community, which may, in turn, excercise some influence on the situation in Russia. 
Ethical issues of my research were considered. Informants were told that 
confidentiality would be maintained, and if they so chose their name would not be 
mentioned in the thesis. 
All of the above differed from one situation to another and depended on a number of 
factors: professional background and position of the respondent, whether they work 
for a state or a private organisation, whether it is a Russian or a foreign company, 
their age, their ideological views, how I met them (whether I was introduced to them 
by someone else), their experience with interviews, their interest in my research, etc. 
For instance, if a respondent was much older than myself, of a Soviet ‘school’ and 
very nationalistically minded, I would introduce myself as an alumni of St. Petersburg 
State University or as a researcher at a Russian research centre (which I was indeed at 
the time of the interview), but would skip the ‘Cambridge’ part of my CV. The reason 
was that on some occasions, ‘inadvertently, the researcher’s presentational self may 
be misrepresented’ (Fontana and Frey, 2003: 77): the ‘Cambridge’ part of my 
biography made me perceived as a spy (who studies on a foreign scholarship and left 
the country) or at least as someone unfriendly in respondents’ eyes, which created a 
certain barrier in our conversation and lowered the level of trust. However, in most 
cases, it was not necessary and my studies and research attracted the interest of 
interviewees. 
Sometimes, even though I defined myself as a student from a foreign or Russian 
university or as a researcher from a Russian research institute, people assumed that I 
was there to represent a bigger organisation with a certain capacity (perhaps to help 
them?), so they would start complain to me about their issues (e.g. a situation in the 
Leningrad Oblast). There was also a situation when I had a feeling that I was taken for 
a controller or an inspector when I gained access to a branch of a company through 
their head office and when introducing myself I had to say that I was directed to them 
from their Moscow office (although I was also very clear about my research and 
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where I come from) – otherwise my chances of getting interviews in that branch 
would have been very slim. I encountered the same access problem in some state 
organisations: people would refuse to talk to me unless I was sent to them from a 
higher ranking organisation or official. Because of the false identification of myself as 
an inspector or a controller, some respondents were afraid and very cautious to 
disclose information of certain sort (for instance, to discuss contradictions between 
Russian legislation and international standards; defects of Russian legislation in 
general; or ‘politics’ (e.g., my interview at the Tikhvinsky kompleksny lespromkhoz). 
And even if not taken for an inspector, I was still sometimes perceived as someone 
from ‘outside’ the company, so respondents tried to avoid certain topics during 
conversation, in order not to create a negative image of their organisation (e.g. even in 
the St.Petersburg office of UPM). For this reason, some respondents requested that 
the interview were neither audio-recorded, nor recorded in writing. Thus, interviewees 
at the press office of Segezha pulp-and-paper plant and at the Tikhvinsky kompleksny 
lespromkhoz asked to not only switch off the audio-recorder, but also to put it away. 
A number of respondents felt uncomfortable at the sight of an audio-recorder and did 
not want to share information on certain topics, so I took notes in handwriting. 
(b) Access 
There were two main ways to gain access to sites and respondents: by directly 
contacting them by email and / or phone calls or even going directly to their office, if 
no relevant information about employees and their contacts was available, or if 
potential respondents travel a lot (e.g. to logging sites) or are ‘busy’, which makes 
pre-arranged meetings problematic); or through someone else. The first method 
worked with NGOs, some academic institutions and some companies. My meetings 
with directors were pre-arranged, whereas my tactics for lower-ranking interviewees 
was often different: I would often just come to an office and find out on the spot who 
is available for a conversation. This is why a spontaneous modifying of interview 
questions was often necessary: depending on the respondent’s position, occupation, 
background, knowledge of certain areas, experience in the sector (e.g., whether they 
worked during the Soviet time as well or only after 1990) etc. In my experience, there 
was a distinct difference between some Russian and foreign respondents (first and 
foremost, representatives of the private sector) in how willing they were to engage in 
a dialogue and discuss existing problems and conflicts in the sector (some Russian 
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respondents being more reluctant). This certainly had an impact on the sample of 
interviews, for instance, Western companies generally appear more open for contact 
and their representatives are easier to access for an interview. 
However, this approach was bound to fail in case of a number of state organisations 
and some employees of some private companies. So, in such situations I either tried to 
persist or referred to someone inside those organisations or someone working in those 
organisations for help. Thus, I succeeded in a case of Swedwood company, whose 
employee and a potential respondent was most reluctant to enter any conversation or 
meet without preliminary agreed and approved (by the respondent) list of questions 
(via email).  Had I sent the list of my questions, it was very likely to have resulted in 
formal and very short answers carrying no relevant information for the study. I failed 
in a case when several respondents from state organisations, e.g., Forestry Agency for 
Leningrad Oblast and the city of St.Petersburg, were reluctant to enter any kind of 
conversation at all (the responses I was given included such as ‘everyone is busy’, 
‘everyone is on holiday, there is no one to talk to you’, and ‘I do not know anything 
about the Forest Code’. 
The first thing I did when I came to Russia for my fieldwork in 2007 was to contact 
research institutions who were actively engaged in studies of the Russian forest sector 
and within them to find ‘an insider, a member of the group studied, who is willing to 
be an informant and act as a guide and a translator of cultural mores and, at times, 
jargon or language’ (Fontana and Frey, 2003: 77). Two major organisations in this 
respect were the St. Petersburg State Forest-Technical Academy (which I then, having 
met with a lack of interest in collaboration, mostly visited for their unique specialised 
library, rather than cooperation) and Centre for Independent Social Research (St. 
Petersburg). This approach (e.g. in some cases, I had some preliminary information 
about possible respondents, their willingness to share information, possible 
ideological inclinations, etc) helped me to save time and avoid certain mistakes. 
Some parts of my fieldwork were carried out with organisational support of members 
of the Centre for Independent Social Research (St.Petersburg) – they helped me to 
establish some contacts and arrange some fieldtrips (Segezha pulp-and-paper plant 
(where an employee of the plant had to request several day-entry passes for me), a trip 
to a remote forest settlement Valday (in Karelia); participation in several public 
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hearings; participation in a working group about the new model forest ‘Segozerye’ 
(privatel, state and NGO sectors, as well as local activists and academia), which took 
place in Petrozavodsk (Karelia).  
Sometimes in conjunction with other researchers associated with the Centre for 
Independent Social Research, I interviewed several civil servants and companies in 
the Far East of Russia (through the director of the NGO BROC), several private 
companies in St. Petersburg (through a friend who personally knew them).  Some 
people, however, who I approached (a situation in a private commercial company and 
a state organisation) refused to provide contact information of people who could 
potentially agree to give an interview. 
Data collection 
In order to reduce the risk of my conclusions reflecting only certain biases or 
limitations of a specific source or method, I aimed to realise the so called 
‘triangulation of data collection methods’, which allows for multiple perspectives and 
a broader picture (Maxwell, 2004: 93; Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 54). I combined 
various primary sources of information, substantiated with relevant secondary 
literature. Primary sources included archival materials, as well as ‘live’ interaction 
with participants of the forest sector. 
In the beginning, my approach to data collection was not completely structured, but 
quite flexible - it developed and was revised as I progressed further in my research. 
This allowed me to focus on particular phenomena, and design my own, individually 
tailored combination of methods. Thus, I ‘traded generalizability and comparability 
for internal validity and contextual understanding’ (Maxwell, 2004: 80 - 81), which is 
particularly useful for examination of processes relevant for my project.  
Two main methods of data collection in the field were (a) interview and (b) 
participant observation. 
(a) Interviews 
I chose interviewing as the main primary source of data for my project because it 
allows us to ‘generate useful information about lived experience and its meanings’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 47-48). I was interested in hearing different stories, 
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personal views and perceptions that would uncover informal institutions and patterns 
of social dynamics. Moreover, interviews appeared a most suitable tool for carrying 
out an in-depth analysis, which would allow to possibly identify issues that are not 
registered in official records, as well as some roots of existing problems. The aim was 
not to capture already known precise data or to explain certain phenomena within 
preestablished categories, but rather to attempt to ‘understand the complex behaviour 
of members of society without imposing any a priori categorisation that may limit the 
field of inquiry’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 125). To these ends, interview questions 
were organised into semi-structured in-depth interviews, most questions being open-
ended. 
There were two types of interviews: face-to-face (one respondent and one 
interviewer) and group interviews (one respondent and several (five) interviewers, 
who took turns in asking questions). Group interviews were carried out where it was 
impossible for me to gain access to interviewees on my own – either due to 
geographical remotedness or the unwillingness of the respondents to engage in face-
to-face discussions. Some interviews were formal, others less formal. Some 
interviews started in a formal setting but towards the end of the conversation the 
respondent would relax and talk in a much more informal and open manner. With 
several interviewees, interviews were conducted several times and in different 
conditions (e.g., venue, number of people present during the interview, different 
features of the audience present at the interview, etc). Where possible, I tried to make 
sure to conduct one-to-one interviews before the group interviews with the same 
respondents. This approach turned out very useful, for one-to-one interviews were, 
naturally, less formal and respondents were more open and provided more unofficial 
information, as well as shared their personal opinions more eagerly. The discourse 
produced in a group context would be different from the one produced in a private 
one-to-one conversation, however both may be equally valid. Moreover, during some 
group interviews, non-Russian researchers were present, which constrained the 
respondents even more, as they omitted details in their responses and some of them 
(e.g. state officials) tried to provide more positive information or to demonstrate their 
competence and successes. 
Due to access restrictions, no pilot interviews were conducted. However, questions 
were slightly modified (their order and phrasing) after several interviewing sessions. 
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Interviews were conducted with representatives of different groups and stakeholders 
of the Russian forest sector, namely the private sector (logging companies, wood-
processing companies, timber industry associations, auditing and consulting 
companies – international and Russian companies) (46 interviewees), public sector 
(local and regional administration, regional ministries, local forest management units) 
(10 interviewees), NGOs (17 interviewees), research institutions (10 interviewees), 
local population, including indigenous population (22 interviewees-informants, some 
of these interviews very short), activists and campaigners (2 interviewees). I gained 
access to those in a position of power and involved in the formulation of regional 
policies. I interviewed people who play a crucial role in organising and are leaders of 
the environmental movement in Russia. I also spoke with major players of the timber 
industry. 
Process of Questioning  
Having considered the debate ‘open-ended questions versus closed questions’ (Foddy, 
1994: 126 ff), I chose the former, as this tool appears more appropriate for answering 
the research question. I believe that in order to understand the nature and causes of 
ongoing institutional processes, one needs to minimise the level of delimitation 
inherent to question-posing and to focus on the ‘meanings that the respondents 
themselves assign’ to events (Foddy, 1994: 126). 
The format for interview questions adhered to principles of simplicity and concrete 
language (Foddy, 1994: 41). The phrasing used in the interviews changed depending 
on the individual (educational, professional, social background, and status). The 
interview-questions were written originally in Russian. For some interviewees, who 
felt more confident speaking English, they were translated into English (e.g. some 
representatives of foreign companies working in Russia). For a sample questionnaire 
see Appendix B. 
Being semi-structured, interviews varied a lot in how their pre-planned design was 
realised. With some respondents, I followed my preliminary order of questions, 
modifying them according to the situation, respondent’s replies and the flow of 
conversation. Usually, having introduced myself, I would begin with questions about 
the interviewee, their experience in the sector and in that particular organisation, their 
work and responsibilities. After that, I would ask general questions and gradually 
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move on to more specific ones, while also asking questions that helped me make sure 
I understood the respondent’s words correctly. 
The fact that my interviews were in-depth meant that participants’ perspectives on 
events mattered for me, and I tried to explore ‘a few general topics to help uncover 
the participant’s views but otherwise respect how the participant frames and 
structures the responses’ (Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 102). 
‘This method, in fact, is based on an assumption fundamental to qualitative 
research: The participant’s perspective on the phenomenon of interest 
should unfold as the participant views it (the emic perspective), not as the 
researcher views it (the etic perspective).’ (Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 
102) 
Questioning was systematised to a degree that was required by a multi-site and multi-
respondent nature of study. 
With some other respondents, I was asked to explain my area of interest and list my 
questions at the very beginning of the conversation, after which they produced a 
monologue (with some more questions afterwards), whereas I remained silent during 
most of their speech to allow respondents to speak openly without interruption. 
During such interviews, points of greatest interest would emerge. These interviews 
provided a wealth of information, confirming the claim that verbal data has become 
‘the keystone of contemporary social science’ (Foddy, 1994: 11).  
However, I recognise that verbal data may be at times unreliable or invalid. In some 
of my interviews (of rivalling and competing for resources parties (an NGO and a 
private logging company)), there were contradictions even with factual information. 
On another occasion, a non-state participant of the forest sector accused an NGO 
(who I also interviewed) of providing false information.  
Moreover, there is always a threat that interviews may generate not ‘authentic 
accounts of subjective experience’, but rather repetitions ‘of familiar cultural tales’ 
(Miller and Glassner, 2004: 125). Research participants, at least to some extent, draw 
on the ‘narratives that come out of the social worlds around them’ (Miller and 
Glassner, 2004: 134). 
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It has also been argued that interviews are social situations with their own agendas, 
and verbal responses may be given ‘not to communicate reality but rather to influence 
the interviewer’ (Bulmer and Warwick, 1983: 38). There were moments when I felt 
that responses of interviewees were directed at me as a foreign student: some 
respondents expressed their wish to get their message across to the international 
community via me. 
It also has to be noted that although I hoped that by asking open-ended questions, I 
would receive answers based on respondents’ own worldviews and conceptual 
frameworks, it may not have always been the case. The symbolic interactionist theory 
predicts that, instead, respondents will negotiate a shared definition of the situation 
with the researcher (Foddy, 1994: 19-21). The researcher is not neutral, but an active 
participant in creating and negotiating the interview responses (Silverman, 2004: 95). 
In other words, even though I was attempting to understand the respondents’ 
paradigms, these paradigms were influenced by my interaction. It is recognised 
(Foddy, 1994: 21) that respondents will look for clues to contextualise questions. So, 
it proved difficult to strike a balance between indicating what kind of information was 
required for my research and avoiding suggestive or leading questions. For instance, it 
is possible that some interviewees read my questions about their relations and 
cooperation with state bodies as an invitation to criticise state officials. 
The degree of outspokenness of interviewees differed a lot and depended on the 
individual state of mind; the degree of openness of the organisation they represent; on 
their culture (e.g., whether they are Russian or foreigners); on how burning and acute 
the discussed issues are for them, etc. 
(b) Observation 
‘Observation is used to discover complex interactions in a natural social 
setting. Even in studies using in-depth interviews, observation plays an 
important role as the researcher notes the interviewee’s body language and 
affect in addition to her words.’ (Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 98-99) 
Throughout my fieldtrip, I systematically took notes about my interactions, recorded 
all events, behaviour of participants of the forest sector, and my understanding of 
these, which I later used while analysing the data. Moreover, I was not only an 
 105 
observer but also, to some extent, a participant observer. Participant observation 
‘demands firsthand involvement in the social world chosen for study. ... This 
immersion offers the researcher the opportunity to learn directly from his own 
experience’ (Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 100). 
I tried to get involved immediately in the relevant context, culture and ongoing 
processes as much as I could and through my involvement to gain an intuitive 
understanding of what was going on and to understand the meaning of my 
observations and collected data (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002).  
I observed (while also being involved in their organisation) public hearings regarding 
forestry issues in Valdayes, Segezha, and Opol’ye. 
I participated in the process of implementation of the forest certification of the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) (e.g., at the Segezha pulp-and-paper plant and Stora 
Enso), being involved in consulting projects for them. I observed cooperation of 
private companies with NGOs (e.g., Investlesprom and the Centre for Independent 
Social Research; Stora Enso and the Centre for Independent Social Research). I 
participated in the joint writing of a handbook about the social aspect of forest 
certification (as an assistant with the NGO). I took part in a week-long training 
seminar and round tables on the forest certification and sustainable forestry practices 
in the North-West of Russia (organized for logging companies). 
I participated in a working group carried out in Petrozavodsk as part of the process of 
creating a new Model Forest ‘Segozerye’ in the Republic of Karelia (with participants 
from the private sector, state agencies, academia, local population and NGOs). 
As part of my participant observation, I was also able to collect a significant amount 
of documentary evidence, such as non-published letters between private companies 
and state bodies. 
Data analysis 
In my research, I worked with a relatively small set of data and put it to repeated and 
in-depth, line-by-line scrutinizing. This approach required a significant time input, but 
helped identify major themes at the initial stage of analysis (Ryan and Bernard, 
2003b) and allowed for a detailed inspection of material later on. 
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The fact that almost all interviews were held in the Russian language made 
transcribing and interpretation easier for me, but meant extra translation work. Neither 
transcribing nor translating were merely technical activities: ‘both entail judgement 
and interpretation’ (Marshall and Rossman, 2006: 110). Several Russian phrases for 
which there is no direct English equivalent or key words were left in brackets during 
translation. It is possible that in the English translation, some nuances of meanings 
were lost, however, I believe that I conveyed the essence of repondents’ messages.  
Data analysis and data collection were conducted close to each other. Analysis started 
immediately after finishing the first interview. I used two types of complementary 
strategies of analysis. The first one is the ‘categorising strategy’ of analysis: such 
analysis ‘fractures’ the initial data into discrete segments and re-sorts it into 
categories. At the same time, part of analysis was made according to the ‘connecting 
strategy’, aimed at understanding data in context.  Using a connecting strategy, I 
looked ‘for relationships that connect statements and events within a context into a 
coherent whole’ (Maxwell, 2004: 98). Connecting analysis helps understand 
particular individuals, their views, and situations (Maxwell, 2004: 99). 
For analysis, I coded all my data according to emerging themes. Themes were 
identified before (on the basis of a literature review and secondary sources), during, 
and after data collection (induced from collected primary data). Techniques used in 
the coding process included linguistic analysis (e.g., metaphors, repetitions etc) and 
analysis of the explicit and implicit content. I used the software ‘Evernote’ to organise 
my notes and transcribed interviews into a codebook and, thus, reduced the data 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003a: 276). 
I recognise that my approach to data analysis and interpretation of semi-structured 
interviews has its limitations. The very format of an interview ‘fractures’ and cuts the 
stories being told, so, in my analysis I have an opportunity to analyse only a part of 
the story. Moreover, ‘the research commits further fractures as well. The coding, 
categorisation, and typologising of stories result in telling only parts of stories, rather 
than presenting them in their ‘wholeness’’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 127-128). I do 
not claim to ground my analysis in ‘ideal’ texts, for the available data is bound to be 
incomplete in its representation of the worldviews and experiences of interviewees. 
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The next chapters will analyse the interviews conducted in order to discover the 
nature of and reasons for recent institutional development in the Russian forest sector. 
Conclusion 
In order to answer the research question, the thesis employs qualitative study 
techniques. The research is mostly exploratory and descriptive, therefore no 
hypotheses are offered at the beginning.  
The results of my studies have been affected by my dual position an insider and the 
outsider to the studied reality. This had a certain impact on my ability to engage with 
people I interviewed, as well interpretation of the data. 
The undertaken research is inter-disciplinary. This approach was deemed appropriate 
because the analysis covered institutions, in particular, institutions related to natural 
resources, which affect many aspects of human life. Moreover, my project juxtaposes 
phenomena from different periods of history, which also predetermined the 
combination of techniques. The study of historical forest management documents in 
the archives and in-depth interviews of major forestry stakeholders in the field 
(European and Far Eastern parts of Russia) were both seen as necessary in order to 
provide a comprehensive picture of institutional changes in the Russian forestry 
sector.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: FOREST SECTOR REFORM - TRENDS AND 
INNOVATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
After explaining the theoretical and analytical framework, as well as the methodology 
of this research, chapters five to seven of this dissertation present the results of 
interviews used to identify and analyse major processes of institutional change in the 
Russian forest sector. The novelty of this questionnaire lies in its attempt to provide a 
broad picture of changes in the sector and to juxtapose co-existing state and non-state 
induced processes, identify their major drivers, obstacles and consequences, as well as 
complex interactions between actors and their effect on the aggregate outcome – the 
institutional set-up of the forest sector. Chapter five explores the tools, process, costs 
and consequences of the state forest reform. Chapter six turns to the non-state agency 
and looks at model forests and voluntary forest certification. Chapter seven focuses on 
different aspects and challenges of interaction between state and non-state actors in 
the sector. 
The state is a major player in the Russian forest sector. Forest land is owned by the 
state in Russia53. Forestry planning is administered by the state (through state 
companies for forest management - lesoustroitelnye predpriyatiya). Prior to the 
reform, the main state bodies of forest management were leskhozes (until 2005, 
leskhozes functioned under three federal ministries – Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Defense). Most Russian forests (over 90%) 
were managed by leskhozes of the Ministry of Natural Resources. Leskhozes had a 
double role in the system of forest management. On the one hand, leskhozes were 
state administration responsible for organization of forest use, forest management, 
forest regeneration, forest protection and interaction of state forest bodies with the 
local population. On the other hand, leskhozes were forest users and had the right to 
carry out logging operations (selection felling (rubki promezhutochnogo polzovaniya) 
and other types of felling) in order to provide funding for forestry works 
(lesokhozyaystvennye meropriyatiya) and upkeep of their staff. The system of state 
forest management is being reformed at the moment. 
                                                 
53
 Forest Code of the Russian Federation 2006, Article 8 
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Apart from state participants in the forest sector, there are private logging, 
woodworking and wood processing companies, who lease forest plots, and NGOs, 
who have started to play a noticeable role since 1990s and have been trying to 
exercise influence on forestry practices and state forest policy.  
As outlined in Chapter Three of this thesis, development of the Russian forest sector 
is shaped to a great extent by two groups of factors: law (legislation and its 
enforcement) and relationships and conflicts between participants of the sector (state 
and society; different social groups). The current situation in the forest sector is 
described by interviewees below. 
‘Grey’ and ‘black’ sectors of the economy are significant… Even if control 
exists, it is on paper only.’ (N) 
The quote indicates the interviewee’s concern about poor law enforcement, legal and 
quasi-legal practices in the forest sector. Other representatives of the sector also note 
that ‘there has never been anything according to law’ (P) and that forged documents, 
violations of law during logging operations, final felling operations carried out under 
the guise of cleaning cutting, tax evasion and criminalization of small and medium 
business in the forest sector are common (P, N).  
‘They would pay to everyone – fiscal bodies, police, foresters, local 
administration… Every police chief has their own thieves’ brigade. The 
forest has already been divided up.’ (P) 
The quote indicates large-scale corruption and criminalisation of regional and local 
state agencies. It shows how actors abuse their power and use the state as a tool in 
private interests and as an illegal source of revenue.  
Forests are said to lack ‘khozyain’ (responsible owner and manager) (N). Law-makers 
and high-level officials in the Federal Government are considered ‘incompetent’ (N), 
‘far from practice’ (P); historically ‘self isolated’ and ignorant of forestry 
developments in other countries (N). Forest management ideas and approaches of 
civil servants (e.g., how and where logging operations and reforestation should be 
organised, etc) are said to be outdated and unable to face the emerging challenges, 
such as forest fires, forest regeneration, etc (P, N).  
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‘In Russia, there are a lot of talented people, but the system is inefficient, 
because it is always only one person who is right.’ (P) 
Authoritarian management culture and lack of democratic practices are believed to 
cause poor development of the forest sector. 
The issue of environmental and economic sustainability concerns the interviewees. 
They argue that it is necessary to curb extensive forest use (large-scale pioneer 
harvesting of virgin forests) (N, A). According to representatives of the private sector, 
principles of sustainable forest use are often abused during logging operations: 
undergrowth and soil are damaged; extensive felling is carried out beyond permitted 
logging boundaries; there are non-timber dumps in the forest (e.g., old equipment) 
(P). Issues of concern include biodiversity conservation (P, N, A); destruction of 
valuable low-disturbed forests (P, N); deterioration of forest quality (development of 
wastelands, soil deterioration; significant poor stands; coniferous species are often 
replaced by deciduous species as a consequence of felling operations) (A, N, S). 
Accessible forests are diminishing in Russia, not only in the North-Western, but also 
in the Eastern part of the country. A crisis of timber supply, in its turn, causes 
pressure on High Conservation Value and protective forests (N, S, P). 
There is still a great need for technological and managerial modernization of the 
sector, ‘equipment falls apart with tremendous speed’ (P). Because of poor 
infrastructure (a legacy of the Soviet period) companies are unable to reach the 
planned annual cut in accessible forests and ‘start to intrude into valuable protective 
forests’ (P). 
‘There are no processing facilities, but at the same time the annual 
calculated cut for aspen is quite significant in the region, which makes 
logging operations not profitable.’ (S) 
The quote indicates that available timber processing facilities are considered 
insufficient. Lack of processing facilities causes underutilization of logging sites, 
which is a reason of the sector’s low profitability. 
‘Today, the return on one hectar [of forest land] is 70 dollars in Russia and 
380 dollars abroad’. (P) 
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Non-timber forest-related economic sectors (such as tourism; non-timber forest 
products (ginseng, pine nuts, etc); ecosystem services, alternative energy 
technologies, complex use of timber (bark, tree tips…), biofuel, bark as fertiliser, 
etc) are said to be underdeveloped (N, P). 
Degradation of forestry science since 1990s is manifested in the lack of funding for 
research institutions; brain drain from the sector because of increasing unemployment 
and underpayment in forestry science and forestry sector in general and declining 
status of forestry and foresters (N). Destruction of scientific institutions brings grave 
consequences for the sector as a whole: ‘continuity in forestry is violated’ (A); 
‘trustworthy data about forests is lacking’ (N). Methods of calculating the annual 
allowable cut are outdated (dating back to the 1930s), which causes discrepancy 
between forest quality on paper and in reality (N, P). 
There is a lack of qualified labour force in the forest, ‘only drunkards are left in 
villages’ (P), which is partly caused by outward drain of qualified labour from 
forestry since 1990s (N). 
Due to commercialization of the sector and diminishing social guarantees from the 
state since 1990s, the situation with local ecology and local community welfare has 
deteriorated. Forest settlements see an increase in poverty, unemployment, drug and 
alcohol abuse, and very low income. 
‘Hunting, fishing etc industries were massively developed in the Soviet 
time. Villages were full of people, everyone made money. Timber 
harvesting was twice as much [in the Soviet time].’ (N) 
Local infrastructure, roads and housing in forest settlements are in decay. In the 
Soviet time, ‘there used to be seasonal delivery of vegetables… all maintenance 
works were paid for…The lespromkhoz had a housing construction plan. In order to 
fulfil this plan, we had resources and cement supplied…’ (P). 
Concerns are raised with regard to the supply of firewood for the local community; 
the forest as a recreational facility (as a place to go for a walk, to pick mushrooms and 
berries) and amenities (quality of water) (P). 
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The concerns of forest sector stakeholders today are very similar to those in the 19th 
century (briefly discussed in Chapter three): shortcomings of the legislation, illegal 
and excessive felling, low profitability of timber industry, conflicting interests of and 
lack of understanding between state authorities and other participants of the sector. In 
addition to these issues, today’s forest sector experiences additional, post-1991 
problems, such as degradation of forestry science. 
Incentives for Reform 
All interviews reflected awareness of the need to reform the forest sector. One of the 
reasons is said to be the developing market economy and the consequent need for 
modernization, as ‘the Forest Code of 1997 worked well then, but market 
relationships do not stand still’ (S).  
At the same time, it is noted that ‘no one carried out [outreach / explanatory] work’ 
with participants of the forest sector about the goals of the ongoing reform, ‘no one 
explained why the reform was started’ (N). So, interviewees express their personal 
vision of the incentives and aims of the reform.  
‘Our present authorities are concerned, first and foremost, with revenue 
from every resource available in the country…to make forests bring revenue 
comparable with oil and gas...’ (N) 
The above quoted NGO representative believes that a major incentive of state 
reformers is to raise returns of the forest sector to the federal budget (revenue). 
Another incentive is said to be cost reduction for the federal budget (N; S; P). 
‘The whole reform is about property redistribution - to make companies 
insolvent and buy them.’ (N) 
The quote indicates that private interests are seen to be a decisive factor in state forest 
policy. Some other interviewees argue that a major goal of the reform has been to 
enable the use of forest land for real estate development and construction purposes (P, 
N), ‘forest land seizure and consequent site development’ (N). The new Forest Code 
is said to have been lobbied by big timber companies, closely associated with civil 
servants (P). 
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Civil servants are believed to individually benefit from the reform through 
distribution of budget means among state agencies (N, A); corruption (P); their 
involvement in private business and deals with forest land (N, P). The state forest 
policy is regarded as institutionalised lawlessness. The forest reform initiated by the 
state is seen as legitimisation of informal and possibly illegal practices. Informal 
institutions are considered to be dominant in the sector, and the long-term principal 
feature of Russia’s political regime termed by (Gel’man, 2004) as ‘informal 
institutionalisation’ plays a crucial role in the ideology and realization of reform. 
Interviewees emphasize the fact that the reform is also meant to serve interests of 
particular governmental bodies and federal authorities. It is a common perception 
(among representatives of industry and NGOs) that authorities seek to redistribute 
forest management responsibilities, to ‘shuffle off the burden’ (N) (of looking after 
forests and forestry works, as well as social issues, providing jobs for numerous forest 
sector workers) onto business and regional authorities (P). 
Several NGO representatives expressed the opinion that the goals of forestry reform 
were political in nature, or at least closely related to politics and such processes as 
presidential elections, elections for the State Duma, which affected deadlines for 
formulation of laws and by-laws and their content (N). 
Similarly to the Soviet tradition, nature tends to be regarded as a tool towards political 
and economic ends. This path-dependent ideology (particularly common among civil 
servants) of the exploitation of forest resources for economic and political purposes 
has shaped the ongoing forest reform. 
5.2 Tools of the Forest Reform  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were three main forest laws passed in 
Russia, which consequently replaced one another: Foundations of Forest Legislation 
1993, Forest Code 1997, and Forest Code 2006. 
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Box 1. Major Post-Soviet Forestry Laws 
1993, March 
6th 
Foundations of Forest 
Legislation of the Russian 
Federation N 4613-1  
 
1997, 
January 29th 
Forest Code of the Russian 
Federation N 22- FZ 
Amended twelve times. 
2006, 
December 
4th 
Forest Code of the Russian 
Federation N 201-FZ 
Adopted in 2006 and took effect in 2007. The Code 
makes provisions for a number of important innovations 
in the system of forest management, such as:  
- transfer of powers / delegation of authority for 
forest management to the regional level (Chapter 
9 Article 83); 
- separation of forest management bodies into 
‘administrative’ and ‘economic’ structures;  
- distribution of government contracts for forestry 
works through tenders or auctions (Chapter 1 
Artcile19; Chapter 5 Article 70); 
- maximal facilitation to real estate development 
on forest land (Chapter 1 Article 21; Chapter 2 
Article 41 (compare with FC 1997 Chapter 17 
Article 123)). 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on legal acts as listed in the bibliography 
Apart from the Forest Code itself, there are further three laws that have determined 
the norms of the transition period. These laws are: the law ‘On the enactment of the 
new Forest Code’, which was passed together with the new Code; another law that 
introduced amendments to the Law on Enactment of the new Code (passed in mid-
2007); and the old Forest Code, some provisions of which were valid until 2009. For 
purposes of the reform, various tools have been applied. Major tools are discussed 
below: legal, financial and administrative tools, which include adoption of the new 
Forest Code and by-laws, further developmemt of forest auctions, introduction of high 
priority investment projects, new contracting for forest lease, forest planning and 
surveying, new regulations for timber trade, delegation of powers from federal centre 
to regions, reorganisation of nature protection agencies and forest guard, separation of 
administrative and economic functions of state bodies, and replacement of felling 
licences with felling declarations. 
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5.2.1 Legislation  
In addition to the Forest Code, there is a large body of laws and regulations. One of 
the reasons for this is that by-laws, accompanying regulations and instructions tend to 
have significantly more practical importance than laws proper in Russia. Wording of 
laws is usually ambiguous and vague. In order to understand and apply major laws, 
one requires further explanations. Therefore, numerous explanatory legal acts need to 
be passed (rules, instructions, orders, etc). This applies in full to the forest legislation. 
A representative of a leading NGO (N) noted that realisation of the new Forest Code 
requires adoption of about seventy different legal acts at federal level (42 additional 
documents are either directly mentioned in the text of the Code, or imply that there 
has to be additional regulation), as well as several regional documents in each 
constituent entity of the Russian Federation. Besides, there are provisions in the Code 
that cannot work on their own despite having no reference to other departmental or 
governmental regulations. The latter regulations, in turn, tend to have gaps as well, 
which makes them inapplicable and require further law-making. It is noted, however, 
that the reform has reduced the number of regulations:  
‘Once, we tried to estimate how many different normative acts, regulations, 
rules, etc relate to the activity of a concrete director of leskhoz. The figure 
we received was – depending on the region and on the situation – between 
six and ten thousand printed pages. It is likely that the figure will be 
between one and two thousands now.’ (N) 
Despite introduced changes, there are numerous concerns about the quality of the new 
legislation. Representatives of the private and non-governmental sectors argue that the 
new law is ‘inconsistent’, ‘self-contradictory’ and ‘unprofessionally written’ (P, N). 
The Code suggests measures that are believed to be ‘too simplistic’ to solve complex 
problems of the forest sector (P). One turns to ‘all-Russian recipes’ (such as high 
export fees), instead of looking for regional solutions (A). The law is blamed for 
being too general, declarative and, therefore, not applicable. It is said not to provide 
any concrete mechanisms of enforcement of the new norms, and is believed – in this 
sense – to resemble documents (or in fact continue the tradition) of the Soviet time (P, 
N). Norms of the new legislation are argued to be vague, blurred and to have 
numerous exceptions, contradictions and factual mistakes.  
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‘The most well-known ridiculous example was how the Government of the 
Russian Federation approved the list of tree species with a cutting ban for 
the whole territory of Russia… On the one hand, one banned felling of 
Sakhalin fir (pihta sahalinskaya), a tree that is the main timber resource of 
wood industry on Sakhalin Island. And on the other hand, the list of tree 
species that were banned for felling contained two herbaceous plants.’ (N) 
Other examples of legal inconsistencies include cases when the new Forest Code and 
other regulative documents used different terminology for crucial forestry concepts 
(A). 
The reform of state forest management and changes in nature protection agencies 
were contradictory. Along with liquidation of the Federal Agency for Environmental 
Protection (Goskomekologiya) in 2000, the Government supported the idea of NGOs 
to create a public forest council (obshchestvenny lesnoy sovet) in 2004. On the one 
hand, there has been a trend for diminishing public participation, whereas on the other 
hand, the state has supported creation of additional institutions for public 
participation. The direction of each particular change is said to be quite arbitrary and 
depend on particular people in office (N).  
Another case was provided by an NGO in the Far East:  
‘From this year onwards, Russian legislation allows the felling of cedar. It 
has been banned since 1990. Now, the state wants to increase the efficiency 
of the forest sector… That is, on the one hand, one provides opportunities 
for conservation of natural areas, but on the other hand, one created a green 
corridor for timber industry, e.g. through absence of auctions for big 
investors.’ (N) 
Inconsistency of the newly adopted legislation (and consequent difficulties of 
implementation) is partly explained by constant changes of staff (e.g. members of the 
working group for designing the Forest Code), and hastiness of the law-making 
process (N). Among possible reasons for hastiness of the law-making interviewees 
refer to: the red tape (time being spent on bureaucratic formalities related to selection 
of executing officers, acquiring endorsements, etc) and consequent lack of time for 
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the actual law-making; and political factors (upcoming elections, the need to report on 
the work completed during the year, etc) (N). 
Inconsistency of legislation has been exacerbated by the timing of reforms. Despite 
hastiness of the legislative process, there have been delays in law making at the 
federal level (P). New regulations often arrive too late, or there are (timewise) 
discrepancies in the law adoption process. Formal rules of the game are changing very 
slowly, the process of change is ‘too spun out, despite attempts of lawmakers to carry 
it out as quickly as possible’ (N). Often, it is the federal level that slows down the 
process, as regions cannot develop their legislation or strategies before the federal 
legislation is in place (P). 
Leningrad Oblast, i.e. the region with the most intensive forest use in Russia, was, by 
mistake, not included into the list of regions to receive subventions for forest 
management. Since there had been no subventions until the law (on the federal 
budget) was amended several months after its adoption, regional authorities were 
unable to execute their functions. So, forest management was carried out on the basis 
of old pre-reform documents, which were not valid any more, by forest management 
bodies (the pre-reform Forestry Agency of Leningrad Oblast) that had no legal right 
to fulfil those functions (N). This case shows that laws are observed only to a certain 
degree. Legislative attempts of the state are considered as ‘vain’, ‘very unprofessional 
and chaotic’, which do affect life to some extent, but not very significantly (N). In 
reality, laws tend to have a tentative role. Even though some ideas of reform may be 
quite radical, they stumble over implementation problems and therefore result in no 
significant positive change on the ground. State policy, where even state forest 
management is not legal, but rather tentative, also facilitates development of a 
neglectful attitude to the law, impair law obedience and orderliness. This shows how a 
poorly designed or hastily implemented state policy contributes to development of 
certain informal rules and practices and, thus, affects the whole institutional system in 
the long run. 
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Lack of experts or professionalism of reform-makers manifested itself in that the 
reforms have been radical and have not sufficiently taken into account forestry 
tradition in Russia.54 
‘If one looks at the new Code and conducts even a linguistic analysis, one 
will easily see that it was written by people far from forestry. There are so 
many new terms there… There has to be a good reason for rejecting the old 
terminology. Continuity is most crucial. Reforms have to be consistent. 
They have to go not a revolutionary way, but rather step by step.’ (P)  
The quote shows the interviewee’s disapproval of the radicalism of reforms and of 
the fact that continuity of the Russian forestry tradition has been broken. He 
argues that reformers should have chosen the evolutionary path of modernisation.  
Revolutionary measures contradict the path-dependent institutional structure of 
the Russian forest sector. This means that entrenched institutions of the 
‘prevailing matrix’ (Kirdina, 2008: 3) may nullify the effects of the reform, as the 
institutional matrix to a significant extent pre-determines the path of the social 
evolution. For evidence of path-dependency of this trait of reforms (revolution 
instead of evolution) see chapter three (3.1) of this dissertation. 
a) Forest Auctions 
An important ‘market’ and ‘commercialisation’ side of the reform has been the 
introduction of auction (instead of tender) as the main mechanism of forest resource 
distribution. 
‘Before the new Forest Code, the system of forest use allowed allocation of 
forest plots for lease on the basis of results of a tender, or for a short-term 
                                                 
54
 In addition to interviews, there is more evidence on the quality and likely consequences of the 
current reform. Thus, the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation published a report (Report ‘On 
the results of…’) about the inspection of how effectively one uses forest fund of scientific-
experimental (research) leskhozes of St. Petersburg State Forest-Technical Academy. The main 
conclusion was that the new Forest Code, while liquidating research leskhozes as bodies of forest 
management, is likely to affect the educational and research processes very negatively. 
 119 
lease (i.e. where one simply cuts it all down – and that’s it), or auctions, or 
through the ‘system of direct decisions’ made by executive authorities.’ (S) 
In the new Forest Code, the Chapter ‘Foundations of forest husbandry organisation’55 
(it was present in the Forest Code 1997) is absent. Instead, there are such new 
chapters as ‘Agreement of purchase and sale of forest range’56, ‘Auctioning the right 
to make a lease contract for forest plots in state or municipal ownership, or the right to 
make a purchase and sale contract for forest range’57.  
The system of direct decisions was applied to agricultural organisations, local 
populations, and budget organisations in rural areas who received timber for minimal 
rates. According to the new system, there are no direct decisions. During tenders, the 
lessor evaluated a number of different aspects of the company, including such factors 
as whether they had certification, created additional jobs, supported kindergartens or 
not, etc (P). So, ‘the price would often play the last role’ (N). Now, the basis of forest 
resource distribution is purely monetary: ‘It is who gives more money that matters 
now’ (S). This change runs counter to several other recent trends in the sector. For 
instance, in some regions, prior to reform, there used to be a practice to take into 
account company’s environmental and social policies, and voluntary forest 
certification during forest tenders (S). This practice discontinued when tenders were 
revoked. So, small local forest users (often successors of Soviet lespromkhozes), who 
tend to carry the heaviest burden of social infrastructure and support forest settlements 
(which also makes them less efficient than companies with less social responsibilities) 
are bound to loose auctions to bigger (and more efficient) companies. The transition 
to auctions as the only instrument of forest lease distribution jeopardizes these small 
and local companies and makes the local population (who are dependent on these 
companies) pay the highest price for the reform. 
The reform is an attempt to make state-business relationships more transparent. At the 
same time, it causes environmental and social problems in the sector, for these issues 
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 ‘Osnovy organizatsii lesnogo hozyaystva’ 
56
 ‘Dogovor kupli-prodazhi lesnyh nasazhdeniy’ 
57
 ‘Auktsiony po prodazhe prava na zaklyuchenie dogovora arendy lesnogo uchastka, 
nahodyashchegosya v gosudarstvennoy ili munitsipalnoy sobstvennosti, libo prava na zaklyuchenie 
dogovora kupli-prodazhi lesnyh nasazhdeniy’ 
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are submerged by monetary interests (N). This change is believed to be particularly 
noticeable in the Far Eastern regions, where the market is relatively insensitive to 
environmental issues, and where state measures were potentially the only crucial 
driver of sustainable development (S).  
This demonstrates that institutional development in the Russian forest sector is 
inconsistent and non-linear. Some institutions start to emerge (e.g. certification gained 
some official acknowledgement of state authorities; the state has, to some extent, 
started to facilitate sustainable and environmentally friendly forestry), but then their 
growth is knocked back by the growth of new institutions (in this case, auctions). 
b) High Priority Investment Projects 
The new forest legislation changed the balance between ‘market’ and ‘administrative’ 
mechanisms in granting access rights to forest resources. One of the state’s tools is the 
newly introduced mechanism of high priority investment projects. Federal and 
regional executive authorities can refer to projects with investment of 300 million 
roubles and more as high priority investment projects in accordance with the 
established procedure. Where a project is given the status ‘high priority investment 
project’, the investor can receive a forest plot with a respective allowed volume of 
timber harvesting for half the minimum price set by the Government of the Russian 
Federation for all other users (and some other benefits as well). Besides this, big 
investors will be able to receive discounts on stumpage price (S, N). 
Big timber businesses can receive significant benefits (including access to forest 
resources for half of the minimal (non-market) price) by virtue of administrative 
decisions, which is an obvious demonstration of the redistributive economy 
(Besssonova, 2006; Kirdina, 2008; et al). At the same time, small and medium-size 
timber businesses, which play a major role in the welfare of forest villages and 
settlements, cannot receive such benefits and are allocated forest leases according to 
auction results. Institutions of the free market are embedded in a fundamentally 
different, strongly entrenched system of path-dependent institutions that are based on 
civil servants as dominant decision-makers. 
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c) Contracting for Forest Lease 
A significant number of developments relate to the changing relations between state 
and private companies and the re-execution of all forest lease contracts. The new 
Forest Code imposes some important new obligations on forest lease holders, 
covering all forestry activity, forest regeneration, fire protection and some other areas 
(Forest Code 2006, Chapter 3 Articles 53, 55; Chapter 4 Articles 62, 64). Earlier, 
forest regeneration of cutover areas, care of stands, fire security etc, was the 
responsibility of state forestry bodies, including leased forests (Forest Code 1997 
Chapter 11 Article 91; Chapter 12; Part II Chapter 4 Article 18). For example, 
according to the forest lease contract between the lessor Federal State Institution  
‘Sosnovetskiy leskhoz’ and the leasee joint stock company Segezha pulp-and-paper 
plant as of 15 May 2006, the following forestry activities were imposed on the lessee: 
forest regeneration, including planting and sowing of the forest, additional forest 
plantation, tending of forest plantations, preparation of soil, improvement felling in 
young forests, arrangement and maintenance of mineral belts, cutting compartment 
lines, setting up information and anti-fire boards.  
The reform is described by interviewees as transfer of responsibility for the whole 
cycle of forestry works onto lease holders, along with potentially less regulation on 
the side of the state. The state has withdrawn a number of its functions and roles from 
the sector, giving more room to market forces. It is private leaseholders who now 
have to not only harvest timber, but also prepare forest management plans, carry out 
preparatory works in the forests, thinning cuts, provide forest fire control, etc, that is 
carry out profitable as well loss-making operations (S). Therefore, private sector 
representatives regard these changes as delegation of additional burdens to private 
companies rather than improvement of state forest management (P). 
All previously made lease contracts had to be brought in compliance with the new 
Forest Code, and they were given two years in order to do this (until 1 January 
2009)58. A leading NGO representative assessed the process of re-execution of lease 
contracts in the following way (N):  
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 Federal Law on the Enactment of the Forest Code of the Russian Federation, Article 4.2 
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‘The procedure for bringing contracts in compliance with the new Code was 
defined as late as in December 2006. In theory, it is relatively simple. In 
practice, however, there can be certain corruption-related problems. 
Depending on circumstances, re-execution of lease contracts can take from 
two to nine months. And during part of this period, leaseholders will have 
no lawful right to forest use.’ (N) 
The interviewee considers re-execution of lease contracts as an additional source 
of corruption and illegal practices.  
d) Forest Planning and Surveying 
Another part of decentralisation reform concerns forest planning and surveying. The 
system of forestry planning and forest surveying (lesoustroystvo) in Russia was 
borrowed from Germany in mid-19th century. Consequently, it was significantly 
improved and adapted to Russian conditions. Until recently, conducting forestry 
planning and surveying and composition of obligatory forestry plans, mostly for ten 
years, has been mandatory according to the Russian legislation and has been carried 
out by special state companies, which had an exclusive right for this activity.  
‘Forest surveying/organisation (lesoustroystvo) is carried out once every ten 
years. On the basis of forest surveying, one draws up a cutting plan (plan 
rubok). Prior to the reform, the state used to do everything. Now, this work 
will have to be financed by companies.’ (P) 
The new Forest Code and the Law on its Enactment changed requirements for 
forestry planning (partly by means of changed distribution of responsibility for 
forestry between state bodies and private sector). 
Information that was necessary for strategic forestry planning on the regional or 
national level was based on the lesoustroystvo’s data until recently. Data about basic 
forest management units (vydel) was accumulated on a higher level, so that in the end, 
one had a basis for the integrated state records of the forest fund, which was organised 
in all forests of the country about once every five years. This caused a ‘conflict 
between interests of statistical accuracy and promptness of information (necessary for 
a good-quality strategic planning) and elaborateness of information (necessary for 
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good-quality prescription of forestry measures and activities)’ (N). The conflict 
would be usually solved in favour of elaborateness and more details, ever more so 
since often leaders of the forest sector were not interested in revealing objective data 
about forest dynamics and the results of their economic activity. Consequently, 
reliability of information about forests and their dynamics on the regional and national 
level was extremely low. The new Forest Code separated forest planning and the state 
inventory of forests. Now, information for the state inventory of forests has to be 
collected separately, using statistical and remote methods. However, methods of state 
inventory of forests are still being developed (N).  
A shift of responsibility (e.g. to survey their forest land) from the state to the private 
sector is seen by representatives of different sectors (S, N) as associated with various 
complications, such as unrealistic deadlines for reform, delay of financial support, 
absence of methods and tools for the supposed new forest management practice. 
Problems are mostly ascribed to the federal level which hinders the work of regional 
state bodies and private structures. 
e) Timber Trade Regulation 
One of the most disputed parts of the forest reform has been customs regulation of 
timber export. In early 2007, the Russian Government made a decision to start a 
campaign against the increasing export of unprocessed timber from Russia by means 
of a gradual increase of customs duties, up to prohibitive duties, and thus make export 
of round timber almost impossible. Export fees for the main product of Russian forest 
export, namely unprocessed coniferous wood, increased from 6,5 percent up to 20 
percent (but not less than 10 euro for a cubic meter) from 1 July 2007 and up to 25 
percent (but not less than 15 euro for a cubic meter) from 1 April 2008. The next 
increase is expected to take place from 1 January 2009 – up to 80 percent, but not less 
than 50 euro for a cubic meter.59 
Only export duty for birch (beryoza) with a girth of under 15 centimeter will be zero 
until the beginning of 2011 (after that, it will also be raised up to 80 percent).  
Export duty of 80 percent is practically prohibitive for any kind of unprocessed 
timber. So, export of unprocessed wood from Russia is expected to drastically 
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 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 5 February 2007 N 75. 
 124 
decrease in early 2009, and export of coniferous wood is expected to completely 
discontinue.  
Despite the commonly shared view that export of round wood should be dealt with 
and that timber processing should be fostered and developed, there are different views 
on these measures of the Government. The interviewed civil servants are optimistic 
about changing customs policy: ‘not a single log will leave Russia’, ‘80 percent of all 
problems will be solved’ (S). It is hoped (S) that timber processing facilities will be 
built in the Far East with the help of Chinese capital. However, reform is also heavily 
criticized by both non-state and state representatives of the forest sector. It is 
criticized for lack of transparency (particularly, with regard to financial flows) (N) 
and consistency, lack of measures to attract investment in the sector, as well as lack of 
measures to enhance forest protection and to terminate illegal logging (P). 
Despite the fact that the importance of tackling the issue of timber export was 
realised, the measures being taken do not represent a complete programme, but rather 
isolated steps, which are not connected to each other. The situation is regarded as 
unlikely to be changed in the near future. Major problems for successful achievement 
of set goals and curtailment of round wood export are the lack of wood processing 
infrastructure (S) and the technological backwardness of Russian industry (A). For 
some interviewees from the private sector in the Far East, the topic was a particularly 
delicate issue, so they refused to discuss it. (‘It is a too painful question for us. I 
would not like to discuss it in front of this audience. We work according to the 
legislation. There is law – we follow it.’ (P) 
f) Delegation of Powers from the Federal Centre to the Regions 
Since the adoption of the Forest Code 1997 until the end of 2004, almost all forests in 
Russia were managed in a centralised way by respective federal executive bodies (the 
structure of these bodies changed from time to time). Most forests were managed by 
the Ministry of Natural Resources (about 95 percent), a smaller portion of forests was 
managed by the Ministry of Agriculture (a little under 5 percent), and a very small 
portion were managed by other federal departments.  Small forest areas were, and still 
are, on land belonging to constituent entities of the Russian Federation, settlements, 
towns and cities, as well as private individuals.  
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In late 2004, the Forest Code was amended. These amendments made provisions for 
some decentralisation of forest management. In particular, forest management powers 
that were previously in the hands of Ministry of Agriculture (in Soviet time in the 
hands of kolkhozes and sovkhozes), were passed over to regional administrations. 
Moreover, regional administrations were entrusted with forest fire fighting duty. 
Funds for forest management and fire fighting were allocated from the federal 
budget.60 
After the new Forest Code was adopted, this model of ‘decentralisation’ was applied 
to all forests, except forests of Moscow Oblast (which still continue to be managed by 
the Federal Forestry Agency) (FC 2006 Article 83). Forests remain property of the 
Russian Federation (FC 2006 Article 8). Major rules related to forest use are adopted 
on the federal level (FC 2006 Articles 73, 76, 81). Most revenue from forest use goes 
to the federal budget and returns in the form of subventions for forest management 
(FC 2006 Article 83). However, immediate forest management rests upon regional 
authorities (FC 2006 Article 83).  
State bodies of forest management that were previously within the system of Federal 
Forestry Agency (mostly leskhozes, forest administration of Rayon level) were 
handed over to the regions on January 1, 200761, and until the early 2008, they 
continued to exist without any major changes.  From January 1st, 2008, in accordance 
with the law on Enactment of the Forest Code, they were separated into 
‘lesnichestvos’, which retained administrative functions, and economic structures, 
which had to carry out different forestry works (in case they get state contracts or if 
they conclude a contract with a forest lease holder).  
g) Reorganisation of Nature Protection Agencies 
Independent federal nature protection agencies were abolished in 200062. The 
independent Rosleskhoz [Federal Forestry Agency] and Goskomekologiya [State 
Committee of the Russian Federation for Environmental Protection] were liquidated. 
                                                 
60
 Federal law of 29.12.2004 N 199-FZ 
61
 Law On the Enactment of the Forest Code 2006, Article 15 
62
 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 17 May 2000  № 867; Resolution of the 
Government of the Russian Federation of 6 July 2000 № 495 
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Rosleskhoz became part of the Ministry of Natural Resources with significant staff 
changes (N, A).63  
‘There was a khozyain (master) of the forest, a state khozyain, who is not 
needed in this new system. One has liquidated it during the last eight years.’ 
(N) 
The interviewee notes that the result has led to a situation where no one takes 
responsibility for protecting forest resources: the khozyain (owner, master and careful 
manager) in the forest sector, whose role used to be played by the state, was 
annihilated.  
‘Some of these people end up in NGOs, some of them end up in the private 
sector, but stay in forest industry, some of them leave forest and timber 
sector completely.’ (N) 
Transformation of nature protection agencies is believed to result in the loss or 
deterioration of human resources and decreasing number of experts in state 
bodies. 
h) Separation of Administrative and Economic Functions 
Until recently, state forest management bodies (leskhozes) ‘have been doing several 
jobs at the same time: they allocated forest plots; at the same time, they cut timber, in 
order to sustain themselves, because the federal budget provided only 20 percent of 
what was needed’ (S). The reform aimed to separate out economic functions and to 
leave only administrative functions to the state system of forest management. 
Opinions about potential consequences of this change vary. It evoked approval 
because separation of monitoring and logging functions may allow for independent 
control. Prior to the adoption of the new Forest Code, leskhozes (i.e. local state forest 
management bodies) (which managed and controlled everything themselves) are 
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 According to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 12th 2008 № 724, the 
Ministry of Natural Resource of the Russian Federation was transformed into the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation. Control of Specially Protected Natural Areas of 
federal importance was delegated to the Ministry. 
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believed to have been major lawbreakers (law was violated during timber harvesting 
operations) (N).  
At the same time, there are certain circumstances that cause concern regarding 
possible effects of the reform.  
‘It is clear that these will be economic structures organised on the basis of 
ex-leskhozes, so, there will still be ‘krugovaya poruka’ [mutual guarantee, 
joint liability of members of community for each other – in Russian 
pejorative] and the same people, but simply separated into two groups.’ (N) 
There is a concern that separation of functions will not be complete, and private 
organisations will remain closely connected to state controlling bodies. Leskhozes 
dispose of knowledge and human resources necessary for forestry works, so 
companies will have to continue work with leskhozes (e.g. preparation of forest areas 
for forest users, thinning operations, forest regeneration and forest cultivation). 
Leskhoz-based organisations are expected to be hired by logging companies (S). 
The effect of introduced innovations may be diluted by path-dependent informal 
institutions, such as ‘krugovaya poruka’.  
‘The Forest Code returned Russia to the forest management system as of 
pre-1928. And it is the right thing to do. In 1928, one created leskhozes in 
order to carry out wood felling operations.’ (A)  
The quote indicates that introduced innovations are not necessarily perceived as 
new. This measure is evaluated differently though. Thus, another interviewee, 
who notes the historical resemblance of the newly proposed system, says that 
‘there is nothing good about this transformation now’ (A). 
i) Reorganisation of Forest Guard 
The ground forest protection service (nazemnaya lesnaya ohrana) was liquidated. 
Before the end of 2004, the system of forest protection in Russia was based on the so 
called ‘obhody’, i.e. forest plots personally attached to employees of state forest 
protection service (foresters-walking inspectors (lesniki-obhodchiki), with overall 
strength of about 70 thousand people in Russia). Since the early 1990s, the work of 
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this system has been causing concern, because in order to secure an acceptable level 
of wages, foresters spent most of their time being involved in various economic 
activities, mostly timber logging under the guise of improvement cutting. 
Nevertheless, forests were not completely ownerless. At least, villagers knew that the 
forest guard existed and theoretically could prosecute a violator. 
On January 1, 2005, the powers connected with forest guard were withdrawn from 
state forestry bodies and handed over to the Federal Service for Supervision in the 
Sphere of Natural Resource Use [Federalnaya sluzhba po nadzoru v sfere 
prirodopolzovaniya]64. This Service had only a small number of inspectors that were 
able to carry out forest protection (under 400 people for the whole country). As a 
result, forest protection became hardly visible. 
‘From 1 January 2007, when the new Forest Code entered into force, forest 
protection powers were handed over to regional administrations. However, 
due to some ambiguities in the new Forest Code, the regions still cannot 
organise any kind of effective forest protection. The total number of people 
vested with the rights of forest guard makes about 12 thousand people at 
present. However, the system of their functioning is only being formed 
now.’ (N) 
Consequently, Russian forests have been practically unprotected recently. Unusual as 
it may seem, it is mainly NGOs who are concerned about the destruction of the state 
system of forest management and control, downsizing of forest guard services and the 
negative consequences of curtailment of forestry expenses, namely the transformation 
of leskhozes into essentially commercial structures. 
‘The state system was deprived of forest guards. Now, there are only 600 
people in Rosprirodnadzor who have the powers of forest inspectors for the 
whole Russia. Before, the number of forest inspection employees was, 
according to different estimates, dozens of thousands. 30 to 50 thousand 
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 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation 
of 30 July 2004 N 400 ‘On Ratification of the Regulation about the Federal Service for Supervision in 
the Sphere of Natural Resource Use’ 
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people. At the moment, there are just six inspectors for the whole Moscow 
Oblast’.’ (N) 
Further changes in forest guard services concerned the status of foresters, namely only 
civil servants (initially, in the first drafts of the law) could act as state forest 
inspectors. It is believed (S) that the number of state forest inspectors was minimized 
in order to reduce the number of civil servants and consequently to cut the related 
expenses of the federal budget (wages, privileges, etc). The fact that forestry service 
was deprived of its powers is regarded as loss of control over forests (A).  
‘At the Forum, Giryayev said that foresters would be given the right to make 
reports on forest offences. Besides, some money from fines will be spent on 
bonuses for foresters. So, there will be more checks. They will drain money 
from companies.’ (P) 
The quote indicates that more powers and financial support for foresters are 
expected, along with more check-ups on companies. 
j) Felling Declarations 
Along with downsizing, the forestry service and the demolition of forest use control 
on the ground, the state also granted more freedom to private forest leaseholders in 
terms of forest management on their plots, and made their control less strict. Thus, 
felling licenses (a document permitting wood cutting that was obtained from 
leskhozes) were replaced by felling declarations. Whilst submitting a felling 
declaration to an authorised state body once a year, the company is supposed to notify 
the state about its intention to fell a certain amount of wood in a certain way within its 
lease.  
Interviewed non-state participant of the sector were critical of the new instrument 
because of its inflexibility (the felling declaration assumes that felling operations are 
determined for one year in advance), lack of information (the new form does not 
contain cartographic information) and its untimely introduction: when various other 
control mechanisms are weakened (N). Representatives of the state, however, 
expressed confidence that the new control system would allow a more democratic 
regime of forest management (S).  
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Since the time when interviews were taken, things have taken another turn. According 
to the draft of the ‘Action plan for 2008 for combat against illegal logging…’, which 
is being developed by the Interdepartmental Commission for countermeasures against 
illegal logging and illegal timber trade (Mezhvedomstvennaya komissiya po 
protivodeystviyu nezakonnym zagotovkam i oborotu drevesiny), the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade have to 
prepare in the second quarter of 2008 amendments to the Forest Code that would 
introduce authorization documents granting the right to harvest timber. Basically, it 
means rejection of one of the main ideas behind the new Forest Code, namely the 
replacement of the licencing system of forest use (when any cutting was carried out 
on the basis of a uniform authorization document – the felling licence) with the 
declaration system (when leaseholders or forest users only submit an annual forest 
declaration and inform state bodies about their intention to cut forest). The new 
system has not started to work yet, because the transition of each leaseholder to the 
declaration system does not happen automatically, but only after they bring their lease 
contracts into compliance with the new Forest Code. Contracts had to be brought into 
compliance by 1 January 2009, but in early 2008 over 90% were still working in 
accordance with the old contracts. 
So, the intention to return to the authorisation / licence system of forest use means 
only that the state itself is not ready to work by the new rules and is willing, at least to 
a certain degree, to return to the norms of the old Forest Code. This trend of 
backsliding to norms of the old forest legislation may not only be limited to the 
introduction of authorisation documents, but will also affect other conceptual 
elements of the new Forest Code. In this case, the only outcome of the reform is likely 
to be the return to more or less the initial state of affairs. 
5.2.2 ‘State’ vs ‘Market’ Tools 
The above mentioned feature of the post-Soviet forest sector, namely that it still 
combines institutions of the market economy with a great deal of state planning and 
control, is perceived as a cause of its numerous problems (P).  
According to some representatives of private logging companies, the state forest 
management companies (lesoustroitelnye predpriyatiya) – due to the lack of will, 
awareness and funding - do not fulfil their functions satisfactorily, which causes 
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problems for the private sector. For instance, inappropriate methods of logging are 
prescribed. 
‘A classical example would be birch forest with a second story of spruce. 
According to the surveyor’s description, this is a hardwood plot, it is 70 
years old, and one can cut it [clear cut]. When we arrived there, we saw that 
there was hardwood indeed, but there was also a second story with 
thousands of thin spruce trees.’ (P) 
So, companies are obliged to carry out clear felling, which requires special equipment 
(in order to cut thin trees) and extra effort to sell those – less valuable – trees. A 
gradual harvesting, however, would allow the thinning of the upper birch story and a 
return to the same logging site in 15 years in order to take the spruce sawlogs. So, the 
dominant position of state forest management companies does not allow effective use 
of forest resources and impedes development of efficient private companies, which 
aspire to compete in the international timber market.  
Despite the recent delegation of forest management functions to private logging 
companies, it is believed that these state ‘lesoustroitelnye predpriyatiya’ will remain 
powerful players in the sector ‘for a long time’ (P), as they possess an extensive 
information base on forests, as well as significant experience and highly qualified 
staff to carry out the planning. 
Another point raised with regard to the clashing market and state institutions is that 
prohibitive duties on round wood export are expected to create a serious barrier to the 
process of certification and transition to sustainable forestry, since companies’ main 
concern will be survival in the market, rather than environmental issues (S). 
Despite the large-scale introduction of an auction mechanism and other attributes of 
the market, reform has not reduced the extent of administrative intervention into the 
process of forest resource distribution. In fact, the trend for extensive administrative 
intervention in the sector coexists with the trend for spreading features of the market 
economy in the sector. The state actively uses such tools as customs control, a system 
of preferences on the federal and regional levels for certain companies, e.g. in profits 
tax, VAT refund for those importing equipment as part of their nominal capital (S). 
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Other examples of growing state intervention in the forest sector include further 
administrative restrictions on the transportation of forest goods (N). 
An important mechanism for civil servants to maintain their influence over forest 
resource distribution flows is through tight individual-level connections of state 
bodies and private companies. It is suggested that despite official separation of 
economic and administrative functions in the sector, as well as distribution of forest 
lease on the basis of auctions, the same people will control both types of activities: 
‘They started to establish parallel structures, where, say director of a former 
leskhoz becomes director of a lesnichestvo. And in parallel, he is the head of 
a certain company. The lesnichestvo will hand over its improvement cutting 
right to this company. In reality, however, it will be not an improvement 
cutting, but the usual commercial cutting, and they will get commercially 
expensive timber.’ (N) 
This means that the state’s impact on newly introduced market institutions and impact 
of market institutions on the state are parallel and closely interwoven processes with 
consequences yet to be seen.  
5.3 Process of the Reform 
There are several major processes and trends that characterise how the reform has 
been designed and implemented. A most important trend that has considerably 
affected preparation and enforcement of the reform is commercialisation of the sector 
(common for different areas of post-Soviet socio-economic life). 
Commercialisation 
The new Forest Code caused deep concern of forest sector stakeholders with regard to 
the changing pattern of forest use. Representatives of NGOs (N), as well as business 
(P) expressed the idea that the new Forest Code was written with the purpose of forest 
land seizure and the following real estate development of the area (including 
protective forests (former forests of the first group), which are particularly valuable in 
environmental and social terms – green zones in urban areas and settlements, water 
protection zones etc). At the moment, there are three main ways to transfer forests to 
real estate development and similar purposes: through official conversion of forest 
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fund land into land of other categories; through occupation of land with disputed or 
unclear status, or through leasing for certain kinds of forest use. 
Concerning the official conversion of land from the forest fund into other land 
categories, the new Forest Code has not changed much. The size of forest with 
disputed or unclear status significantly increased with the introduction of the new 
Forest Code, mostly on the account of forests that previously used to be managed by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and used by agricultural organizations. In the early 1990s, 
most of such forest, along with other lands of former kolkhozes and sovkhozes, were 
divided into land shares / units (zemelnye pai), converted to land for agricultural 
purposes and partly privatized. The process of privatization of such forests was 
stopped. However, in most cases, the land remained part of the land for agricultural 
purposes.  The new Forest Code does not regulate the status of forests situated on the 
land for agricultural purposes in any way, which creates conditions for land seizure 
and real estate development in place of these forests (which is realized in practice by 
many people).  
The biggest change concerning real estate development in place of forests that 
happened once the new Forest Code was introduced was the possibility to develop 
leased forests without official change of their status (so ‘on paper’, forest may still be 
forest, but in reality, there may be mansion houses there, for example). The right of 
construction work in the forest is given to lease holders who obtained forest for the 
purposes of wood harvesting, hunting, religious and recreational activities, etc (FC 
2006 Articles 36, 38, 41, 47).  
‘At the moment, quite large plots of forest land are already being transferred 
to lease for recreational purposes, implying possible development activity, 
in the Moscow region.’ (N) 
Commercialisation of the forest sector occurs through implicit introduction of private 
property on forests. State authorities officially retained predominance of state 
ownership of forests. However, they ‘created conditions for actual unregulated 
development of private property for purposes of real estate development’ (N). 
So, despite the development of the market economy, dominant institutions are 
retained in Russia, such as the institution of ‘razdacha’ (deal-out) (the concept 
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introduced by Bessonova, 2006) in this case. The state remains dominant in the sector, 
as it retains the right of resource distribution. Moreover, there remains the consumer 
attitude to the forest as an economic resource. 
Business-Oriented Discourse: Forest Land, Forest Plots, Forest as Collateral 
Another concern raised is about the changing attitude towards the forest. The main 
value is now seen to be in forest land rather than forest ecosystems. Terminology and 
the concept of the forest significantly changed in the Forest Code. Thus, in the old 
Forest Code of 1997, forest is defined as:  
‘a complex of forest vegetation, land, wildlife and other components of 
natural environment that have an important ecological, economic and social 
importance.’ (Forest Code, 2006: 3) 
In the Forest Code 2006 (Chapter 1 Article 5) the definition is different:  
‘Forest use, security, protection, and regeneration are carried out on the 
assumption that the forest is an ecological system or a natural resource.’ 
(Forest Code, 2007: 4) 
The social value of forests is not emphasized any more, and significant stress is 
placed on forest as a resource. The terminology commonly used in the Forest Code 
2006 indicates the growing commercialisation of the sector and increasing emphasis 
on land, rather than other forest resources. Thus, the titles of the Code articles include 
the following: ‘Land on which forests are situated’ (‘Zemli, na kotoryh 
raspolagayutsya lesa’), ‘Forest plot’ (‘Lesnoy uchastok’), ‘Construction, 
reconstruction and exploitation of objects not related to creation of forest 
infrastructure’ (‘Stroitelstvo, rekonstruktsiya I ekspluatatsiya obyektov, ne svyazannyh 
s sozdaniem lesnoy infrastruktury’), ‘Investment activity in the area of forest 
exploitation’ (‘Investitsionnaya deyatelnost v oblasti osvoyeniya lesov’). 
Previously, one would use the term ‘plots of forest fund’ (uchastki lesnogo fonda). 
Now, one talks about ‘forest plots’ (lesnoy uchastok). So, the mainstream discourse is 
not about the natural resource any more, but rather about land plots. One leases land, 
rather than forest. Besides, previously, one used to pay natural resource rent for cubic 
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metres. However, as one of interviewees noted, the rent is going to change soon, and 
one will be paying for hectares, i.e. for land (P). 
Features of the market economy have also found reflection in the new terms for 
harvesting operations: 
‘Before, one distinctly differentiated between industrial harvesting of timber 
and improvement cuttings (which is an element of forestry aimed at forest 
regeneration). Now, all kinds of timber harvesting from final felling (harvest 
cutting) up to improvement felling are called in the same way – ‘harvesting 
of wood’ (zagotovka drevesiny).’ (S) 
The private sector regards the new Forest Code ‘strategically better’ than its 
predecessor, since ‘one can find lease, sub-lease, collateral, etc there [in the 
Forest Code]’ (P). 
‘Now, if you build roads, you have a future. However, in order to build 
them, one needs to find money somewhere – and this is capital investment. 
Our company is unable to provide such capital investment from our own 
resources. But if we have an option of collateral, we can pledge these roads - 
and build even more roads.’ (P) 
The quote indicates that the reform is perceived as a further step to the market 
economy and as new economic opportunities being opened up for business. 
Public Participation 
The process of commercialisation of the forest sector is closely related to another 
characteristic trend of low level of public participation in the course of law-making 
and forest management. 
‘Previously, not a single harvesting plan was approved without public 
environmental impact assessment or public hearings… Now, according to 
the Forest Code, all this has been discontinued. It is who gives more money 
that matters now.’ (P) 
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Commercialisation is believed to make public participation even more negligible than 
it has been before. Representatives of the private sector witnessed that the process of 
writing the Forest Code was not open, with no public participation allowed (P). Both 
NGOs and civil servants expressed their concerns about the extent of public 
involvement in the legislative process. An NGO representative directly involved in 
the law-making process felt that it had cost NGOs a substantial effort to get involved 
in the process and organise dialogue with experts from Rosleskhoz. Moreover, they 
were allowed participation in drafting only one normative document (Timber 
Harvesting Rules) and only at the initial stage, after which their suggestions were 
discarded and NGO representatives were debarred from the process (N). 
‘*Everyone* participated in elaboration of the Forest Code. Another 
question, however, is whether their opinions were taken into account. 
Opinion of practitioners was not taken into consideration very much. The 
Forest Code was written in cabinets and is detached from reality on the 
ground.’ (S) 
Drafting of the Forest Code is said to have happened purely ‘behind the scenes’, the 
names of its authors have remained undisclosed to the general public. There is a firm 
belief that decisions have been made ‘not just at the top, but at the very top’, namely 
by officials in the Presidential Executive Office (N). Most decisions were made on the 
federal, top level. The main rules related to forestry and forest use with commercial 
purposes are defined on the federal level (through governmental instructions or orders 
of the Ministry of Natural Resources), whereas regions are given mainly regulation of 
issues related to forest use by local population for household needs [Forest Code 
2006, Chapter 9 Articles 81, 82]. 
To be fair, one ought to mention that the Forest Code is said to be possibly the most 
discussed federal law during the last ten years (N, S). However, it happened against 
the will of the state: 
‘Authorities, including the law-makers, relevant ministries, and Presidential 
Executive Office, and factions in the Parliament that are actual decision-
makers in the State Duma, were, on the contrary, all against any kind of 
public discussion.’ (N)  
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The debates that took place were driven by civil society. (N) However, final versions 
of the law were adopted by a narrow circle of people under the pressure of a 
commercial lobby. (P, S) And even when decision-making is delegated to lower, 
regional levels, excessive bureaucracy and administration still prohibit voices from 
the ground from being heard. (P, N) 
‘All reforms in Russia that were carried out from the top – they would all 
die halfway.’ (N) 
The quote shows lack of belief in the potential of state reforms, and an awareness of 
the need to develop a working feedback system and adopt more democratic 
procedures of decision-making.  
Absence of a working feedback system for the law-making process results in 
legislation being perceived as unpredictable and of poor quality. The new Code is said 
to give significantly less room for public participation, as it has been deprived of 
articles providing for public environmental impact assessment (replaced with state 
environmental impact assessment) and other tools of public participation (N). 
The extent of public participation has a most significant impact on the nature of 
institutional change in the Russian forest sector, for this characterises the ‘meta set of 
rules’ (Ostrom, 2005), namely the rules of rule-making. The state is assigned strong 
advantages in the rule-changing process. 
Perspectives on the Reform 
Interviewees united in their opinion that in the future, there would be constant long-
term amendments to the passed legislation. In other respects, viewpoints of 
interviewees varied across the spectrum from positive to very negative. 
Some interviewees expect new legislation to be more flexible with regards to 
harvesting rules, which would allow them for example to leave certain trees on 
logging sites and, thus, meet some requirements for biodiversity conservation (P). The 
quality of forestry works (forest regeneration, thinning operations, forest fire 
preventive works, etc) is also expected to improve, as they will be carried out by 
private companies, i.e. those interested in their good quality and in designated use of 
funds (as opposed to state organisations) (P). 
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‘During the Soviet period, [such works as improvement felling, preparation 
of soil, fire fighting etc] used to be carried out by leskhozes. Leskhozes were 
assigned state budget money for this. And on paper, they could do anything. 
That is, they would do the job themselves and then control it themselves as 
well. It was very rare that an inspector came and controlled how the project 
was completed. For example, they had a plan of 1000 hectare improvement 
felling in a young forest. In reality, they would do at best one third well.’ (P)  
The interviewee suggests that previously, due to how the system of control was 
organised, leskhozes did not carry out their duties responsibly. He hopes that this 
situation may change after the reform, which is meant to give more flexibility and 
freedom for private leaseholders, and put them in charge of the whole forestry cycle. 
‘The small business will go, but it will find its new niche as contractors for 
logging site cleaning, bio-fuel production, thinning operations, lumbering, 
etc. Forest lease will be held by big companies though. This will allow 
foresters to exercise better control… Duties will allow reducing illegal 
timber export.’ (P) 
The quote above is a commentary of a private sector representative about round 
timber customs duties increase. The reform is seen as an opportunity to organise more 
effective control mechanisms, thus reducing illegal timber trade.  
‘Earlier, the situation was the following: there was a leased area, for which 
there were at least two ‘khozyains’ [landlords], namely a leaseholder, who 
carries out main fellings (rubki glavnogo polzovaniya), and a leskhoz, who 
steals timber under the guise of improvement fellings, and often in larger 
amounts than the leaseholder. So, there were at least two khozyains, because 
in reality, leskhoz could also transfer their right to someone else or even to 
several companies at the same time.’ (N) 
The quote indicates that prior to the reform a situation of several forest users on one 
forest plot was common. Their activities were poorly coordinated with each other, if 
at all. No-one was ultimately responsible for the whole cycle of forest management. 
Delegation of responsibilities to the timber industry is believed to change the 
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situation, create actual centres of responsibility and make forest users accountable for 
results of their forest management. 
The above quote also suggests that the reform may imply a shift from ‘supreme 
conditional ownership’ (Kirdina, 2008) to private ownership. It is indicative of the 
ongoing transition to the market economy. The open question remains to what extent 
such core institutions (as e.g. the institution of supreme conditional property) will be 
replaced or retained. Are the introduced changes to be interpreted as the crisis of the 
‘razdatok’ economy (Bessonova, 2006), which forced authorities to allow more room 
for alternative institutions? Is it a sign of a new emerging institutional system or a 
liberal form of the razdatok economy or a temporary retreat of the state to be followed 
by its full-fledged return later on? 
Most optimistic about the upcoming change are representatives of the state sector. 
Their hopes are connected with the increase of export customs duties on round timber 
and development of processing capacities (S). 
However, change is not only related to reform or state measures, but also to general 
development of the economy and a shift towards market economy.  
‘Companies are now in new market conditions. They switch to re-execution 
of lease contracts; they start to create forest guard agencies and to protect 
their forests. So, in essence, they move away from illegal timber market.  
That is, we see germs of civilized forest use.’ (S) 
At the other end of the spectrum is the feeling of frustration and disappointment of 
interviewees about potential change and the opinion that the reform has destroyed the 
forest management system, control over the forest sector has been lost, whereas a new 
working system has not been created (P, A). 
‘There is still no head of forestry sector in the Krai. There were ten people – 
each of them would work for under a week and leave for different reasons. 
So now that it is time to carry out preparatory work for the next year, we 
cannot get the necessary documents signed (there is no one to sign the 
documents).’ (P) 
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The interviewee expresses his concern about the inability to organise normal 
company’s functioning due to constant changes and lack of relevant civil servants 
in office. 
If disintegration of the state forest management system and reduction of state 
responsibility for forests is one side of the coin, the other side is changing 
relationships and distribution of responsibilities between state bodies and private 
companies. Business is given more flexibility in organisation of forestry on its lease, 
but at the same time, it is obliged to carry out most forestry works. Under conditions 
of more freedom and high risk, a significant part of businesses are expected to move 
into ‘grey zones’ (N). The reform (particularly liberalization and decentralisation of 
the sector) is expected to result in significant polarization in the quality of logging and 
forestry operations. 
‘[We] made a regional list of types of Specially Protected Areas (OZU), 
which was based on a federal classification but also corresponded to 
regional peculiarities and goals of a ‘High Conservation Value Forests’ 
concept. This list was approved by local forestry bodies as well. However, 
all this has almost lost its force in view of our forest reform now.’ (N) 
This commentary shows that the reform has annulled an important achievement of 
NGOs and private sector (implementation of the concept of High Conservation 
Value Forests in Archangelsk Oblast) that was made in the past several years. 
A major complaint of the private sector concerned the replacement of felling licences 
with forest declarations. Recently, big companies established their own systems of 
tracking timber origin. These systems were based on felling licences. So, once this 
document ceased to exist, the whole system was paralysed (P). This shows the non-
linearity of the institutional development: new institutions (such as private systems of 
tracking timber origin) can be stifled by a new state forest policy. 
‘One cannot get a forest lease. There are no felling licences. There is no data 
on the new forest management and planning. Production rates have fallen by 
15-30 percent all over the country.’ (P) 
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This comment refers to the temporary deterioration of situation during the transition 
and reform implementation period. The interviewee describes difficulties with 
obtaining necessary documents and information, which affects companies’ activity 
and output. Another interviewee notes similar problems: civil servants have been ‘too 
overloaded with reform-related problems to look into anything else’, e.g. biodiversity, 
public participation, etc (N). There has been confusion and lack of understanding 
among forestry officials as to ‘how things are supposed to work now’ (P). This has 
been accompanied by temporary legislative gaps and inconsistencies (N, P). There are 
issues with financial support of reorganisation of the forest sector (N). Private 
companies had to postpone their development and certification plans in view of the 
need to adapt to new regulations (N). 
However, it is not just the short-term transition period that is looked at with 
scepticism by interviewees. The reform is said to have caused an increase in 
paperwork, rather than real change on the ground (N). There is a strong feeling that 
despite all official innovations, nothing (or not much) is going to change as a result of 
the current forest reform, e.g. business is unlikely to receive more support from the 
state than it has had before (P). New regulations are not expected to be any closer to 
targets and norms suggested by NGOs, as they have been written by the old 
generation of foresters, who were educated in the Soviet system and are not interested 
in changing the system (N). The new legislation is said to give no room for such 
innovations as model forests (A). 
The reformed forest management system is expected to return to its status quo after a 
while: ‘Even if they destroy leskhozes, they will have to restore this system later…’; 
‘We shall go back to the old, most likely’ (P).  
‘In reality, there is no reform. Well, leskhozes were supposed to be 
removed, but they still have not been removed. The same people make 
decisions in lesnichestvos. Of course, these people will still try to make sure 
leskhozes (well, one can rename them into joint stock companies) retain 
their rights and receive budget money. They will try to do their best so that 
leskhozes win all tenders for all forestry activities – fire fighting, forest 
plantation, etc. Of course, leskhozes will be still doing it inefficiently and 
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one will still close one’s eyes on this, because it is ‘our people’ who do it.' 
(N) 
The above quote suggests that informal ties are predominant in the sector and to a 
great extent determine how the sector functions irrespective of changing formal 
institutions. Other interviewees from the non-governmental and state sectors also 
believe that the current reform will have only a minor impact on the informal 
institutional system of the forest sector. According to a state representative (S), as 
previous reforms of Russian forest sector showed, irrespective of whether 
administrative (forest management) and economic (logging) functions (leskhoz and 
lespromkhoz) are officially separated or not, on the ground, functions are carried out 
according to the actual skills of people employed by leskhoz and lespromkhoz: 
‘In practice it is as follows: everyone is doing whatever they are good at. If 
someone studied for forest protection, forest regeneration and tending of 
forest, and if they worked in an organisation like this, then they would carry 
on like this, despite legislative changes.’ (S) 
Another interviewee (A) goes even further to suggest that the reform is unlikely to 
notably affect forest management because of stable corruption in the forest 
management civil service and consequently poor compliance with regulations. So, the 
situation is not expected to deteriorate even after liberalisation and weakening control 
in the forest, as the previously existing system has been far from impeccable and has 
been held up largely by informal institutions. 
Similarly, in the opinion of several NGO representatives, the effect of increased 
export duties on round wood in the Far East will have a significantly lesser extent 
than expected by policy-makers. The first reason is that the Chinese industry has a 
strong interest in Russian raw timber and will therefore take measures to ensure the 
supply of  Russian timber (potentially through subsidies for import, or building 
sawing facilities in Russia, or bribing local authorities in Russian rural areas). 
‘There are plenty of back-ways around export duties, plenty of options for 
the state and business to get their way round – with the help of the Chinese. 
Customs officers have been saying this. There will be a drop in 
exportation... But life will start to find back-ways.’ (N) 
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Among other reasons for such expectations are: the newly introduced formal 
institutions, while processed by the officialdom, are distorted, which nullifies the 
effect of the reform on the ground (S); the state has not created the necessary business 
environment (e.g., wood processing capacities) for development of new informal 
institutions (P). 
5.4 Costs and Consequences of the Forest Reform 
5.4.1 Costs of the Forest Reform 
Re-execution of lease contracts, along with rewriting all planning documents and the 
beginning of realisation of a number of new responsibilities, has been a costly and 
complicated process for lease holders, particularly for small local companies, which 
operate on a separate village or settlement scale (due to remoteness of administrative 
centres, lack of competent lawyers and overall lack of information about the current 
reform). Some new contracts contain provisions that are absurd and do not introduce 
any innovations. Thus, according to the forest lease contract between the lessor 
Federal State Institution ‘Sosnovetskiy leskhoz’ and the leasee joint stock company 
Segezhskiy pulp-and-paper plant as of 15 May 2006 (clause 6.2.32), the leaseholder is 
obliged to ‘carry out together with the lessor voluntary forest certification in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law’. However, this procedure is not 
prescribed by law. Civil servants neither comment on how this clause should be 
implemented, nor agree to any kind of cooperation with the company. So, 
expectations of some private companies are that under current conditions (namely, 
very poor available forest resources (in the North-Western part of Russia) and very 
poor quality, but at the same time high price of planting material that companies buy 
from leskhozes) many companies may start to abandon their leases, because the price 
of one cubic meter of standing crop is already higher than in Finland (P). 
So, it is mostly small companies and their employees who have been paying the 
highest price for this reform. 
A number of issues related to implementation of the reform (as described by regional 
civil servants) refer to the federal level of forest management and management of 
financial flows. 
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‘The new Forest Code delegates powers for forest management to 
Khabarovsk Krai. The main problem that impedes execution of delegated 
powers (execution of powers is supposed to be carried out on the account of 
federal money, i.e. subventions) is that the amount of allowed subventions 
makes up only 30 percent of what is needed. There is not enough money for 
fire fighting and for forestry works…’ (S) 
Representatives of state and non-state sectors express their concerns about delayed 
transfer of subsidies from the federal to regional budgets, which impedes enforcement 
of the reform at the regional and local level, as well as normal functioning of regional 
forest management bodies (S, N).  
Institutional Costs 
Re-execution of lease contracts is seen by non-state actors not just as an extra expense 
or a threat to their activity, but also as a legalised way to ‘redistribute forest 
resources’ (P), thus making the reform institutionalisation of illegal activities. 
Besides, the new lease contracts are said to contain a number of ‘obviously illegal 
provisions’, especially if the company (leasee) does not stand upon its rights (P). 
Another major cost of the reform is believed to be disintegration of the state forest 
management system (S, N). The unified professional forest fire protection system has 
been disintegrating. Until recently, forest fire protection was carried out practically in 
full by state forestry bodies in Russia. In densely populated areas with well-developed 
road network, fire-fighting arrangement and forest protection, detection and extinction 
of forest fires were carried out mainly by leskhozes. Forests in sparsely populated and 
hardly accessibly areas were protected from fires by divisions of the unified federal 
structure Avialesokhrana [Agency for Air Forest Protection]. The same structure 
provided, to a great extent, fire fighting of large-scale or particularly dangerous fires. 
When the new Forest Code was adopted, Avialesokhrana was divided between 
regions and fell apart into numerous independent (and often non-viable) fragments. In 
2007, ‘there was no possibility for forest fire fighting projection operation between 
regions’ (N). In March 2008, the law on the federal budget was amended, so some 
stand-by funds on the federal level for fire fighting were restored. However, the 
ability for projection operations of qualified forces between regions in a centralised 
way has not been restored yet. And while the state-run system has been liquidated, 
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private leaseholders ‘have not accumulated the experience or resources necessary to 
put out large-scale forest fires’ (S). 
The reform, with its numerous transformations since 2000 and a dramatic reduction of 
state forestry agencies, is argued to have caused a ‘grave loss of professionalism’, 
skills and knowledge of forestry officials (N).   
‘Competent experts leave forestry bodies. Usually, this process is 
irreversible, because very few come to replace them. First, because of 
kumovshchina [nepotism] and similar things, i.e. they hire only their friends. 
Secondly, only few agree to work on such conditions, when you are not a 
human being, but a mechanism, and you are told what to do.’ (N) 
Lack of professionalism in state structures leads to numerous problems, such as 
mistakes in legal documents, illogic, excessive radicalism, inconsistency, lack of 
consideration of existing practices for Russian forest management and relationships in 
the forest sector (N). 
Social Cost 
The forest sector in Russia and the USSR has traditionally been of considerable social 
importance. It was second largest employer of rural population (after agriculture), and 
in some taiga regions it was even the largest employer. When the USSR fell apart, 
there were about 2.1 million employees in the forest sector (N). Since the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, the number of employees in the forest sector has been constantly, 
although irregularly, decreasing, which was related to a sharp decline in production 
output and forestry works (in the early 1990s), as well as to the large-scale technical 
upgrade of the sector. By 2006, the number of people employed in the forest sector, 
reached about one million, one quarter of who were employed in various state forestry 
bodies (A). 
Concerns about recently increased unemployment are related to technological 
advances and increasing efficiency in the sector (N).  Moreover, redistribution of 
forest leases in the interests of bigger forest businesses and the increased 
responsibility of private companies are expected to cause further job cuts, especially 
in smaller regions. Small companies, which tend to be effective in terms of 
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employment but not efficient as businesses, are not believed to be able to survive the 
reform, causing severe social problems (P, N). New regulations are expected to cause 
a lot of small and medium-size companies to stop their operations or to go 
underground (move into the illegal sector) (N, P). Changes are believed to be 
implemented at a very fast pace, and the new legislation is believed to increase the 
unemployment growth rate by two to three times (N). 
Unemployment involves not just employees of the private sector, but also local 
forestry state organisations, which have been curtailed.  
‘Those two hundred thousand forest sector employees that were handed over 
to the regions are not needed in such quantity. This problem has existed for 
a long time, namely that there were too many forestry employees, but no 
budget money to support them. So, there was a question how one could 
dismiss them. This is why they were simply shoved off to the regions – 
effectively fired, at least most of them.’ (N) 
Large-scale dismissal of forestry employees is bound to cause a number of further 
social and environmental issues, such as a growth in poaching and illegal logging, 
particularly in remote areas with no employment alternatives (A). 
The cost of reform is believed to be particularly high not for big business or civil 
servants of the federal level, but for the local population and local employees of the 
forest sector. The cost is regarded as practically prohibitive for small and middle-size 
forestry companies (who bear the burden of social responsibility) in view of the 
implemented reforms on the basis of the new Forest Code. 
Legislative changes raised not only the issue of employment, but also that of restricted 
access to essential forest resources for population. Free access to forests was officially 
retained in the new legislation. Nevertheless, there arose several issues. 
‘Of course, there are very frightening things in the new Forest Code. For 
instance, if I decide to lease a piece of forest for my apiary site, I would 
need to go through a very complicated procedure. At the same time, a big 
company like Rimbunan Hijau will be able to get a piece of forest even 
without an auction (auction is not obligatory for big investors).’ (N) 
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The interviewee is concerned about the unfairness of forest distribution 
procedures: rules for forest use by the local population are said to be more 
complicated than those for big industrial investment projects. 
‘In order to obtain the right to cut some trees for fire wood, a citizen from 
say Samarga or some Agzu settlement will have to appeal to executive 
authorities in Vladivostok, the city with regional executive authority offices, 
and he will have to travel to Vladivostok. This is a requirement of the 
federal law.’ (S) 
The quote shows concern about the rules for obtaining felling licenses for household 
purposes and excessive centralization of forest management. 
As the above quotes demonstrate, these issues are recognized equally by NGOs and 
representatives of state agencies. It is admitted that the new forest legislation has 
significantly restricted and complicated access of rural population to vital forest 
resources, first and foremost to firewood and timber for small-scale construction and 
maintenance works, and non-timber forest resources for processing and sale 
(mushrooms, berries, etc). 
Despite the high cost of reform for all key participants of the forest sector, their 
concerns are not voiced accordingly, the only recent exception being a massive wave 
of protest from forestry employees and regional authorities as a reaction to the first 
draft of the Forest Code (N). The discontent with ongoing changes and such 
consequences as the lowering status of leskhozes after delegation of powers to the 
regional level; loss of jobs and other social issues (S), finds reflection mostly in 
‘hidden discourses’ (Scott, 1990). Not just private companies, but also local civil 
servants express their concerns about the state reform (S). However, these concerns 
and critique of official policies tend to be voiced in a non-public social space. 
5.4.2 Consequences of the Forest Reform 
Rise of Environmentalism? 
The environmental aspect of the new legislation is assessed differently by 
interviewees. 
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‘I think that Russian legislation is changing for the better. Thus, a Strategy 
for conservation of rare and extinct species has been approved at the level of 
the Ministry of Natural Resources.’ (N) 
The interviewee notes a certain ‘greening’ of state forest policy and legislation. The 
awareness of biodiversity issues has been growing.  
New regulations provide for the possibility of biodiversity conservation and 
protection of low-disturbed forests. For example, previously, companies would be 
fined for leaving groups of trees on the logging site (as a method of biodiversity 
conservation), now the new legislation provides an opportunity for leaving groups of 
trees on the plot (P). National legislation and rules are believed to have become less 
rigid, allowing more flexibility for forest users, e.g. when choosing environmentally-
friendly technologies (N). 
‘Despite all drawbacks of the Code and transition period (not everything 
goes smoothly yet), the Forest Code overall tries to oblige forest users to do 
the jobs they should be doing, namely forest protection and regeneration, 
rational forest use, etc on their leases. So, it comes out that the leaseholder 
undertakes a commitment (according to the lease contract) to work 
essentially within the framework of certification.’ (S) 
The quote shows that there is a trend towards juxtaposition of the new legislation 
and FSC requirements (international standards). Changes in forest legislation, 
such as granting more responsibility to leaseholders, are regarded as the 
harmonisation of national laws with international norms. 
‘When the majority of the rural population either worked for the timber 
sector or was in some other way dependent on these companies, people 
mostly closed their eyes to the devastation of the forests taking place. Now 
that the economic ties between the majority of the rural population and the 
timber industry have been disrupted, the active part of the population 
(usually not a very large one) is not willing any more to put up with the 
situation where remnants of valuable forests disappear, and villages and 
settlements are still left in poverty.’ (N) 
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The increasing unemployment is expected to correlate with possible changes in 
attitudes towards devastating timber harvesting techniques. A change in attitude 
to forest resources and a turn towards environmental thinking is expected as a 
consequence of, possibly, weakened (as an outcome of the forest reform) 
economic ties between the population and the forest. 
These changes demonstrate that despite a strong path-dependence of the law-making 
process, there is room for institutional innovations. Despite the persistent ‘razdatok’ 
centralised economy, some areas are released from the state control. As Bessonova 
(2006, 2008) would argue, these are just areas that represent no interest for the state or 
that such liberalization occurs during periods of crisis and deteriorated state capability 
(which could refer to the current situation). 
‘One often says that concerning conservation or low-disturbed forests, 
biodiversity, etc, FSC criteria do not accord with the Russian legislation. 
This is not true. They absolutely correspond to the federal Russian 
legislation – all these approaches, requirements, etc. And what they do not 
correspond to is departmental normative acts, such as Harvesting Rules, 
Rules for Allotment and Inspection of Forest Plots (pravila otvoda I 
osvidetelstvovaniya lesosek), Sanitary Rules (sanitarnye pravila), and Rules 
for Improvement Cutting (pravila rubok uhoda).’ (N) 
The quoted NGO leader argues that environmental shift of the forest legislation is 
challenged not by major federal laws, but rather by internal contradictions within 
the Russian legal system. The reason for this discrepancy is that these 
departmental documents were written long time ago, and respective norms of 
forest use have become entrenched as everyday practices. A change of these 
formal institutions has started (e.g. new Harvesting Rules), however, it happens 
slowly (N). 
‘In principle, these [Harvesting] rules contain more possibilities now for 
biodiversity conservation on different levels. However, as always, I see a 
big pitfall here. I am afraid that in the Russian reality, our loggers will 
understand this as follows: ‘Well, this is what we do not need, something 
rotten and doty, overmature and commercially not attractive, so we shall 
leave this for biodiversity…’ (P) 
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The quote shows that concerns relate not only to law-making, but also to 
implementation of introduced innovations. The interviewee expressed an opinion 
that even such positive legislative changes can lead to negative effects and 
deterioration of environmental situation due to particularities of implementation 
in Russian conditions. 
Informal institutions, namely underdevelopment of environmental thinking (forest 
perceived as purely an economic resource) in conditions of poor control and 
liberalisation in the forest sector are believed to present a serious challenge to 
environmentalistic changes of the legislation. During the current period of transition 
and development of the Russian forest capital, transplantation of international 
standards and institutions requires particular caution. There is a feeling (N) of a 
backwards movement in terms of environmentalism, increasing threat to protective 
forests, expanding opportunities for commercial logging and growing 
commercialisation of the sector. 
Change in Power Relations?  
NGO interviewees argue that the reform has not brought any significant changes to 
power relations in the sector. Thus, decentralization is regarded as ‘fictitious’, as it 
implies delegation of obligations and duties, rather than rights and power to regional 
authorities (N). Only some forestry service property and employees were transferred 
to the regions (N). These changes do not diminish the resemblance to the Soviet 
system. 
‘All money [forest revenues] goes upwards, to the federal budget. Money 
from the federal budget is distributed in the form of subventions among 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Besides, the allocated money 
does not depend on how much they received from the constituent entity. I 
mean, there is a technique to calculate it, but the technique is of Soviet and 
egalitarian type. There is no connection with efficiency of forestry in each 
particular region. So, regions have no financial motivation for raising 
efficiency of their forestry sectors. They have a plan how much they have to 
collect. But again, it is the old Soviet planned system.’ (N) 
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The quote shows that financial levers are in the hands of federal authorities, and funds 
of regional forestry bodies depend on the centrally made decisions.  
Moreover, a new scheme of payment for forest resources was introduced, whereby the 
authority to fix the coefficient for payment for forest resources was taken from 
regional level and passed to the federal level. Prior to the reform, minimal fees for 
forest lease were fixed by federal government. However, there were the so called 
regional rates, and regional budgets had the right to receive funds that could be 
collected in addition to the rates fixed by the federal government. In the course of the 
reform, the right to fix this scaling-up coefficient has been taken from regional 
authorities and given to the executive federal body Rosleskhoz (S). 
So, financial control after adoption of the new legislation has continued to be shaped 
by institutions that bear a strong resemblance to the Soviet system of forest 
management, namely institutions of redistribution where the state plays the dominant 
role, vertical hierarchical authority (Kirdina, 2008) and institutions of ‘razdacha’ 
(deal-out) and ‘sdacha’ (tribute to the ruler) (Bessonova, 2006). The state fosters the 
dependant’s psychology and the ‘give me’ syndrome (Bessonova, 2006).  
The legislative level of forest sector management is controlled by federal authorities: 
all laws and most normative acts (including the ones that shape industrial, large-scale 
forest use) are designed at the federal level (N). 
‘Regions are allowed some law-making, but it is mainly norms concerning 
forest use by individuals, i.e. for household needs. However, it is a very 
small share of norms, and it concerns mostly minor issues.’ (N) 
After the redistribution of powers, the specifying of species that are not allowed to be 
harvested belongs only to the federal authorities. Regional logging restrictions or bans 
for certain tree species (such as linden in Khabarovsk and Primorsky Krais) were 
lifted (N). 
‘The system of lesnichestvos, new bodies of forest management, has to be 
agreed upon by the federal level. The heads of these structures also have to 
be approved by the federal level.’ (N) 
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Thus, administrative control is also in the hands of federal civil servants, as 
candidates for important governing posts have to be approved by federal 
authorities. 
So, delegation of forest management powers to the regional level has to a great extent 
been fictitious. All actual levers of forest management (financial, legislative and 
administrative) have remained in the hands of federal authorities. The institutional 
system has remained dominated by informal path-dependent institutions. 
The main right delegated to the regional level was the right to allocate forest leases 
for felling. It is not clear how it can be guaranteed that governors are interested in 
sustainable forest management. There is a concern (N) that they will be interested in 
allocating as much forest as possible for lease and in felling as much as possible. 
There is a concern that goals related to long-term sustainability, quality of water, 
recreational space for population, development of specially protected natural areas 
and tourism will shift to the background. 
Consequences of the attempt to decentralise forest management have been 
metaphorically summarised by an NGO representative:  
‘I would compare this with the situation before Revolution in Russia – with 
a typical image of a stingy landlord, who lives somewhere in Moscow or St. 
Petersburg, but has an estate, which is run by a steward. So, he says to his 
steward: ‘Your every step has to be agreed with me. And you have to give 
every earned kopec [penny] to me. Later, I will probably give the same very 
kopec back to you for your essential needs.’ Such is the management model. 
Such steward is just a nominal steward. He just executes the will of his 
khozyain [landlord]. The same has happened with the regions now.’ (N) 
The above mentioned specificity of the decentralization process in the Russian forest 
sector and the lack of change in power relations are an obstacle for the development 
of such informal institutions as a sense of responsibility in civil servants. Since 
regional governors are appointed from Moscow and are ‘a continuation of the 
executive vertically’ (N), they remain largely unaccountable to local population, 
which means that consequences of decentralization are likely to be arbitrary and 
depend heavily on central authorities. The attempt at decentralization is likely to 
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result in just new formalities but leave the fundamentals of the ‘unitary political 
order’ (e.g., governing positions are filled by appointment) (Kirdina, 2008) (and 
accompanying informal institutions) unchanged. 
Legal Nihilism 
The new Russian forest legislation is described as ‘intricate, messy, contradictory and 
difficult to implement’, ‘obviously hostile to individuals, first and foremost to the 
rural population’ and aimed at ‘securing convenience for civil servants when 
handling individuals or companies’ rather than conservation of forests or securing 
convenience for local population. All this is believed to shape a negative attitude of 
the population towards forest laws and rules, as well as A steadfast reluctance to live 
according to these rules and regulations (i.e. legal nihilism): ‘people are concerned 
not so much about finding a way to comply with the new law, but rather about finding 
a way to avoid the law’ (N). 
Among provided examples was a situation with felling licences, when regional 
authorities had to violate the new law and issue felling licences, so that the logging 
activities did not stop (N). Similarly, regional authorities had to break the law and 
define the procedure for re-execution of lease contracts themselves (it was supposed 
to be done by federal bodies, not the regional ones), when the federal bodies failed to 
do this in time. In some situations, due to all these difficulties, companies had to work 
during certain periods of time without any legal documents justifying their activities.  
Another example of laws being observed only to a certain extent was when a number 
of forest management powers were delegated to the regional level. Due to legislative 
mistakes (one ‘forgot’ to provide financing for forest management in Leningrad 
Oblast, Koryaksi and Nenetski Autonomous Okrugs), regional bodies could not start 
executing their powers, so the old forest management bodies had to do the job, despite 
the fact that it was not legal any more (N). 
So, the reform is expected to have a substantial long-term institutional effect, namely 
development of legal nihilism as the basis of relationships in the forest sector. 
Regional Differences 
Interviewees emphasize that consequences of the reform differ across the country.  
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‘Polarization of businesses and regions is unavoidable. In a small number of 
regions, the situation is likely to become even better than it is now. Some 
advanced regions with a lot of competent experts will be able to become 
even better under conditions of more administrative and legal freedom. 
However, in most other regions, the situation will become even worse.’ (N) 
Expected disparities are explained through individual traits of regional leaders: 
‘In Khabarovsk Krai, management [administration / authorities] is different. 
In Primorye, authorities come from criminal circles.’ (P) 
Consequences of decentralization and delegation of certain powers to the regions are 
perceived as ambiguous. One of the reasons for concern is financial disparities 
between regions (S). Some interviewees are concerned that regions will adopt 
different models of forest management, and some of them may cut down on forest 
management expenses and thus leave forests unattended (S).  
Conclusion 
The focus of the chapter has been on the state (right-hand side of Figure 1) as a major 
actor in the Russian forest sector, and on the effect that past practices have on the 
actions of the state today (the top part of Figure 1). The chapter has discussed major 
incentives, tools, process, costs and expected consequences of the forest reform. The 
major changes introduced are: decentralisation and liberalisation of forest 
management systems and the development of market relations in the sector. 
Introduced measures triggered a process of full-scale commercialisation of the forest 
sector with the state partly withdrawing its responsibility for environmental 
protection. Commercialisation of the sector combined with a weak tradition of 
environmental thinking (forests being perceived as merely an economic resource) and 
poor control appear to present a challenge to sustainable development of the forest 
sector. Therefore, during the current period of transition and accumulation of the 
Russian forest capital, transplantation of international standards and institutions 
requires particular caution. Because of this, no final conclusions can yet be made 
about environmental consequences of the reform. 
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The chapter showed that despite a strong path-dependence of the law-making process, 
there is room for institutional innovations. Although most departmental documents 
were written a long time ago and respective norms of forest use became entrenched as 
everyday practices, a change of formal institutions has started. The analysis has 
shown that the reform may facilitate a shift from path-dependent to new, often 
imported institutions (such as ‘supreme conditional ownership’ (Kirdina, 2008) to 
private ownership). This change often occurs within the framework of the ongoing 
transition to the market economy. Despite the persistent ‘razdatok’ centralised 
economy, some areas are released from the state control. As Bessonova (2006, 2008) 
would argue, these are a few areas that represent no interest for the state, and certain 
liberalization occurs during periods of crisis and deteriorated state capability. At the 
same time, the emerging environmental shift in legislation is challenged by internal 
contradictions of the Russian legal system, poor enforcement of rules, ongoing 
liberalisation of the forest sector and persisting informal institutions. The chapter has 
provided several examples of coexisting and clashing ‘new’ (e.g. certification, private 
systems of tracking timber origin, etc) and ‘traditional’ (centralised and intransparent 
system of decision-making; unaccountability of authorities to the local population; 
perception of forests, etc) institutions as well as inconsistent and non-linear 
development of the forest sector. It showed how certain innovative institutions 
introduced by non-state actors are stifled by the state forest policy. The newly 
developed institutions of free market and imported institutions of sustainable forest 
management are embedded in a fundamentally different, strongly entrenched system 
of path-dependent institutions that are based on civil servants as dominant decision-
makers. 
The chapter has discussed the development of informal institutions, such as legal 
nihilism as a basis of relationships in the forest sector. It revealed how legislative 
shortcomings shape common practices and the long-term institutional system. Laws 
are argued to be inconsistent, too radical and therefore sometimes impossible to 
implement. Being radical, laws stumble over implementation problems and therefore 
result in no significant positive change on the ground. Some of the non-state actors 
admit that they do not acknowledge the legality of state forest policies. All of this 
facilitates development of neglectful attitude to law and impairs law obedience. 
Actors therefore turn to informal institutions that could allow them to decrease the 
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costs. This raises questions about consequences of the reform, extent and quality of 
actual institutional transformations. 
There has been a redistribution of duties and rights amongst participants of the forest 
sector, with the state retaining its dominant position. The federal authorities have 
strengthened their position as ultimate decision-makers. The open question remains to 
what extent such core institutions (as e.g. the institution of supreme conditional 
property) will be replaced or retained. Are the introduced changes to be interpreted as 
the crisis of the ‘razdatok’ economy (Bessonova, 2006), which forced authorities to 
allow more room for alternative institutions? Is it a sign of a new institutional system? 
A liberal form of the razdatok economy? Or is it just a temporary retreat of the state to 
be followed by its full-fledged return later on? There are still signs that the new 
introduced institutions become embedded into a firm structure of ‘traditional’ rules 
and norms, such as the common rules of rule-making in the Russian society and the 
exceptional position of the state in this regard (‘meta set of rules’ (Ostrom, 2005)). 
Privileges and resources are largely distributed through administrative decisions, 
showing the persistence of the redistributive economy, where the ultimate (and 
arbitrary) decision maker is a state official. 
The above analysis has shown that state and non-state actors have come to bear 
different ‘costs’ in the course of the reform. Non-state and the least protected actors 
pay the highest price. The reform is regarded as a tool to serve private interests of 
civil servants, who are closely related to big business and real estate development. 
The applied analytical approach was borrowed from Polterovich (1999), who used the 
concept ‘costs of institutional transformation’ to explain ‘institutional lock-ins’, i.e. 
persistence of ineffective institutions. The above analysis also corresponds to the 
framework suggested in (Becker and Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2005): institutional 
change is explained through the relations between actors, the natural resource, the 
distributional effects of new (post-reform) rules and their relation to the ‘meta-rules’. 
As the recent experience and enforcement of the recently adopted legislation show, 
revolutionary measures contradict the path-dependent institutional structure of 
Russian society (also discussed in Hedlund, 2005; Bessonova, 2006; Kirdina, 2008) 
and the forest sector in particular. This means that entrenched institutions of the 
‘prevailing matrix’ (Kirdina, 2008: 3) may nullify the effects of the reform, as the 
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institutional matrix to a significant extent pre-determines the path of the social 
evolution.  
The chapter revealed that there is no consensus among actors concerning the best way 
of modernization of the forest sector. Legislation designed by state agencies tends to 
be inconsistent and in parts radical. Non-state interviewees tend to argue in favour of 
the evolutionary path of development.  
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CHAPTER SIX: MODEL FORESTS AND FOREST CERTIFICATION 
6.1 Model Forests 
Model forests in Russia are long-term regional projects ‘aimed at improvement in the 
quality of forest management and effectiveness of forest use’ and ‘based on 
partnership and interaction of stakeholders’ (Polozhenie ob..., 2007: 1). Currently, 
there are five major model forests in Russia: Gassinski model forest (Khabarovsk 
Krai), Pskov model forest (Pskov Oblast), model forest ‘Priluz’ye’ (Republic of 
Komi), Kologrivsky model forest (Kostroma Oblast), and Kovdozersky model forest 
(Murmansk Oblast). 
6.1.1 Drivers of model forests 
As an interviewee in the North-West of Russia noted, ‘the ones who are really 
interested in the project are timber companies’ (N). They consider model forests 
as a tool that may help them ‘to avoid fines imposed by leskhozes’ when 
companies attempt to comply with international forestry requirements that may 
contradict Russian law (P). The special status of model territory gives an 
‘opportunity to live according to slightly different laws than everyone else in the 
forest sector’ and to circumvent Russian law, e.g. to leave behind ‘key habitats’ 
behind on the logging sites (P). 
Some model areas, organised by private companies, serve the purpose of 
experimenting with forestry methods (e.g., final felling with consideration of 
environmental factors) and developing intensive forest use techniques (P). 
‘In the Soviet time, leskhozes and lespromkhozes did not have such model 
plots on their territories. And now, that the UPM has come, ever more 
attention is given to this.’ (P) 
As the quote indicates, development of model forests is closely related to 
international companies (UPM in this case) and their entry into the Russian 
market. In particular, this process is believed to be triggered by ‘certification (in 
order to conserve biodiversity and use forests in a sustainable way)’ and ‘certain 
corporate requirements’ (P). 
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Other stakeholders have also contributed to promotion of model forests in Russia. 
‘During the last seven-eight years, WWF approached state structures for the 
first time with the idea to create a model forest in Pskov Oblast. And at the 
same time, one launched a model forest project in Komi.’ (N) 
New international non-governmental entrants to the Russian forest sector (such as 
WWF) and newly established Russian NGOs (the Silver Taiga in the case of 
Komi model forest) have started to play a role with the idea ‘to demonstrate what 
an intensive and sustainable forestry in Russia is and how it can be implemented 
in practice’ (N). 
Interviewees mentioned the initiative of the state only in the case of Gassinski model 
forest (A, N). There, the idea of model forests was also borrowed from abroad 
(Canada), where it emerged as a response to campaigns of environmental 
organisations against destructive forest cutting (A). 
‘Does the Model Forest Network help you in any way? They just reimburse 
our travel expenses to meetings. And apart from this no, it does not help.’ 
(A) 
This quote indicates that the work on model forests is fragmented, and there is little 
cooperation even between those model forest stakeholders who are supposed to unite 
the efforts. 
Another interviewee describes his experience with a failed model forest project in 
Chuguyevsky Rayon in the late 1990s: despite availability of foreign funding and 
participation of local administration and other state agencies, ‘local companies 
work with China and are not interested in sustainable forest use’ (N). Thus, the 
interviewee suggests that there are actors who do not advocate development of 
model forests due to certain market conditions and availability of economically 
more attractive opportunities. 
According to the interviewees, the main drivers of model forests are private 
companies, NGOs, and the state. The efforts of these participating forces are not 
always combined.  
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6.1.2 The idea of model forests 
Stakeholders have various ideas about model forests, their purposes and potential. 
‘This means organising forestry according to Western patterns and going 
away from Russian requirements.’ (P) 
The above quoted interviewee from the European part of Russia perceives model 
forests as a Russian adaptation of the Scandinavian model of intensive forest use. He 
notes that ‘Western’ forestry methods are based ‘on a more democratic approach, on 
getting profits and minimising expenses’, whereas the Russian system ‘has still 
remained of the Soviet kind’ (P). It shows the readiness of some stakeholders to make 
further steps towards market economy and democratisation of society. 
A director of a model forest in the Far East described the model forest as ‘a territory 
where one tests a management model’ and where ‘a managing company has to unite 
interests of different parties’ (forest users, game and fishing husbandries, indigenous 
people, etc) – with an aim to ‘economically secure everyone working in this region’, 
to put an end to illegal activities in the forest and preserve or restore biodiversity (A). 
The interviewee (A) did not mention techniques of intensive forest use, which may 
have reflected the irrelevance of Scandinavian forestry technologies in the Far Eastern 
part of Russia. 
The above quotes indicate that opinions vary not only across regions, but also across 
sectors. Private companies put more emphasis on commercial value and profit-
making. However, NGOs also see goals of model forests in making it ‘viable for 
business to invest into forest sector’ and ‘improve the quality of forests shape the 
structure of the forest to make it more valuable for timber business’ (N). Thus, the 
business-oriented discourse is characteristic for both NGOs and the private sector. 
NGOs expect model forests to bring new technologies for ‘intensive sustainable 
model of forest management’, including new methods of evaluation of forest 
resources, methods of economic planning of forest use, logging technologies (N). 
Representatives of the private sector refer to model forests as a potential ‘link between 
science, technology and production’ (P). 
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Interviewees (private, state and NGOs) see the goals of model forests in local socio-
economic development of communities: ‘to achieve growth of revenue of local 
population’ (A); to provide alternative employment opportunities, e.g. eco-tourism; to 
provide ‘social stability’ (N); ‘to support settlements financially, and also develop 
them culturally’ (P). 
An employee of the state-initiated model forest described purposes of the model 
forest in the following way: 
‘The aim of our institute is further education and training in the area of 
ecology, environmental protection, use of natural resources... <Do you offer 
any courses on sustainable forestry practices or multipurpose forest use?> 
Yes, we teach everything that is in the Forest Code.’ (A) 
So, the interviewee explained his understanding of the model forest as an institution 
that offered the same services as Soviet educational institutions. There was a lack of 
understanding with the interviewee on several issues (such as the example above). 
The interviewee tried to show compliance with state regulations and adherence to law. 
However, the interviewee seemed to be not familiar with concepts of international 
forest management. 
Another interviewee described model forests as potentially a form of ‘green 
extremism’:  
‘One should not make a single strict reserve (zapovednik) out of Primorsky 
Krai... Of course I support model forests, but one should not overdo it. 
There are logging techniques that facilitate forest regeneration. Why should 
we ban forest logging?’ (A) 
The interviewee expressed a cautious view on model forests. He perceived them 
as superfluous and unnecessary as there already are environmentally-friendly 
forestry methods. Moreover, he noted that existing rules provide guidance for 
‘unconventional logging’ and, thus, legal framework for sustainable forestry. 
‘During the last five years, foresters pillaged the forest under the guise of 
this unconventional logging. The problem is not bad rules, but that we 
cannot control their implementation.’ (A) 
 162 
The interviewee expressed concern that poor law enforcement affected realisation of 
even most sensible ideas and caused their distortion and abuse in practice which 
caused his scepticism about the potential of model forests. 
A representative of the state sector commented on model forests as follows: 
‘In general, it does not comply with our rules… During final felling (rubki 
glavnogo polzovaniya), they usually leave some trees on the site… But this 
is breakaway from our rules.’ (S) 
The quote indicates that model forests are also perceived as a deviation from 
legitimate rules and as something alien. Thus, the two last quotes show trust in and 
almost monopolistic legitimacy of state designed regulations. 
The head of the Forest Programme of the Amur branch of WWF Russia expressed 
doubt about the possibility of realization of model forest projects in Russia. 
‘Unfortunately, I do not know a single case, at least in the third world, 
which we are part of, where public participation worked.’ (N) 
The interviewee showed disbelief in the future of public participation and democracy 
in forest management. Moreover, he referred to Gassinski model forest (the only 
existing official model forest in the Russian Far East) as ‘merely a feed box 
(kormushka) for certain circles and organisations’ (N), namely for academia and 
researchers. He noted that no significant results have been achieved and nothing new 
implemented in Gassinski model forest, and the project provided ground only for 
‘para-scientific’ research projects. 
‘Pskov Model Forest is basically a return to the Soviet system, because one 
introduces rigid regulations again (for example, how far from watercourses 
one is allowed to cut), but on smaller territories now.’ (P) 
This observation of a private-sector interviewee indicates that Russian model forests 
are considered to be a return to the Soviet-like institutions, namely to excessive 
regimentation. It shows that model forests may fit well into the available intellectual 
tradition and the path-dependent institutional system of the forest sector. The 
historical predominance of top-down forest management, abundant regulations and 
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existence of ‘model’ structures in various areas of socio-economic life leave their 
mark on the perception and implementation of model forests in Russia. 
6.1.3 Consequences of model forests 
New regional regulations have been developed on ‘re-afforestation, logging, 
improvement cutting, and conservation planning’, and the legal status of such projects 
changed, e.g. the Pskov model forest was officially acknowledged at the level of the 
federal Ministry of Natural Resources (N). 
Model forest projects included ‘inventory checks of flora and fauna’, ‘monitoring of 
biodiversity’, respective changes in logging practices, and organisation of wildlife 
reserves, which resulted in improvement in the quality of the forest fund (A).  
Various new forms of engagement with the local population have emerged: public 
hearings, consultations, discussions about what is ‘important and necessary for them’ 
(N), and forest clubs (A). 
‘One tries to combine a model of more or less intensive forestry with 
interests of the local population. To take into account interests of villagers, 
where they gather berries and pick mushrooms, etc; their requirements to 
preserve some forests that are valuable for them.’ (N) 
The quote indicates that model forests are seen as a framework for consideration of 
cultural, recreational, ecological and economic interests of the local population. 
‘Everyone learned that one cannot conserve biodiversity if there is no united 
effort (if state forestry bodies and other stakeholders act separately).’ (A) 
The above cited interviewee suggests that model forests, in order to reach their goals, 
require cooperation not only with local population but also importantly with state 
agencies. How successful have model forests been in developing public participation 
and building partnerships? 
‘The main thing that we failed to achieve was our main goal, namely 
partnership and public participation in natural resource management.’ (A) 
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Among the reasons for ‘failure,’ interviewees listed the lack of legal mechanisms for 
public participation and the ‘Russian mentality’ (A). 
‘Of course, it is difficult for us to understand it. Our thinking (soznaniye) is 
different. For example, when we have public hearings and someone makes a 
presentation, there are neither debates nor any questions after the 
presentation… Our people are passive, and everything happens very 
quietly.’ (P) 
The idea of multi-stakeholder natural resource management is believed to be common 
to international practices but new and alien to the Russian mentality, which 
complicates the development of model forests in Russia. 
Gassinski model forest is said to ‘have failed to develop the idea of its long-term 
sustainable existence’ because its president ‘controlled the money and did not install 
a democratic system of model forest management’ (P). Its participants were pursuing 
their personal, rather than common interests and ‘were trying to snatch as much 
money as possible’ (P). Strong dependence on irregular funding and eventual lack of 
financial resources predetermined the outcome of the project: ‘once they have eaten 
up the grant, the project was over’ (N). 
Model forests are said to be opposed by the state and ‘develop only to the extent to 
which one succeeds to avoid the everyday control of state forestry bodies’: 
‘Everything that is created under immediate supervision of state forestry bodies 
perishes.’ (N). The belief in ‘state capacity’ (Skocpol, 1985) and trust to the state is 
very low. Civil servants are believed to resist changes: they ‘do not understand most 
innovations’, ‘are simply not familiar with those things that have been long perceived 
as a norm in countries with developed forestry – due to their isolation’ (N), and 
‘hardly understand practical issues’ (N). Interviewees are concerned that civil 
servants may ‘falsify or simplify’ the idea of model forests and ignore its social or 
environmental components (N). There is a trend towards ‘bureaucratisation’ and 
unification of the system of model forests in Russia now (A): 
‘When a decision was made that the Rosleskhoz would manage the Russian 
network of model forests, everything started to be assessed according to the 
same criteria and principles.’ (A)  
 165 
The state is expected to take an ever bigger part in development of model forests. This 
is believed to be accompanied by a trend towards ‘a lot of instructions, guidelines and 
documents’, which ‘leads to nothing good’ (A). 
Overall, despite attempts of different stakeholders to develop model areas, these 
attempts have remained isolated from each other so far. There is no Russian network 
of model forests, no joint activity with the international network of model forests (A), 
but rather only sparse ‘islands of change’ with a very uncertain future (P). 
6.2 Forest Certification 
Box 2. Forest Certification Schemes 
Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) 
Single national standard 
not required. 
Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest 
Certification schemes 
(PEFC) 
Independent, non-
governmental, non-profit 
organizations established to 
promote the responsible and 
sustainable management of 
the world’s forests through 
independent third party 
certification. 
A single national 
standard is required. 
Validation of Legal 
Timber Programme 
(VLTP), Khabarovsk Krai 
Based on the creation of a public-private partnership 
between the regional Government, audit company SGS 
as an independent verifier and a local partner (Far 
Eastern Forest Certification Centre). The VLTP Scheme 
has been set up separately from the Government and is 
run by SGS in association with the Far Eastern Forest 
Certification Centre. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on FSC Russia Official Website, PEFC website, 
and VLTP website 
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There are several forest certification schemes65 in Russia. Forest certification schemes 
refer usually to forest management certification or chain of custody (timber legality) 
certification. Three major schemes are briefly characterised in the table below. The 
most popular and essentially the only nation-wide scheme in Russia is FSC – with an 
area of 21.2 million hectares of certified Russian forests in 200866. 
6.2.1 Drivers and Perception of Voluntary Forest Certification 
As set out in Figure 1, private companies find themselves under the influence of 
local, national and international actors and processes. What factors and actors in 
particular drive the change in their policies and introduction of the voluntary 
forest certification? 
‘Western companies started to get certified, and then, on their model, 
Russian companies started to certify as well.’ (N) 
Certification is perceived as an imported Western phenomenon, driven by forces 
outside Russia. Russian forest sector is developing into a global player and becomes 
ever more exposed to market-based global institutional pressures.  
‘Why does the company need certification at all? - First, we work within a 
framework of an international company. Previously, we had only domestic, 
all-Russian significance... Now, we are obliged to comply with requirements 
of international standards.’ (P) 
The quote indicates that there is a growing self-awareness as a part of the international 
socio-economic system, which implies the need to comply with international 
standards and requirements. 
‘No-one requires certification in the domestic market… Our society is not 
mature enough yet to ask for certified products.’ (P) 
                                                 
65
 Forest certification stands for standard-setting, trademark assurance and accreditation services that 
are provided to companies (that are involved in forest use and management) by third-party 
organisations. (FSC Russia, Official Website) 
66
 FSC Russia, Official Website 
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Russian society and consumers are regarded as catching up and only developing 
towards the stage that some Western counterparts are at.  
Certification is believed to be strongly driven by profit-seeking private companies 
(brand development; reduction of expenses on forestry works) (P). The main idea of 
certification is described as ‘Profit comes first’ (S). The local population is neither 
involved, nor showing any interest in certification. Market incentives are said to have 
significantly more power than awareness of ecological problems and environmental 
values in the Russian forest sector (P). 
An interviewee describes his company’s work on High Conservation Value Forests in 
the following way: 
‘We realised long ago that this work had to be done. And one of 
requirements of forest certification is this work as well… I do not know 
whether it would have taken place were it not for the forest 
certification…’ (P) 
This shows that companies have started to realise that old approaches have to be 
replaced and that one needs to carry out modernisation of the private forestry in 
Russia. At the same time, certification serves as a crucial trigger for changes. 
Awareness of private companies of the necessity to change shows that established 
paths of institutional development contain within themselves resources for 
transformation and off-path organization. However, realization of this potential 
requires additional economic triggers. 
‘If there were institutes in Russia that educated competent specialists who 
would be able to suggest procedures, organize their monitoring and control, 
etc… then one would not need certification so much.’ (P) 
Despite their intention to better organise prodiction, companies experience lack of 
local expertise and therefore turn to certification as an external source of knowledge. 
‘Certification helps to fight against authorities… We live in a hostile 
environment. ‘We’ means timber business and our company. When I say 
hostile environment, I mean local population and authorities, state 
officials…’ (P) 
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Thus, certification is also believed to be used as a political tool, a mechanism for 
negotiations. By means of certification, companies hope to ‘build dialogue with 
authorities’ and  ‘to avoid functions that are not typical for business, such as 
maintaining the whole infrastructure of forest settlements’ (P). Certification has a 
potential to make rules of the game more transparent and thus restrict 
opportunities for power abuse by civil servants (and their ability to shift social 
burdens on the private sector). It would not be wrong to say that in this sense, 
certification helps to ease the transition from the Soviet institutional system to the 
post-Soviet, more market-oriented system. 
‘The forest fund is depleted here... So, for instance Terneyles, before they 
even started certification, switched from clear cuts to partial cuts - purely for 
economic reasons…’ (N) 
The above quote of an interviewee from the Far East suggests that requirements 
of certification meet companies’ needs arising from growing scarcity and 
deterioration of available forest resources. Partial felling allows companies to opt 
for natural, rather than artificial, forest regeneration and thus cut their expenses. 
The quote indicates the increasing awareness of companies about the need to 
change their practices in order to survive. 
‘Besides, there are quite educated and intelligent people in business. They 
have a flexible mind, without stereotypes and ready to constant change.’ (N)  
The interviewee notes that private sector is open to innovation, interested in 
preservation of forest resources - ‘at least more so than forestry civil servants’ 
(N). Other interviewees (P) note that individual value systems and perceptions of 
managers provide further incentives for certification: business leaders are aware 
of environmental problems and are personally interested in responsible and ethical 
behaviour in the forest. 
It is clear that changes of behaviour (and in patterns of forest use) cannot be explained 
merely in economic terms. The narrow focus of NIE researchers makes them overlook 
a number of issues related to the interaction of humans and nature, including 
development of the ecological thinking. 
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Some major drivers of certification lie outside Russia, in the development of global 
value chains and branding, oriented towards consumers of Western markets, which 
are becoming particularly environmentally sensitive. Inside the country the major 
drivers are the weaknesses of state control over the sector and the growing awareness 
of the private sector of the need to modernize forest management. 
 ‘It is about the market. The world puts pressure on China to make it buy 
legal timber. China is our main market... Besides, Dallesprom positions 
itself as a responsible forest user. Our capitalisation will be higher, for FSC 
confirms that the company is trustworthy…’ (P) 
Certification is regarded as a requirement of the global markets and, thus, as a 
necessary tool for development of the company and its expansion into other 
markets. It is expected to become a competitive advantage of the company. 
‘Certification is an instrument to prohibit access to markets. They will shout 
to the whole international community that there is something wrong with 
our logging operations... It is unfair competition.’ (P) 
The above interviewee regards certification not just as a tool of international 
competitive struggle, but rather as an artificial barrier to foreign markets. 
Voluntary forest certification is compared to traditional instruments of state policy. 
‘(The audit company) SGS takes upon itself functions of the state now, of 
the state that does not perform its duties. The standards of VLT are in fact a 
duplication of forestry regulations. They de facto control whether companies 
comply with major forestry regulations.’ (N) 
Certification is seen as a duplicate of state forestry regulations and laws, but with 
possibly more effective enforcement mechanisms. Failure of the state to organise 
effective and sustainable forest management, as well as to enforce existing regulations 
has caused development of alternative, non-state systems of governance and 
independent guarantors of a certain level of forest management. 
At the same time, unlike traditional state tools of governance, certification is said to 
be not coercive, ‘not a repressive body, but a tool to improve company’s operations’ 
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(P). The interviewee (P) describes certification neither as a strict hard law, nor as a 
repressive mechanism or a punitive institution, but rather as a tool for improvement of 
the company’s output. It is seen as a ‘nice-to-have’ (to become potentially in the 
future a ‘must-to-have’) necessary for business development. 
‘We got involved in certification in late 1990s. And for many years, this 
provoked resentment / antagonism of civil servants... However, in 2002-
2003, the state started to realise that voluntary certification is good and that 
it should be developed.’ (N) 
The interviewee refers to confrontation between the state and NGOs over 
certification, which, however, appears to have mitigated. There has been an evolution 
in relations and attitudes, which started from being ‘quite tense’ relationships in late 
1990s, when ‘high-ranking officials would issue circulars with the purpose to simply 
ban FSC’ (N).  
‘Only thanks to the circumstance that forest management system is not 
completely controlled, and the right hand does not know what the left hand 
is doing, the first attempts of certification became possible.’ (N) 
So, the interviewee suggests that some institutions become possible only due to 
disagreeing actions of civil servants and existing gaps in the system of state control. 
Another view of the changing state attitude is that once big companies ‘that have 
influence on the federal policy’ engaged in the process of certification, ‘position of the 
Rosleskhoz changed and softened’ (N). A strong incentive for the state to get involved 
was not to lose ‘financial and political control over the forest sector, particularly to 
NGOs, which were very suspicious and potentially spying organisations’ (N). 
Some civil servants at the regional governmental level (S) consider certification as a 
mechanism ‘to bring the sector in order’ (navesti poryadok) as it is not obligatory but 
highly recommended to companies, if they wish to be granted various preferences by 
state bodies (e.g. government contracts). 
‘The position of our (regional) government is as follows: if the company is 
open, it will have a certificate... If you do not have a certificate, it means 
that you have something to hide.’ (S) 
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The above mentioned regional government perceives certification as an additional 
instrument of forest management control, and undertakes certain measures to 
improve state – non-state cooperation. For instance, the government signed an 
agreement about verification of timber legality with an audit company, in order to 
create favourable conditions for certification. This example indicates that state 
and non-state actors are able of dialogue and cooperation in the Russian forest 
sector. It also shows that some civil servants hope to use certification as a tool to 
institutionalize practices that they failed to institutionalize with traditional 
instruments of state governance. 
‘There are a lot of people in leskhozes who realise that it is necessary to 
bring things in order. Certification is one of the instruments’. (N) 
The state is referred to as a multifaceted actor, which consists of different departments 
and individuals with different incentives. At the local level (the concept of ‘street 
bureaucracy’ elaborated by Lipsky, 1983), certification is said to often meet 
understanding. However, due to a high employee turnover at the federal level (e.g., a 
frequent change of the head of the Federal Forestry Agency) and the consequent 
inconsistency of federal forest policy, the situation becomes complicated and 
uncertain (N). 
6.2.2 Effects and Challenges of Institutionalising the Forest Sector 
Certification is believed to contribute to reduction of environmental impact of logging 
operations, as well as to engage companies in biodiversity conservation. Companies 
are expected to carry out ‘obligatory special investigations’ of their leased areas and 
consequently conserve High Conservation Value Forests (N). They are also expected 
to thoroughly control ‘collection and proper disposal of oils and fuels’ at logging sites 
(P). Some of them design their own, internal control systems in order to ‘assess the 
quality of logging operations’ (P). 
The shift towards environmental thinking is said to be particularly noticeable in 
comparison with the Soviet period, when ‘the main principle was to harvest as much 
timber as possible and one never considered the real environmental effects’ (P).  
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The process of certification is closely related to new logging technologies that have 
recently become available to Russian companies. Short-length logging (sortimentnaya 
zagotovka) (being more profitable and less damaging for the forest) has been 
replacing the old Soviet full-length felling technology / tree-length felling system 
(hlystovaya zagotovka). (P)  
‘People have become more responsible... One has become stricter about 
health and safety (everyone wears helmets and protective trousers now). 
Besides, last year, there were public hearings in Kotelskiy Rayon. This does 
not happen at a company that is not certified. This is new... The attitude has 
changed - it is stricter now.’ (P) 
The quote indicates that certification is associated with changes in the social 
responsibility of companies and their relations with employees and local 
communities.  
While facilitating the process of forest certification, NGOs have been contributing to 
a ‘massive capacity building’ (N), the development of human and professional 
resources in the forest sector. NGOs have been providing advisory services, preparing 
textbooks on sustainable forest management, and organising special educational 
programmes for various target groups.  
‘Very soon it became obvious that only Western auditing companies work in 
Russia: their staff is Western, they know neither Russian legislation, nor 
Russian reality. They would come here with their own, certified for their 
company, standards. So, we set ourselves a task to raise a group of national 
experts on FSC certification.’ (N) 
The quote of a representative of a leading NGO indicates that NGOs regard 
themselves as incubators for home-bred professionals who could modernise the forest 
sector. There is a clear awareness of the specificity of Russian practices and, 
therefore, the need to concentrate on domestic human resources.  
These new educational institutions in some sense provide an alternative to traditional, 
state supported ones, because ‘no institution of higher education in Russia has an 
official course on sustainable forest management or forest use’ (N). 
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Key players in the timber industry undertake environmental commitments and design 
their own independent systems of verification of legal timber origin. To this end, 
companies design their own databases and multi-tier control systems (verification of 
information provided by timber suppliers, comprehensive customs checks, regular on-
site inspections of company’s contractors/suppliers). Intra-corporate, ‘private’ 
systems of control are said to be in no way inferior in their comprehensiveness to their 
equivalents run by state and regional authorities (P).  
‘Where it concerns protected areas, we look at two things: officially 
protected areas and – this is especially relevant for Karelia and Arkhangelsk 
Oblast – areas that do not have an official status of protected, but are 
identified as especially valuable by NGOs. We have undertaken a 
commitment not to carry out any logging operations there.’ (P) 
The private sector introduces its own standards of sustainable forest management, 
which, as the quote indicates, tend to be stricter than official state-imposed 
regulations, and enforces their implementation. Importantly, this system is not a 
one-way coercion, but a mutual learning process: there is a working feedback 
system between companies and their contractors / partners (P), which makes the 
whole system more flexible and viable. 
These companies are, in turn, audited by third party organisations. So, the 
internal, intra-corporate systems of timber tracking, monitoring and control form a 
global ‘private’ system of forest management, which in certain aspects becomes 
an alternative to national state governance.  
Certification as Institutionalisation of Common Practices 
Interviewees were asked whether they feel that certification has changed their work in 
any way. 
‘Well, certification is a nice word. In fact, certification simply implies 
normal operations of the company within the law and rules of the game… 
We have been working for thirty years like this and have not thought of any 
certificates… Now one has simply to restore it… Certification simply makes 
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us think about what we have forgotten, about the fact that we simply must 
do these things.’ (P) 
The quoted interviewee maintains that most of the ‘innovative’ practices (particularly 
the ones concerning rights of employees, health and safety) that are required by 
certification already existed in the Soviet Russia prior to certification, and just need to 
be restored now. Actual innovations are believed to be only few and concern mostly 
biodiversity conservation, eco-trails, conservation of different cultural and sacred 
sites. 
Several interviewees noted that certification did not change any practices of their 
companies, and that changes ‘were mainly about documents’ (P). Certification has 
required companies to officially report ‘what they have been doing anyway’ (P), 
such as setting aside biologically valuable forest plots, plots with wood grouse 
leks; support to local community etc. This evidence suggests that certification 
may imply not so much institutional innovations, but rather institutionalisation, 
formalisation of already existing practices.  
Institutionalisation is expected to be beneficial for companies now, in the market 
economy, as they can capitalise on these practices and make them their competitive 
advantage (S, P).  
The other side of the coin of such certification is that ‘there is no positive dynamics, 
as a rule, companies are at the same level we saw them a year ago’ (P). According to 
an interviewed auditor (P), regular annual audits of certified companies show that 
certification fails to trigger any significant changes, and ‘90% of companies get 
certified only because of the certificate and are not interested in development as 
such’. This means that there is a danger that certification, as it takes place now, will 
serve as a substitute for actual modernisation of the sector.  
Change in Public Participation 
Public participation has emerged on the agenda of interviewees. Private companies 
have started to ‘share information’ with NGOs (P), invite them for examination of 
their leased forests and have become more open to ‘suggestions about what should be 
protected and conserved’ (N).  
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‘We have a whole list of stakeholders. First, it is companies we work with… 
Second, we try to cooperate with NGOs and authorities.’ (P) 
The quote shows that the local community is mostly left out of ‘participation’ and is 
considered as the least significant stakeholder in the process of decision making and 
forest resource management. Realisation of the imported multi-level governance and 
public participation paradigm (e.g., Berkhout, Leach and Scoones, 2003) is 
fundamentally modified in Russia. The role of local agents is played not so much by 
local population, but rather by locally operating companies and possibly NGOs, if at 
all. 
‘Mostly, it is the heads of local administrations that contact us and ask for 
help. For example, transport, or to grade the road after a rainy season, etc… 
The local population is not very active... We have to make an effort, because 
all of us are a little bit passive. If you pin up a notice, people will pass by 
and say ‘What am I to do with this?’’ (P) 
This quote partly explains for the above described attitude towards the local 
population: state organisations remain the most active and interested stakeholders. 
The local population is passive and does not show particular interest in forest 
management. 
Nevertheless, some companies have started to arrange public hearings for local 
population, where they discuss geography of their logging operations, preservation of 
wildlife, hunting, issues of indigenous people, etc (P). 
‘It takes a lot of time to explain the company’s goal to the population, 
because in their understanding, the company’s goal is just timber logging... 
They do not understand that forests must be cut, that there have to be 
sanitary cuttings, and that mature forest has to be cut. So, we have to explain 
them that when we cut the forest we take into consideration all 
environmental requirements, etc.’ (P) 
As the quote makes clear, timber logging companies and local population have 
different ideas about forest management and on what environmental practices 
should be like, which weakens the possibility of their cooperation. The local 
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population tends to perceive forests as something that ought to be preserved, 
rather than exploited, whereas private companies attempt to promote the idea of 
industrial forest use with certain restrictions for reasons of sustainability. 
In this situation, forest certification, whilst offering tools of dialogue, may provide a 
framework for harmonisation of these conflicting discourses. Certification offers a 
framework that may help to raise the role of the public in forest management. As an 
attempt to institutionalise the dialogue between stakeholders, certification appears 
absolutely innovative for the Russian forest sector and may (although with a number 
of reservations, such as “under favourable socio-economic, political, environmental 
conditions” or “if successfully combined with the rest of the path-dependent 
institutional system”) hold potential for further structural institutional changes. 
Obstacles and Opposition to Certification 
Legislation is considered a major obstacle to the process of certification. 
‘In Russia, things change all the time… Our legislation is constantly 
changing. So, one cannot do anything…’ (P) 
Work on the national PEFC standard and FSC related documents have been 
postponed because of the legislative reform, since requirements of certification have 
to take into consideration requirements of the national legislation (P). 
‘There are of course contradictions between certification standards and our 
Russian legislation.’ (P) 
The interviewee notes that there is a significant gap between requirements of the 
legislation and certification, e.g. concerning issues of conservation planning, 
biodiversity, and High Conservation Value Forests (P). 
Another interviewee says that ‘there are still no mechanisms of sustainable forest 
use’ in the legislation, ‘there are only general principles, but no concrete 
procedures for their implementation’, so ‘leskhozes cannot do anything about it’ 
(P). Certain principles of sustainable forest management are declared including 
the conservation of biological diversity (Article 1 of the Forest Code of the 
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Russian Federation), however, there are no respective regulatory documents 
(normativnye akty). 
There are contradictions between federal legislation and departmental regulatory 
documents (vedomstvennye normativnye akty), such as Harvesting Rules (Pravila 
rubok), Rules for Allocation and Inspection of Felling Sites (Pravila otvoda I 
osvidetelstvovaniya lesosek), Sanitary Rules (Sanitarnye pravila), and Rules for 
Improvement / Thinning Cutting (Pravila rubok uhoda):  
‘These departmental documents were written only with consideration of 
harvesting operations, without social or environmental aspects. And since 
these documents were created long ago, they traditionally did not comply 
with the federal legislation. But they are traditionally still being used. And 
leskhozes and fiscal bodies of Rosprirodnadzor require compliance not with 
the federal legislation, but with governmental bodies’ acts 
(podvedomstvennye akty).’ (N) 
In addition to formal institutions (legal instability and inconsistency, contradictions 
between requirements of legislation and certification), there are other factors 
hindering certification.  
‘Since the FSC is still regarded as a foreign system, and the general 
direction of our (Russian) policy is mostly to support only national 
initiatives and nothing international, of course, our life is not particularly 
easy now.’ (N) 
Thus, it is noted that the Russian state system still attempts to remain isolated from 
Western ideas and closed for influences from abroad, and is opposed to foreign 
imported institutions, such as certification. 
At the same time, an intervieweed practitioner points out that it is possible (‘a semi-
legal way’) for a certifying company ‘to reach a compromise with local authorities’, 
i.e. leskhozes, ‘roughly speaking, so that leskhozes do not penalise you for leaving 
some key habitats behind’ (P). This indicates that the state consists of multiple 
components and that bureaucracy is heterogenous (as argued by Skocpol, 1985, and 
Lipsky, 1983). In the case of Russian forestry, the role of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ 
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(Lipsky, 1983) is played by leskhozes and lesnichestvos (local state forest 
management units). They make decisions on the ground and may have a different 
stand towards certification than officials at the regional or federal level.  
Another reason for discrepancies between certification and legislation is that 
‘companies interested in certification are in the minority, and the initiative of these 
few companies cannot have a significant impact on anything’ (P). According to the 
interviewee (P), ‘the interest of big companies is to sell round wood’ rather than 
develop sustainable forestry. 
The cost of certification is said to be ‘very high’ for many companies in Russia 
because of the amount of necessary changes to be introduced (N). Problems are 
related to a large number of migrant workers (issues with the social aspect of 
certification), timber purchasing from dubious sources (in terms of legality) (N, P), 
lack of experts and effective managers (N), lack of wood processing facilities in some 
regions (P). 
Certification is challenged by the lack of customary practice and ‘lack of 
understanding why it is necessary’ (N). 
‘One has to change psychology of people… Even if we talk about 
conservation of key habitats, some forest operators will say ‘Why do I need 
to leave them? I shall rather cut them and take them to my sawmill.’ (P) 
There is a perception that one ‘cannot break the mentality’ and ‘accustom 
workers to order’ – ‘they still spill fuel and oil and do not wear helmets’ (P). 
Change of employees’ thinking requires significant effort of companies’ 
management.  
The concepts of the forest as an ecosystem and of biodiversity conservation are new 
for forestry practioners in Russia. Problems of the forest sector have been considered 
in terms of reproduction of economic resources (N). Since this mentality is new to 
companies, realisation of certification may have different consequences from what is 
expected.  
 179 
Some interviewees believe that ‘certification will fulfil its function only if it is a very 
rigid system (not a voluntary system)’ (N), i.e. if it is transformed into a mandatory 
system, similar to state regulations. 
‘There has to be a national certification scheme. Changes should come from 
the top.’ (S) 
In these quotes, interviewees refer to the state as the only actor capable of rectifying 
the situation in the Russian forest sector. The development of certification in Russia is 
seen as a battlefield where different frameworks of thinking / intellectual traditions 
clash. New frameworks of resource management clash with the top-down approach 
and tradition of mandatory, coercive state enforcement of innovations. 
Quality of Certification 
Interviewees draw attention to the deteriorating quality of audits, due to the 
‘dumping of certification’, when ‘everything audit companies care about is how 
to make the certification process easier for their clients, rather than make their 
clients meet the requirements of the standard’ (N). Less time is allocated for 
audits, and fewer experts accompany auditors on their field trips, which does not 
allow a detailed examination of company’s activities (N). These changes have 
been taking place because of increased competition among auditing companies 
and desire to grasp a bigger share of the market (N). 
‘The problem is that auditors depend on the companies’ money. So, they 
cannot be objective. This is not an independent assessment anymore.’ (N) 
Strong material motivation and lack of independent control have become a 
challenge for certification. Auditing companies ‘are after quantity’ and therefore 
‘certify everything’ (N), i.e. take a biased stand. 
‘Certification has its advantages and disadvantages... The disadvantage is 
that good ideas are often falsified / distorted and simply start to be used for 
one’s selfish ends, i.e. certification becomes a source of revenue for 
someone.’ (P) 
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The above quote indicates that development of forest certification in Russia is seen as 
commodification67 and misuse of the discourse of environmental protection for one’s 
own personal ends.  
‘NGOs are often passive. They do not want to collaborate with small 
companies, because in those cases NGOs cannot earn much.’ (P) 
A representative of an audit company suggests that ecological discourse is also used 
by NGOs for commercial and selfish purposes. The interviewee describes how NGOs 
approach the audit company and ask the company ‘to put in a word for them’, so that 
timber companies buy their services (P). 
‘I think that this situation is also NGOs’ fault. If we want a high-quality 
certification, we need to set our own rules of the game and train auditors…’ 
(N) 
It is argued that unless NGOs take a more proactive position, audit companies 
‘will assess first and foremost existence of procedures in the companies, but not 
their implementation; they will take the line of the least resistance’ (N). So, major 
quality-related concerns refer to market-induced problems. One of solutions is 
seen in a more active civil society and a more inclusive concept of civil society 
(which reflects the imported modern ‘participation’ discourse), which could have 
a role of a third-party control body.  
However, changes in the civil society must be accompanied by changing the 
attitude of the broader population. Individual NGOs are unlikely to considerably 
improve the situation unless ‘the population starts to treat companies more 
strictly’ (N), i.e. the greater bulk of the population becomes more demanding of 
companies in terms of the environment and their forestry methods. Insufficient 
cooperation of stakeholders does not allow fully-fledged modernisation of the 
forest sector to achieve the goals of certification in full. 
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 This phenomenon (termed by Lemos and Agrawal (2006) as ‘commodification of nature’) is 
regarded as a potential danger of corporate social responsibility and voluntary certification schemes 
due to their potential incentive to subordinate environmental sustainability to profit (despite their 
ability to contribute to standard-raising). 
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6.2.3 Certification versus Other Processes in the Forest Sector 
Model Forests versus Certification 
Model forests and certification are both processes driven almost without exception by 
non-state participants of the forest sector. Both of these processes proclaim 
sustainable forest management as their ultimate goal. Both processes are reinforcing 
each other. There is a better chance of a model forest being arranged in an area that 
has already been certified and, thus, a certain basis for sustainable forest management 
has already been laid. Model forests may contribute to a more effective compliance 
with requirements of the FSC certification (P, N). A model forest is about obtaining a 
special status for a certain forest territory, which allows companies to implement 
forest management techniques that are common outside Russia and, thus, comply with 
requirements of certification, where it contradicts Russian regulations (P). 
Experiences with model forests and voluntary forest certification in Russia 
demonstrate that results of implanted institutions, including the ones related to 
participatory natural resource management, are strongly dependent on established 
practices, political and socio-economic institutions that they are embedded in (the 
phenomenon referred to in (Vira and Jeffery, 2001) as the ‘political economy of 
institutional change’). In order for implanted institutions to survive, there need to be 
concurrent changes of institutions at different levels of social life. As argued in 
(Conroy et al, 2001), single agencies may not be able to confront established political 
and socio-economic structures, unless elites are likely to gain from the potential 
change. At the moment, there appear to be no elites interested in developing 
democracy in the Russian forest sector. This explains why single efforts of individual 
activists or NGOs to promote public participation in forest management have failed to 
bring about any noticeable change so far. 
The important role of financial incentives and particularly of foreign funding, in 
development of voluntary forest certification juxtaposes certification with model 
forests – also driven by the market and monetary flows from outside of Russia.  This 
distinguishes certification and model forests from traditional mechanisms of forest 
management that have historically been common in Russia, namely from 
administrative tools of state pressure and state intervention as a method to introduce 
innovations. 
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If one compares obstacles and problems that certification and model forests meet, one 
will find a number of common issues. First of all, problems that are encountered by 
participants of both of these processes relate to two stages of these processes: the 
initial stage, those issues that are decisive for a model forest to be organised or a 
company to get certified at all; and the development stage, those issues that define the 
quality of a project or a certificate and whether the initial goals of the projects are 
reached or not.  
Second, the encountered hindrances to model forests and voluntary forest certification 
are made of both informal and formal institutions. Moreover, these problematic 
institutions cause difficulties for both processes. Many of these institutions relate to 
the bureaucratic and legal system in Russia. Other issues include traditional mentality, 
passive local population, very low level of public interest and participation, low level 
of understanding the necessity of such projects, lack of belief into possibility of 
positive change, high economic costs of the projects in the situation of poor state 
support. Poor quality of certificates and model forest projects is also explained by: the 
predominance of economic interests (of civil servants, auditing companies, 
participants of model forests, including academia and local population) over 
environmental or social ones; low level of (especially long-term) interest of local 
companies in these projects; the lack of systematic changes (modernisation depends 
on the local context a lot, takes place only in separate few places and is difficult to 
export elsewhere). 
These issues raise the question about the potential of NGOs to solve problems of 
sustainable forest management at all. In a situation where initial environmental and 
social goals of certification are often replaced by short-term economic targets and 
where model forests take the form of almost random ‘point’ modernisation, one can 
rightfully wonder whether it is, despite everything, the state that could bring in 
change? Will there be any other drivers of reform that will be strong enough to 
overcome the existing hindrances? 
State Forest Policy versus Certification 
Certification and state (national and regional) forest policy are tightly and 
unavoidably related to each other. Certification is both a competitor to state 
governance institutions and a potential tool of the state. Despite the state’s 
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involvement in certification processes, state and non-state efforts to reform the forest 
sector nevertheless employ different approaches (state actors applying more coercion 
methods and administrative intervention) and appear to have different outcomes, first 
and foremost because of different incentives of state and non-state stakeholders. 
Quality of certification depends on forest legislation. At the same time, the state 
appears to have started to undergo certain changes under the influence of certification 
schemes, as it needs to be competitive vis-à-vis global non-state players.  
Another demonstration of power of the market (and certification as a market tool) can 
be seen in that certification is essentially not about fundamental forestry innovations, 
but rather about better enforcement of already (theoretically) accepted forestry 
principles (which are also elaborated in official state regulations). And so, in some 
respects, new governance mechanisms in which non-state actors are central prove to 
deliver better results in facilitating institutional change and sustainable forest 
management. 
6.3 Path-Dependence as a Limitation to Change 
Specificity of Russian norms and practices is regarded as a significant obstacle for 
reforms. This specificity is described in various aspects: differences between Russian 
and non-Russian forestry traditions (N), after-logging and harvesting techniques (N), 
forest road building techniques (P). 
A common explanation of persisting problems of the Russian forest sector is 
expressed in terms of ‘mentality’, ‘self-isolation’ of civil servants (N), ‘our own, 
paradoxical and inconceivable path’ (P).  
Perception of Forests and Forest Management 
‘We always suffer with all our wealth. The vastness of our land has always 
caused a consumer attitude to forest. Due to such affluence of our resources, 
we treat nature badly.’ (A) 
 
The interviewee believes that the ‘abundance of forests’ has caused lack of 
environmental thinking, a wasteful attitude to forests and extensive model of forest 
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management in Russia. Perception of and careless attitude to forests are said to be 
very persistent and difficult to change. 
‘They do not understand it and do not need it… You see indifference of 
everyone around you.’ (P) 
The local population tends to be indifferent to problems of forest management, unless 
it has a direct impact on their lives. Individuals are said to be more concerned with 
problems of survival and more inclined to spend time working in their kitchen 
gardens than participate in public hearings (P). 
Perception of Law and Governance Regime 
A common belief about the law is that ‘if one works according to all rules, one will 
never be able to make money’ (P), i.e. compliance with rules is not regarded 
obligatory. 
 
Sense of responsibility for one’s own property is said to be lacking, which causes 
unpreparedness to introduction of private property in the forest sector (P). 
One notes the absence of tradition of public participation in forest management and 
the lack of a democratic tradition. The population has ‘lost their sense of 
responsibility’ (N), are reluctant to get involved in the forest management and are 
happy to delegate total authority to few individuals. Interviewees refer to this issue 
both in the Far East (P, A, N) and in the European part of Russia (P).  
‘It may be about Russian mentality. People are not used to getting involved 
in issues of forest use – despite the fact that according to the Constitution 
forests are property of the whole people who live there.’ (A) 
A lack of democracy is found particularly at the level of informal institutions, as 
certain formal elements of democratic governance are present.  
Weak civil society, dominance of the federal level of state management, and high 
importance of the ‘administrative vertical’ (N) affect the style of forest management 
and implementation of ‘Western’ ideas. 
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Perception of the Future and Change 
There is a sense of future uncertainty, caused also by dependence on natural resources 
(P). Moreover, there seems to be no belief in the possibility of positive change (P). 
For instance, interviewed members of an indigenous community (L) expressed their 
scepticism about the possibility of a new national park.  
‘In Russia, it is always this way: you see that there is banditism there, but it 
is all legal. So, what can you do?’ (N) 
The above comment (about contradition between legality of activities on paper 
and availability of legal documents and illegality of activities in reality or in 
essence) reflects the not unusual perception of fatality and impotence to change 
common practices. 
‘Government has control and power to change things.’ (P) 
The quote indicates a strong belief that a serious change is likely to come only from 
the state, not just the individuals. 
Working and Business Culture 
One interviewee commented on differences in style and quality of work between 
Finns and Russians:  
 
‘The quality of work is roughly the same. The difference is that when one 
has a good Russian brigade, they can work two shifts. Generally, Russians 
do not like to work in the forest a lot: they will work eight hours – and that’s 
it.’ (P) 
 
Such ‘idleness’ is referred to both by Russian and foreign interviewees (P). At the 
same time, this ‘idleness’ is compensated by gumption of Russians (P).  
 
Russians are believed to be characterised by a high propensity for risk and lack of 
precaution (‘russkiy avos’’) (P). Russians are believed to have a preference for very 
short-term planning (P). 
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‘In Northern Europe, if a contract has been signed, it is a ‘Bible’. In Russia, 
one has to make contracts for larger amounts (by 15% more) because of the 
risk of the breach of contracts... Moreover, in Russia, you have to meet face 
to face.’ (P) 
The quote indicates that there is a specific Russian business culture and informal 
norms - poor enforcement of contracts, low level of trust, importance of personal 
connections, and a different business model.  
 
‘Our style of management reminds one of an emergency or rush during fire 
fighting. The Western style of life, management and production is steadier, 
more predictable and more balanced. They do not rush.’ (P) 
 
The interviewee notes that there is Russian corporate culture, rhythm and style of 
work that differs from Western counterparts and is characterized by a higher degree of 
unpredictability and less stability.  
The Role of Civil Servants 
‘There are very few people who promote innovations. And if there are such 
people, they encounter such bureaucratic hurdles that... For example, there is 
a big shot civil servant in a state agency and has a good reputation 
somewhere. Here comes a lower-ranking official, who works immediately 
with logging companies and environmental organisations. He says: ‘Let’s 
change this – it will make things better for everyone.’ But no, he will be 
stopped for sure. They will tell him: ‘No, *do* keep a low profile! If you 
don’t, we’ll get rid of you.’’ (P) 
Civil servants are described as mostly having a particularly path-dependent, rigid 
thinking and no incentives to be pro-active in their jobs. The bureaucratic machine is 
seen as an inert structure that opposes any innovations, which may happen to emerge 
within this structure. 
‘We have still preserved that old perception: You just take a sit in your 
office and that’s it! One does not need to learn anything new or develop in 
order to get one’s salary.’ (A) 
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The quoted representative of an NGO and a state organization notes that civil 
servants have a very low propensity to learning and innovations. Rigidity of the 
state bureaucratic machine is believed to be a legacy of the Soviet rule (P) and is 
said to cause difficulties for private companies.  
Other path-dependent institutions include corruption, availability of fake 
documents, which may potentially make such innovations as certification less 
valuable (N, P); official red tape; inefficiency of state authorities, which has 
caused cooperation of business and NGOs (P). 
These institutions contribute to the specific ‘Russian phenomenon’, which implies 
inter alia: unpredictability of any political, economic or legal changes in Russia (P); 
and a different implementation of ‘Western’ ideas. 
Conclusion 
The chapter analysed actions of major non-state participants of the Russian forest 
sector (the left-hand side of Figure 1), and particularly the influence of global 
community (the bottom part of Figure 1). The focus has been on two new processes in 
post-Soviet forestry: model forests and voluntary forest certification. The changing 
political, socio-economic and environmental conditions, in a situation with limited 
state capacity and weak state control over the sector, raise the awareness of actors 
about the need to change their practices and modernise forest management. A 
significant role is also played by individual views and value systems of actors. This 
corresponds to the idea of ‘hidden’ alternatives of social development and 
opportunities for path-creation that always exist within society and are available to 
actors (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). However, mostly, model forests and certification 
are believed to be driven by global markets, international private companies and 
NGOs operating in Russia with the aim of bringing Russian forestry into compliance 
with international standards, transfer certain technologies, and make forestry more 
sustainable and profitable. This agrees with theories of multi-level governance and 
‘global citizenship’, which suggest a growing influence of the market, expanding role 
of global consumer community, improving opportunities of civic organizations, and 
partial erosion of national boundaries (Berkhout, Leach and Scoones, 2003; Edwards, 
Hulme and Wallace, 1999). 
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Stakeholders have different ideas about model forests and certification. These views 
can be roughly classified into three groups. The first group of interviewees considers 
model forests as the only viable path of development, as an alternative and 
counterweight to bureaucratization and excessive state regulation. State policies are 
believed to be carried out by ignorant and incompetent civil servants with rigid 
thinking.  
The second group of interviewees regards model forests as an illegitimate institution, 
unnecessary duplication of already existing state forestry regulations, or even 
deviation from legitimate state-designed rules. This allows the drawing of a parallel to 
studies by Edwards (2001) and Clark (2001), who showed that civil society 
organizations (demonstrating little accountability and enjoying little trust of local 
communities) need to be reformed, in order to become more powerful. 
The third view can be characterised as approval, but scepticism about the achieved 
results, viability and potential of model forests. Some interviewees argue that the 
strong path-dependence of the Russian forest sector threatens to distort the idea of 
model forests, bureaucratise and transform them into already existing institutions 
within the framework of top-down forest management. There is a perception that 
model forests have failed to realize the idea of multi-stakeholder natural resource 
management and to build partnerships due to entrenched formal (law) and informal 
(mentality) institutions. 
Certification is considered a competitive advantage in the global market; a source of 
expertise; a tool that allows companies to make dialogue with the state, local 
populations and NGOs more effective, particularly during the transition from the 
Soviet to the post-Soviet institutional system. There is an opinion that certification is a 
tool of unfair competition and an artificial barrier to foreign markets. 
Certification is sometimes perceived as institutionalisation, formalisation of common, 
already existing practices rather than the introduction of significant innovations. 
Actual innovations are believed to be few and concern mostly biodiversity 
conservation, eco-trails, conservation of different cultural and socially important sites. 
There is a concern that such ‘formal’ certification may substitute actual modernisation 
of the sector. 
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Certification is challenged by formal institutions (existing forestry legislation) and 
informal institutions (customary forestry practices and intellectual tradition, ideas 
about forestry). The concepts of the forest as an ecosystem and of biodiversity 
conservation are new to forestry practioners in Russia. Problems of the forest sector 
have been considered in terms of reproduction of economic resources. Since this 
mentality is new to companies, the realisation of certification may have different 
consequences from those expected. 
The quality of certification and its effects on forest management practices in Russia 
were explored. In comparison to state governance, voluntary forest certification, 
although being less coercive, is believed to have more effective enforcement 
mechanisms. Several market-induced issues were revealed, such as deteriorating 
quality of audits, lack of independent control, and commodification of the discourse 
of environmental protection. Solutions to these problems are believed to lie in a more 
inclusive concept of civil society, partnerships and broader participation of population 
and more effective cooperation of stakeholders, which requires a change in thinking. 
This corresponds to the theory of ‘communicative action’ of Habermas (1974), who 
believed in potential of communicating individuals and ‘public sphere’ that could 
counterbalance the state as a monopoly on opinion- and decision-making.  
The attitude of the state towards certification and model forests has been changing, 
from strong confrontation to its acceptance as an additional instrument of forest 
management control and as a tool to institutionalize practices that were not 
institutionalized with traditional instruments of state governance. Non-state actors 
(private companies and NGOs) have been exercising influence on the state policy in 
this regard. 
The state is a multifaceted actor, and the heterogeneity of its bureaucratic apparatus 
finds reflection in state - non-state interaction concerning certification and model 
forests. This corresponds to studies of the state as an actor by Skocpol (1985) and 
Nordlinger (1981). 
Model forests and certification are not only institutions competing against institutions 
of state governance, they are battlefields for competing intellectual traditions: the top-
down approach to natural resource management (and belief in the state as the only 
legitimate and capable actor in the forest management; tradition of mandatory, 
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coercive state enforcement of innovations) versus democracy and public participation. 
Some stakeholders are willing to become more engaged in the market economy and 
democractic society. However, cooperation between stakeholders is weak, and their 
actions are mostly fragmented and isolated from each other. In this situation, forest 
certification and model forests, while offering tools of dialogue, may provide 
frameworks for harmonisation of conflicting discourses. As attempts to 
institutionalise the dialogue between stakeholders, certification and model forests 
appear absolutely innovative for the Russian forest sector and may hold potential for 
further institutional changes. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERACTION OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
7.1 Private Sector and NGOs 
7.1.1 Drivers of Change. Why Cooperation? 
Perception of Forests 
To a great extent, an explanation for NGO-business cooperation can be found in their 
understanding of forests. Private sector interviewees describe forests as a ‘special’ 
and limited resource that ‘takes very long to grow, the time of its existence is 
incomparable to the lifetime of a company or a human’ (P). Forest has been ‘savagely 
exploited in the past’ (P) and hence is requires special treatment (P). The actual or 
potential scarcity of forest resources (be it virgin ecosystems or a certain standard of 
commercial timber) has an effect on how much one can exploit the forest. Interviews 
with managers of private companies have shown their awareness of the limit to the 
rapidity with which they can deplete the forest. They do care about nature protection; 
conservation of valuable forest areas is part of companies' beliefs and ideas (P). They 
mention that companies voluntarily plant forest, even when they are not obliged to do 
so by law. They also attempt to address issues of fauna and flora conservation 
together with other stakeholders, e.g. at public hearings (P). Therefore, NGOs and 
business explicitly admit that their environmental interests coincide (P, N). 
Depletion of Forest Resources 
There is evidence that particularly in the North-West of Russia, forest resources have 
become exhausted (P). 
‘Forestry is a child of poverty. So, now companies have started to think 
about proper forest management. Hence our relationships with companies, 
even big holding companies, at least with those who understand that they 
will not profit from pure theft and logging.’ (N) 
This quote from a leading NGO indicates that attitude and practices of private 
companies, as well as their relationship with NGOs are changing. The growing 
demand for sustainable forest management is regarded as a consequence of 
depletion of forest resources. 
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The demand for timber for pulp-and-paper plants is growing, and hence sustainable 
forestry is needed. NGOs organize dialogue and cooperation mainly with big business 
and companies that have realized the new reality. They also try to exchange 
information with companies and raise their awareness about the growing problems. 
The need to install sustainable forestry techniques is realised. At the same time, it is 
admitted that NGOs and companies on their own do not have the resources or power 
to do this, and cooperation is believed to be necessary. Intervention of the state is seen 
as absolutely necessary (N). 
Incapability of the State 
A private sector representative explained that cooperation of NGOs and 
companies is driven by economic incentives, and ‘each party benefits from this 
interaction’, since their cooperation allows them to ‘put pressure on authorities’ 
(P). 
‘If we had more functional and efficient authorities then, certainly, such 
cooperation with business would not be possible. Adequate authorities 
would be protecting business, as it happens in many countries. And here [in 
Russia], things are upside down.’ (P) 
The quote indicates that cooperation of NGOs and private sector has become 
possible due to lack of understanding and cooperation with state authorities. 
Interviewees also express their concern about current inability of the state to carry 
out necessary intervention and to provide a number of relevant services or 
resources. 
‘And if logging requirements are low or unclear, one has to train staff from 
scratch up to a certain level. This is quite difficult. For instance, how one 
cuts trees correctly and in an environmentally-friendly manner – state law 
cannot teach such things. And state forestry bodies cannot teach it either. So, 
companies have to look for such experience somewhere on the side – either 
abroad or with NGOs, or to work oneself up to the desired level by means of 
one's own resources.’ (N) 
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As the preceeding quotes reveal, NGOs and the private sector understand the need for 
change towards sustainable forestry practices, the need for acquiring new knowledge, 
skills and teaching sound principles of silviculture. They wish to see the state 
contributing to modernisation and innovative development of the forest sector. At the 
same time, they are aware that the state does not have the ability (or the political will) 
to provide the necessary resources at the moment. Hence, they resort to cooperation 
with each other (NGOs or business respectively) as the only viable option. 
'Now, a very common situation is that it is possible to come to terms with 
business. Their interests are clear. And their requirements are clear. It is 
clear whether there is a real conflict of interests or they bluff. One can talk it 
over and discuss. It is far easier than talking to the Rosleskhoz.' (N) 
The above NGO interviewee also admits that dialogue with business is much easier 
than with civil servants, and their relationships (unlike relationships with state 
organisations) are more transparent and open. 
Commercial Interests 
NGOs all over Russia have difficulties with sponsorship, so they need to work more 
with business, e.g. by offering their consulting services (N). One of interviewed 
researchers renders consulting sevices to timber companies. An interviewed director 
of a regional NGO is also employed by a non-profit organization offering certification 
services.  
Private companies also have their own particular interests in joint projects and good 
relationships with NGOs. Business often supports NGO activities for the latter 
advocate changes that are economically beneficial for private companies (P). Thus, 
conservation of key biotopes implies that companies will have the right not to cut 
unmerchantable trees (dead, doty etc trees), as well as not to carry out logging 
operations in water-logged areas, etc (N). NGOs help private companies oppose the 
state bureaucracy, so sometimes they form alliances, e.g. during their work on the 
Harvesting Rules, NGOs and private companies advocated the same position 
concerning biodiversity (N). 
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'It is high time to unite and all together put pressure on the state, although it 
is better to put pressure at the international level. Segezha pulp-and-paper 
plant initiates a case against the state, attempts to push the state, send 
information to Markovsky [an NGO], who forwards the information to 
international organisations.' (P) 
NGOs and business cooperate against abuse from state officials, particularly in cases 
when officials break the law. Thus, another interviewee (P) said that ‘civil society is 
necessary in order to help put pressure on the authorities’ and described a situation 
when a leskhoz (state-owned) carried out illegal logging on the lease of a private 
company and the company cooperated with a leading NGO to resolve the situation 
(2005). 
Moreover, companies are interested in cooperation, since they experience deficit of 
experts and knowledge in certain areas (sustainable forest management, conservation 
of biodiversity), which NGOs can help them with (P, N). 
Certification has been a strong incentive for NGO-business cooperation (P). Timber 
companies in the Far East are interested in cooperation with NGOs because they need 
someone to carry out research work as part of their certification process, i.e. to 
identify high conservation value forests, key biotopes, etc, of which there are plenty in 
the Far East. Besides, there are indigenous peoples in the Far East, and companies 
need NGOs to help them negotiate with those communities (N, P).  
'SGS, being a private company, needs to earn money. In order to earn 
money, they need clients. In order to get more clients, they need to put 
pressure on timber companies, so that those companies decide to get this 
certificate. And it is us who put pressure on timber companies, so we are 
together in this situation.' (N) 
Thus, NGOs and audit companies also have a common interest in popularising 
forest certification. Moreover, big companies that work with environmentally 
sensitive foreign markets and need to prove legality of their products are willing 
to cooperate with NGOs regarding systems of timber origin control. Good 
relationships with NGOs are also used as a means to retain a positive image of the 
company (N). Bussiness agrees to cooperate in order to avoid undesirable, 
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negative publicity, by means of which NGOs attempt to exercise pressure on the 
private sector in negotiations (P, N). 
International Context 
The project Pskov Model Forest perhaps would not be possible if it were not for the 
support of SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), to whom 
the initiative is said to belong. The Agency invested in the project, and has various 
training schemes for participants of the Russian forest sector. According to a private 
sector interviewee, SIDA were interested in testing Scandinavian forestry 
technologies in Russia, and so these forces outside of Russia facilitated interaction of 
business and NGO sectors in Russia. 
Sometimes, international companies operating in Russia bring in their connections 
with foreign and international NGOs as well. Thus, one of the foreign companies 
operating in Russia organised a project on HCVFs identification in their leased forests 
in Karelia and Leningrad Oblast. To that end, the company invited a Swedish NGO, 
who suggested their methods (P). 
7.1.2 Forms of Private Sector - NGO Interaction 
There are different models and forms of cooperation and interaction of private and 
non-governmental organisations. They include both formal agreements about 
cooperation (e.g. between WWF Far East and Primorsky GOK) and cooperation 
without any formal agreements (e.g. between WWF Far East and Terneyles). Several 
areas of NGO–private sector interaction are discussed below. 
a) Protected Nature Areas  
As a result of business-NGO cooperation, some forests are given the status of 
Specially Protected Forest Areas. Companies have started to invest in stock-taking of 
HCVFs, for which they hire NGOs (e.g. SPOK and Greenforest in Karelia work with 
Stora Enso, Segezhskiy pulp-and-paper-plant and UPM; the NGO Silver Taiga work 
with Swedwood in Karelia, as well as with Mondi Business Paper in Komi).  
With regard to conservation of old-growth forests, in 2008, the NGO SPOK signed 
agreements concerning conservation of the biggest Western old-growth woodlands in 
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Europe with JSC Karellesprom and JSC Muyezersky lespromkhoz. The preserved 
territories are supposed to become wildlife reserves and a nature sanctuary (N). In the 
course of negotiations with a leading NGO, the biggest company in the Far East 
agreed to stop cleaning cutting in HCVFs (N). 
Companies have begun to comply not only with national and regional legislation on 
protected areas, but also with non-official recommendations of certain NGOs (P). 
This is especially true for Karelia and Arkhangelsk Oblast which are areas of 
particularly intense activities of such NGOs as Greenpeace and SPOK. Thus, there is 
an agreement between Greenpeace and Solombalales concerning preservation and 
possible use of a low-disturbed forest area in Arkhangelsk Oblast within the leased 
territory of Boretsky and Konetsgorsky lespromkhozes in 2008-2009. Another 
company made an (informal) commitment to refuse from any logging operations in 
the areas that were recognised as particularly valuable by NGOs (P). 
b) Intensive Forest Management  
The dialogue between the NGO sector and business is also aimed at developing 
mechanisms of sustainable forest management for intensively exploited forests. A 
famous example of realisation of this goal, the Pskov Model Forest project, was 
initiated by the WWF. Among partners and active participants of the project have 
been Russian state agencies and organisations, including the Ministry of Natural 
Resources of the Russian Federation, Administration of Pskov Oblast, Administration 
of Strugo-Krasnensky District of Pskov Region, Forestry Agency for Pskov Oblast, 
Northwest Forest Inventory Enterprise, and St. Petersburg Forestry Research Institute, 
but also the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and the private 
company Stora Enso Oyj. 
Despite the different motivation of actors involved, a combination of skilled and 
determined people, a shared interest in sustainability, as well as financial resources, 
allowed the organisation of one of the most successful projects in sustainable forestry 
in Russia (N, P). 
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c) Voluntary Forest Certification 
Often, companies do not have sufficient knowledge of certification standards and 
requirements, so they invite NGOs to help them prepare documentation for 
certification (P). NGOs organise seminars, trainings (covering environmental and 
social aspects of certification), and study tours to neighbouring countries. Some 
NGOs offer financial support for certification (P). 
NGOs aim not only to push companies to FSC certification, but also to monitor and 
ensure better quality of those certificates (N). Since NGOs are not always satisfied 
with the quality of issued certificates, they try to make private companies play 
according to their rules of the game, also through their consultations with audit 
companies, as well as with Accreditation Services International (ASI), who check the 
quality of FSC certification bodies (N). Besides, NGOs attempt to monitor the 
certification process and participate as observers and local experts to help the 
auditors, since they have a deeper knowledge of local realities than invited external 
auditors (N, P).  
Moreover, NGOs work on regional certification standards (N), since the relevant 
Russian legislation does not elaborate biodiversity conservation well enough.68 
                                                 
68 The only exception is the Komi Republic, where it was the republican authorities (rather than 
private companies or NGOs) who financed stock-taking of virgin forests (N). 
'The Silver Taiga [a regional NGO in Komi] has had a massive impact on them. And people are more 
independent there. And the company, which is a monopoly there, also offered a strong support. All 
factors were in favour of such situation there. This does not happen in other regions though' (N). 
All interviewees who mentioned the Komi case characterised the situation there as exceptional and 
most successful. The Silver Taiga is referred to as a very strong organisation at the regional level, 
which manages to achieve extraordinary results mostly due to ‘much more adequate and receptive 
regional forest authorities’ (N). Another reason of the Komi’s success is believed to be the NGO’s 
approach to their dialogue with authorities. The Silver Taiga is ‘consistently constructive’ and lacks 
any extremism in its methods. It attempts to establish cooperation and a fruitful dialogue, not war, and 
hence needs to be agreeable to compromises. One of its significant accomplishments is a legal (i.e. 
prescribed by regional law) mechanism that allows the preservation of virgin forests (N). 
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d) Tracking Timber Origin. Other areas of Cooperation  
Big business and NGOs cooperate to combat illegal logging. NGOs carry out research 
about timber and forest product markets, trade, global supply and value chains, and 
major market players, both national and international, and use such reports to put 
pressure on foreign retail companies that are involved in dealing with illegal timber 
(N). 
Metsaliitto maintains regular contacts with such NGOs as the Baltic Fund for Nature, 
SPOK, the Kola Division of the Biodiversity Conservation Centre, Greenpeace, 
WWF, and Green Cross: NGOs that are active in the regions where the company 
purchases timber from. They have meetings several times a year. In 2007, they 
launched a project of Karelia zoning (depending on how likely particular areas are to 
be source of illegal timber for export) (P). 
WWF has been working to provide recommendations for official authorities and 
companies concerning timber origin tracking (‘since the Forest Code did not provide 
a firm legal basis for eradication of illegal timber trade’ (N)). 
Another example of successful NGO-business cooperation is partnership WWF-IKEA 
in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast’: financing of anti-poaching activities and measures 
against forest violations. 
Among other commonly undertaken activities are: exchange of information 
concerning developments in the forest sector in Russia and abroad (a particular role 
being played by Greenpeace Russia); agreements on reduction of cedar export (WWF 
and Terneyles); work on the issues of indigenous peoples (Dallesprom and the 
regional Association of indigenous peoples); joint work on landscape planning, 
development of non-timber forest use projects (WWF). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
This case is just another demonstration of the typical situation, where private companies and NGOs are 
on the one side of the 'field', and the state on the other. The Komi case is believed to demonstrate the 
potential (although yet hardly realized in Russia) of NGOs to exercise a significant impact (under other 
favourable conditions) on the state. 
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7.1.3 Challenges of Private Sector - NGO Cooperation 
Conflict of Interests: Profit vs Environmental Protection 
Relationships between NGOs and private companies are not without tensions and 
disagreements. Obvious reasons for this are personal conflicts and the circumstance 
that companies are happy to cooperate and comply with environmental requirements 
of certification and NGOs except situations where their economic interests are 
jeopardised (N). 
'Our relationships with the WWF are neither good nor bad. WWF want to help 
us but in a strange way. They say 'Let us make an HCVF for you'. But we 
work only in virgin forests... Those HCVFs were marked according to the 
map of Greenpeace, based on subjective data, on satellite data. However, in 
reality, no one knows what real value those forests have… WWF make 
strange suggestions. There is a suspicion that they spy. At the moment, 
companies fight for forest land. And there is a constant process of information 
collection going on – about quality of the forest in different areas. Forest in 
the West [of Russia] has all been distributed. It is Siberia and the Far East that 
are now left.' (P) 
The quote reflects scepticism, suspicion and lack of trust of private companies 
towards NGOs, doubts about potential benefits of cooperation with them, as well as 
reluctance to cooperate because of companies’ commercial interests (e.g. debates 
about HCVFs). In this particular case, the interviewee had worked together with 
international organisations previously, and his mistrust towards an NGO did not 
appear to be related to the fact that the NGO is international, but rather seemed related 
to generally the low level of trust and widely spread informal practices in Russian 
society.  
In certain situations that I witnessed during my fieldwork, NGO-business conflicts 
resemble merely a fight for resources and territories. The discourse of environmental 
or social protection is used as a tool in a conflict over material resources or personal 
benefits (N, P). 
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Mechanisms of Interaction 
According to a representative of the private sector, ‘there are no adequate 
mechanisms’ of systematic stakeholders' interaction. NGOs are said to be biased and 
trying to shift all responsibility for forest management onto the private sector. An 
interviewee from the private sector argued that NGOs often present legal logging 
operations as illegal, in order to preserve those areas as HCVFs. The interviewee 
emphasized that the only existing mechanism to organize interaction is agreements 
between companies and environmental NGOs. These agreements concern mainly 
HCVFs, areas of forest lease surrendered by companies (areas that cease to be 
counted as part of annual allowable cut) and monitoring process. 
Criticism of NGOs by Private Sector 
Timber companies are not always satisfied with the work of NGOs due to 
environmental NGOs' small numbers, few professional human resources, poor 
accountability, and low activity (P). NGOs are believed to be essentially business 
oriented structures and pursue their own financial interests (P). 
‘I am not saying NGOs are a bad thing. But I have seen how some NGOs 
present things in the media...’ (P) 
Private sector interviewees show disrespect and lack of trust to some NGOs, and 
acknowledge resource limits of others (P). 
Another criticism is that NGOs tend to work only with big companies, since they are 
interested in providing services for those companies, so they are looking only for 
solvent partners. NGOs ask audit companies ‘to drop a word for them’ and help them 
get contracts with timber companies (P). NGOs prefer to work with big business, 
rather than small companies (because it would be too labourious for one NGO to 
negotiate with each and every small company (there were about 70 forest leaseholders 
in early 2007 in Karelia); and it appears more important to preserve first and foremost 
large old-growth areas) (concerning negotiations about preservation of old-growth 
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forests) (N). In other words, the transaction costs69 of cooperation with small 
companies are too high for existing NGOs, and there are no mechanisms that allow 
reduction of these costs at the moment. 
Initially, it was big international, foreign companies that offered support and started 
cooperation with NGOs. Decisions about such cooperation projects were made by 
their non-Russian top-management (P). Later on, Russian companies also began to get 
involved in similar projects, e.g. Investlesprom, Primorsky GOK, etc. This may have 
contributed to a more active cooperation of NGOs with big business. 
Criticism of Private Sector by NGOs 
Practices of big companies, especially international big companies are a matter of 
concern of some NGOs. 
‘They demand that we explain everything to them. But there are certain 
apriori things about nature: sometimes, it is simply necessary to preserve 
certain areas and that’s it. But they want everything to be explained to them, 
why this or that tiny bit of forest land has to be preserved.’ (N) 
It is pointed out that companies and NGOs may not share the same ideas about 
sustainability and forest conservation. NGOs find the process of negotiations with 
such companies harder. 
Moreover, local domestic companies are said to differ from international ones in 
their work ethics (N). It is argued that foreign companies operate in accordance 
with their revenue goals, rather than conditions of particular territories or welfare 
of the local population. The interviewee expresses the assumption that Russian 
companies will become similar to international ones later on, i.e. abandon the 
‘personal approach’ in solving environmental and social problems that they used 
to have while their managers lived close to operation sites. Companies are 
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 For foundations of the transaction costs theory see Williamson, 1979; Carroll and Teece, 1999. 
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growing and thus losing their personification. Decision-making is moving to top 
levels, i.e. regional social issues lose their importance (N). 
Besides, Russian NGOs do not necessarily agree with Western European techniques 
and methods of forest conservation (promoted by foreign companies), e.g. the concept 
of key biotopes, since there is no unanimous position among scientists on this issue 
(N). 
So, there are different perspectives on cooperation of NGOs with big business. On the 
one hand, NGOs are criticised for being profit-seeking while picking only big 
companies as their partners. On the other hand, big companies appear more 
problematic than smaller local companies in certain respects and hence require 
attention of NGOs. 
NGOs express their concern about auditor's work, namely the dumping of forest 
certification: ‘audit companies think about how they can make it easier for their client 
to get a certificate, rather than their client complying with the standard’ (N). 
However, such conflicts tend to be resolved quickly, since NGOs and audit companies 
have a common interest, namely growth of forest certification. 
7.1.4 Consequences of Private Sector - NGO Interaction 
Variety of Perspectives 
One cannot assess the achieved results of business-NGO interaction as single-valued. 
Participants evaluate the nature and extent of NGO impact on business behaviour 
differently and not univocally. Some representatives of the private sector insist that 
NGOs have no influence on business, and it is only market forces that matter for 
decision-making (P). 
'It is difficult to change everything in such a short period of time... It is 
difficult to call companies to wildlife preservation now, for their main 
concern now [reform and post-reform period] is survival.' (N) 
The quote shows that NGOs are aware of their limited ability to introduce 
significant changes at present. 
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However, some private sector interviewees perceive civil society as a source of 
positive future transformation and see great potential in cooperation with NGOs. 
Perspectives of NGOs 
'Even in the case of Terneyles [a strong conflict between environmental and 
economic interests], there is some movement and some discussion, there are 
some agreements that one generally follows. This activity pays off. At the 
same time, when we talk to Rosleskhoz, it is similar to a black hole where 
everything disappears.' (N) 
The quoted NGO interviewee expressed positive expectations concerning 
cooperation with companies, particularly because their interaction with the private 
sector looks more fruitful than with the state. The Terneyles company in the Far 
East of Russia is widely known for environmental modernisation of its policies. 
They adopted a Programme for implementation of environmental policy for 
sustainable forest management in 2003 in order to guarantee timber legality, 
transparency of policies and operations, preservation of HCVFs, and to comply 
with international principles of sustainable forest management. 
Furthermore, there is a feeling that the case of Terneyles is not an exception, but 
rather a beginning of a new trend (N). Companies increasingly engage in forest 
certification and develop cooperation with NGOs. When being interviewed, a 
representative of the WWF confidently expressed his determination to sign an 
agreement with Tyndales company concerning HCVFs. WWF supplied the company 
with an update on intact forest landscapes for the company’s lease. Several other 
companies (also going through forest certification) were mentioned as very likely to 
expand their cooperation with WWF and make concrete committments to preserve 
HCVFs and key biotopes (N). 
The evidence that the situation is gradually improving comes not only from the 
Russian Far East (see N above), but also from the North-West. Muyezersky 
lespromkhoz (North-West) (which used to have significant old-growth forests as part 
of their lease and carried out logging operations there) has been acquired by the 
holding Investlesprom, which caused their practices to change, and Karelian 
subsidiaries of the holding company declared their environmental policies. There is 
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evidence that companies are converting their lease containing old-growth forests into 
specially protected natural areas (N). 
According to an NGO representative, thanks to ecological education, the attitude of 
companies towards NGOs immensely changed in the course of the last ten to fifteen 
years. If one compares the current discourse of major NGOs to that of some 
representatives of big forest business, they are very similar. 
Despite optimism, results of the current NGO-business interaction and prospects for 
the future are highly uncertain and depend on several factors. The result of this or that 
particular project is predetermined to a great extent by particular people involved. 
Thus, during one of forest certification seminars, the message of an NGO 
representative to the company's staff was that a certified company has to, first and 
foremost, satisfy the requirements of their auditor, i.e., on the one hand, their 
discourse has to be no different from the discourse of an environmental NGO (in the 
vein ‘Nature is our temple’). However, on the other hand, the NGO representative 
carried on as follows: 'There is no single truth. There are different discourses, but no 
one knows what is right and what is the best way to preserve forests.' The message of 
the seminar was 'try to make the auditor happy, you do not need to be excessively 
environmentally-friendly, you just need to have prescribed procedures on paper and to 
comply with some basic requirements'. This makes me assume that the real effect of 
such cooperation is not going to be much more than some extra paperwork, rather 
than real change of people's way of thinking. 
As to cooperation with companies abroad, interaction is not always smooth and easy 
to build. Some NGO representatives in the Far East regret that their contacts with 
retail companies in the US are not sufficient. They complain about American 
companies being unwilling to cooperate and not replying to NGO's requests. 
Multi-Stakeholder Process and Role of the State 
A crucial factor that contributes to NGO-business interaction failure or success is 
behaviour and the stand of the Russian state. The role of the state makes some 
interviewees (P) view preservation of old-growth forests with scepticism: a company 
(Swedwood) may surrender part of its leased forest territory as a high conservation 
value forest, so that the area is not exploited for logging any more. However, the same 
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territory may be later leased out to another company (Uhtales company), which will 
cut the forest. In such situations, the role of NGOs is limited.  
‘There should be interaction of companies, environmental organisations, 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation and Rosprirodnadzor.’ (P) 
Instances of logging on specially set-aside and surrendered for reserves areas were 
described by NGOs as well, who point at state bodies, such as Rosleskhoz, and their 
private interests as responsible for such violations. Another demonstration of the key 
role of the state in mediating business-NGO relations is combat against illegal 
logging. NGOs recognise their own limits in forest control and their inability to fully 
replace the state. 
‘And when we supported the anti-poaching team and when later on we 
supported the team “Panther” together with Rosprirodnadzor in Primorsky 
Krai, the idea was to demonstrate how one can, while successfully using 
mobile teams and working systematically, significantly bring down or 
totally put an end to illegal logging. We have demonstrated it to the state. 
The state, however, does not want to put this experience into service.' (N) 
The above quote indicates that: first, stakeholders see the need for cooperation with 
other players; and second, that without a strong state support and active participation 
of state bodies, attempts of business and NGOs to solve problems related to illegal 
activities in the forest and conservation of valuable forest resources are bound to 
generally fail. Even if such joint projects do succeed, then they do so only at a local 
level and do not eradicate the root of the problems. The currently achieved results of 
such business-NGO cooperation are not sustainable, simply because the non-state 
actors do not have resources, authority or capacity to maintain their work in the long 
run. Moreover, their cooperation only becomes possible at all under the condition of 
active state participation in such projects70. 
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 The understanding that the key to sound forest management may lie in the multi-stakeholder process 
and sustainable partnerships (for such approach allows for a realistic evaluation of one’s capacities, as 
well as for monitoring of the progress through criticism, exchange and mutual learning) to some extent 
reflects recent world-wide trends of changing governance, in particular what has been referred to as 
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'One has to protect nature, this is for sure. However, it is also necessary that 
the state started to change. Our company cannot solve everyone's problems.' 
(P) 
With such words, the interviewee (P) refers to the situations when companies are 
given forest areas for lease that include valuable territories and are protected by 
NGOs. In such situations, companies are between the devil and the deep blue sea: 
they have to leave those areas untouched, but at the same time, comply with official 
regulations and cut those forests. State support and good coordination of state and 
non-state activities are seen as crucial for private companies. The interviewee (P) 
explicitly notes that if there were state support, the process of change would have 
been much quicker. He emphasizes that participation of official authorities on certain 
NGO-business projects serves as another impulse for companies to participate, since it 
can speed up a number of processes. This happened during the project 'Identification 
of forests of high biological value' which combined the Baltic Fund for Nature and 
Swedish Forestry Agency and the private company Metsaliittoo, as well as the 
Administration of Leningrad Oblast. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
‘deep democracy’ (Appadurai, 2001). The concept of ‘deep democracy’ is based on ‘inclusion’, 
‘participation’, ‘transparency’, and is used to describe a phenomenon of ‘globalisation from below’. 
Appadurai applies this concept to the issue of poverty in urban areas. He argues that this issue may be 
solved through partnerships of local communities with governments and international agencies, and 
local efforts to build international networks or coalitions. The situation in the Russian forest sector is 
similar to the case described by Appadurai in the sense that a number of local or regional actors attempt 
to engage in partnerships with more powerful international, multilateral and official state agencies. 
However, it appears that these horizontal movements are still poorly bound to broad local communities. 
The local population (e.g. who live in forest settlements) are not actively engaged in this ‘inclusive 
democracy’. The role of local community (whose capability is improving and performance becomes 
more powerful) in these partnerships is mostly played by private companies and very few 
local/regional NGOs.  
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7.2 Private Sector and the State71 
7.2.1 Nature and Forms of Private Sector - State Interaction 
The term ‘state’ is usually associated with various state bodies and civil servants. It 
often replaces the term ‘government’. In this latter meaning of the state, business-state 
interaction is perceived by interviewees differently, which we shall demonstrate 
below. 
Cooperation between private sector and the state 
Cooperation of state bodies and private organisations has different forms and aspects. 
A state official described business-state relationships as cooperation in the areas of 
fire fighting (funded both by the state and companies), forest certification and 
verification of timber legality (there is an agreement between the regional government 
of Khabarovsk Krai and an auditing company) (S). There is an agreement between the 
government of Khabarovsk Krai and a private company about public-private 
partnership with the aim of building a pulp-and-paper plant and facilities to process 
logging residues (S, P). State bodies (militia and leskhozes) and private companies 
organise joint control raids and check points against illegal loggers (P).  
For some forestry operations, private companies hire state leskhozes as contractors (as 
they have the necessary equipment) (S, P). There are often close ties between them at 
the personal, individual level, as many employees of private companies used to work 
for (state) leskhozes before (P). 
Perhaps the most significant part of state-business cooperation is the so called ‘social 
block’, i.e. additional ‘social duties’ of business. They mainly consist in companies’ 
providing financial support to local population and maintaining local infrastructure. 
Usually it is the supply of fire wood at lower prices or for free, monetary support 
depending on the size of logging operations, maintenance, renovation and support of 
churches, hospitals, roads, housing and public utilities, schools, hospitals and sports 
facilities, bridges, supply of transport for local schools, accommodation construction 
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 Due to difficulties of getting an agreement of state officials to give an interview, most information in 
this chapter has been retrieved from interviews with representatives of private companies and NGOs. 
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support to the local population, creation of additional jobs, support of the local 
association of indigenous peoples (together with the regional government), help for 
employees to upgrade their professional knowledge (e.g. through modern equipment 
and training) and other forms of social help and donations. For example, local 
administration can ask a company to clear a dumping site (P). Basically, the private 
sector has been partly replacing local authorities in their social and economic 
functions.  
This tradition, namely that private companies play an additional socio-economic role, 
goes back to the Soviet time, especially in cases when companies were ‘town-
forming’ (i.e. principal employer and mainstay of the entire area). At that time, 
companies would build and maintain whole settlements for their employees (P). 
According to one of interviewees (director of a now private and prevously state 
lespromkhoz), in the Soviet time until the early 1990s, all social infrastructure for 
1200 employees of the lespromkhoz (currently only 200 employees) was maintained 
by the lespromkhoz, including an electrical power station, a boiler house, water 
supply, repair and construction site, all accommodation, etc. Now, this infrastructure 
belongs to the administration of the settlement. However, today, the state is often 
incapable of providing these services (the situation comparable to the one described as 
weak ‘state capacity’ by Skocpol, 1985). 
‘Local people approach our company in the first place, because when they 
approach the local administration all they can offer is their own chair and a 
desk...’ (P) 
If one looks further back into Russian history, one finds more parallels and discovers 
that the social responsibility of private companies is just a modern form of the 
traditional Russian institution of obligatory labour, termed by Bessonova (2006) as 
‘service work’ (‘sluzhebny trud’). 
‘In 2000, we won the second prize in the nomination ‘Companies of high 
social effectiveness’ in the section ‘Salaries and social payments’.’ (P) 
Support of social infrastructure still plays a significant role for some Russian 
companies today, who take pride in it. 
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Naturally, most private companies try to get rid of such additional obligations, for 
economic reasons (P). However, they still carry out a number of responsibilities in 
return for good relationships with and support from local authorities. As some 
interviewees note (P), such state support is particularly vital for foreign companies 
operating in Russia: ‘Without governmental support, a foreign company cannot do 
anything’, so they need to work with the government ‘as one team’. It is also a 
method of solving local conflicts, e.g. with an indigenous population (through the 
intermediary of local authorities) (P). The amount and nature of such social 
responsibilities of companies varies and depends on the results of negotiations and 
agreements with local authorities (S).  
Another direction of state–business cooperation is ecological education and support of 
local / indigenous cultures. For instance, in Leningrad Oblast a private company 
jointly with administration of a settlement intends to organise a museum of Vepsian 
culture [indigenous people of the area], as well as an ecological trail and a school tree 
farm (the latter in collaboration with several other private lease holders of the area) 
(P). 
According to a number of interviewees, business seeks active cooperation in 
environmental issues from the state (e.g. activities aimed at forest protection or 
preservation of key biotopes), whereas the state attempts to minimise it (or at least 
minimise involvement and efforts of state officials) (P). 
In many cases, ‘state support’ to a project implies not material or financial support, 
but rather a permission to realise that particular project (P).  
Moreover, as examples of successful cooperation show (e.g. transition from clear cuts 
to increment thinning and joint (company and leskhoz) testing of new techniques), 
only significant deterioration of economic conditions (e.g. deficit of forest resources) 
is likely to change the attitude of state employees and make them willing to cooperate 
(P). 
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Coercion and Confrontation 
State-business relations are also perceived as coercion of business by the state. 
Leskhozes are certainly referred to as controlling bodies, as they fine companies for 
violations of forest legislation (P).  
‘Now, there is a question whether we shall build a pulp-and-paper plant or 
not. But now, there is pressure from the governor, for the president has 
extended his term under condition that he finishes what he has begun, 
including the pulp-and-paper plant.’ (P) 
The quoted interviewee feels the pressure from regional authorities and their 
intervention into company’s strategic decisions for political reasons. This 
situation has become possible due to a strong administrative hierarchy and 
undemocratic governance regime. 
Interviews reveal that power position of business is still weak if compared with the 
state (N). Particularly, one notes a difference between Russian and foreign companies 
operating in Russia, in their potential negotiating power with the state as foreign 
companies have a smaller chance to have an impact on state decisions (P). 
Business-state relations are also perceived as antagonism and struggle. Thus, one 
interviewee notes that their company ‘pays fines for complying with laws on 
environmental protection, Convention on Biological Diversity, etc’ (P). The 
company’s behaviour is described as resistance to the state and compliance with their 
own ethical and economic principles.  
‘The time has come [now that 2/3 of Karelian forests are in private lease of 
big lessees] for all of us together to put pressure on the state. Although it is 
better to put pressure at the international level [through international 
networks of NGOs].’ (P) 
The interviewee gives an example of a situation that took place in 2005: Segezha 
pulp-and-paper plant wrote an open letter to Karelian Forestry Agency about a 
leskhoz that illegally cut wood in the area leased by the pulp-and-paper plant. The 
letter caused a grave scandal, Moscow officials visited Karelia, carried out an 
inspection and confirmed the fact of illegal logging by a leskhoz. Illegal operations 
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stopped, but no-one was penalised. In 2006, six instances of illegal logging were 
revealed and two criminal cases opened. However, state bodies are said to be 
uninterested as such cases are evidence of defects in their work. 
‘When I talk to timber industrialists, they perceive it all – the Forest Code, 
export fees etc – as a raider attack on the scale of the whole country. Many 
companies go bancrupt now. There no investors, they have no money. So, 
someone will just buy those companies...’ (N) 
The quote shows that the state is associated with illegal activities and private 
interests of state officials or associated stakeholders. Moreover, lease contracts 
(which are written by the Forestry Agency) are said to include ‘lots of illegal’ 
clauses about obligations of lessees. 
It is argued that companies operate ‘in a hostile environment’ (P). This environment 
includes local population and state authorities. Companies say that they need ‘to fight 
state officials’, who attempt to impose too many obligations (such as various social 
responsibilities) on them. 
Informal Interaction 
Interaction of private sector and state bodies is said to often have an informal or semi-
legal nature. For instance, parties come to informal agreements and compromises (at 
the local level) in the situation of certification (where requirements of certification 
contradict official regulations) (P, N) or while dealing with issues of model forests 
(P). It is noted that local / regional officials and companies have to negotiate and 
reach informal compromises because of existing faults of the legislation.  
An NGO representative makes an assumption that private auditors and the process of 
voluntary certification have a bigger influence on business, for state bodies are easier 
to bribe than private auditing companies. The reasons for this are that employees of 
leskhozes have much smaller salaries in comparison to auditors, they tend to suffer 
from alcohol addiction and also each forester is in charge of a very large forest area 
that he is simply physically not able to control. 
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Informal personal relations matter also for allocation of forest leases (P, N) and may 
take the form of a strong lobby and corruption (e.g. to replace felling licences with 
felling declarations) (P).  
There is abundant evidence of illegal activities of state employees together with 
business. An interviewee tells a story about his work in the forest sector in the Soviet 
time (in a lespromkhoz (state-owned logging company)), in the 1990s and today:  
‘I have never been a forest thief, but our activities have never been legal 
either. One would report one cubic metre of felled timber, and in reality fell 
three cubic metres. And now it is the same. They are thieves-in-law. The 
militia are all corrupt. We used to pay for 100 cubic metres, and would cut 
500 cubic metres. We paid everyone: the tax service, militia, foresters, local 
administration... Every prosecutor, every top official in the militia has their 
own thief brigades.’ (P) 
There is a certain dualism in big business lobbying national forest policy. On the one 
hand, companies admit that difficulties of environmental lobby are related to poor 
organisation of businesses in this respect (P), as they are interested in logging 
expansion and have lobbied abolishment of auctions as a method of forest lease 
distribution (for big investment projects, as well as permission to cut stone pine / 
cedar (kedr) (N). At the same time, it is precisely the lobbying of big companies that 
is said to have a strong influence on federal forest policy and making it more 
compatible for instance with certification processes (N). Naturally, such lobbying has 
economic goals. For instance, a company that lobbied to increase export fees on raw 
timber as a means to combat illegal logging (they wrote letters to the Ministry for 
Natural Resources) was pursuing its own commercial interests, being a timber-
processing company (P). Just as the state can be considered a resource (to be used 
used by NGOs and companies) for sustainability-friendly change, the state can also be 
used in private commercial interests. This phenomenon of poor insulation of state 
structures from private pressures has been described as weak ‘state autonomy’ by 
Skocpol (1985). 
‘If a person understands that it is necessary to protect [forests] and if he 
takes it personally, then he will make concessions and will try to find – even 
in our old Forest Code – some loopholes [in order to help]... However, it is 
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difficult, and everyone would rather sit and wait to hear what to do from 
above.’ (P) 
The quote indicated that the degree and quality of cooperation between companies 
and state agencies may differ and depends a lot on particular individuals in office 
and whether they are personally concerned about the state of forests. 
Differences among regions are explained through the personality of regional 
governors. Thus, in Khabarovsk Krai, at the time of the interview, the governor was 
Ishayev – ‘a very good economic manager’ (P), whereas the governor of Primorye 
was Dar’kin – ‘from a criminal world and where management is organised according 
to different principles [redistribution of region’s resources among one’s own 
companies]’ (N).  
To some extent, relations with local administration depend on the contribution of the 
company to the regional / local budget: if a company is an important taxpayer, then 
the administration treats the company differently (P). 
7.2.2 Challenges of Private Sector - State Interaction 
There are a number of issues that interviewees believe hinder the effective interaction 
of business and state. 
The Feedback System 
In the opinion of non-state actors, the feedback system between state and society does 
not function properly. The feedback system is believed to be very poor because civil 
servants at lower levels take into account what is being said at the higher levels of 
state hierarchy and are not so much concerned with what business says (P). 
‘People are personally afraid to say things. And big companies realise that 
we are not going to have the rule of law in the forest sector any time soon, 
and they will have to live in these conditions, at least for another five 
years… Very few can afford talking openly about what is going on here. In 
the back-rooms, yes, many of them say that the current situation is not good 
at all.’ (N) 
 214 
The interviewee suggests that representatives of big companies are cautious in 
expressing their thoughts, for they do not want to disrupt their good relationships with 
state bodies, which still have a lot of tools of influence. Criticism of state policies by 
private companies tends to take the form of ‘hidden discourses’ (Scott, 1990) rather 
than open public ‘transcript’. An exception was probably the adoption of the Forest 
Code, which was actively lobbied by state authorities, but could not be passed in its 
initial draft because of protests of the forest sector (in 2004). 
The above quote from an NGO was corroborated by interviews held with 
representatives of private companies. For instance, during my conversation with an 
employee of a lespromkhoz (P), the interviewee tried to evade my questions about the 
role of international companies in the process of modernisation of the Russian forest 
sector calling them ‘political’ or even ‘unpatriotic’. Comments made by the 
interviewee included: ‘I am not afraid to talk, although our conversation is being 
recorded and will be passed on into another system...’ 
Small companies, which suffer more than any other companies from unsuccessful 
reforms, are not organised or represented at the federal level. Regional interests are 
underrepresented at the federal centre. Interviewees complain about poor 
communication with Moscow and few possibilities to express their concerns 
effectively in conditions where real mass media essentially does not exist (N, P). 
The Bureaucracy 
A serious hindrance to efficient cooperation is said to be bureaucracy (P, N). Civil 
servants are blamed for providing distorted information about the real condition of the 
forest sector (P), as well as for their negative attitude to forest business and hampering 
business development (e.g. too long procedure to acquire permission for building a 
road) (P). 
State officials appear to be disinterested in cooperation with business, partly because 
this would require changes in certain forestry practices, which is not foreseen by the 
legislation (P). State officials at the regional and higher levels are believed to be 
indifferent to problems of the forest sector and unwilling to change things, whereas 
officials at lower levels (leskhozes), despite their positive attitude to cooperation, are 
said to be unable to implement new complex projects (partly because of their limited 
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authority) or afraid of making their own decisions. Leskhozes are described as the 
most flexible and ready-to-cooperate among state forest bodies. Foresters at the local 
level appear to have the best knowledge of problems on the ground (P). The reason 
even they may not be not inclined to make concessions is that changes may mean 
extra work for leskhozes (e.g. going into the forest and marking areas that should not 
be cut). Besides, it may also cause problems for leskhozes themselves (e.g. if they 
allow to leave more trees on logging site to be left), for they are controlled by other 
state bodies (P). State support is limited to only verbal approval (P). The reasons for 
this are believed to be lack of individual responsibility of civil servants for 
development of the forest sector and their impunity in case the sector makes no 
progress. 
State agencies are argued to be interested in cooperation only if they see personal 
benefit for themselves. There are documents and verbal evidence (P) about a situation 
of 2006 when Segezha pulp-and-paper plant offered to sign a cooperation agreement 
to the forestry agency of Karelia Republic with the aim of implementing voluntary 
forest certification, as well as realisation of the international Convention on Biological 
Diversity (1995), article 2 of the Forest Code of the Russian Federation (1997) and 
the Agreement between the Ministry for Natural Resources of the Russian Federation 
and the Government of Karelia Republic (2003). This offer was rejected by state 
officials. 
The state is said to be a constant debtor of business (P). It is believed (P) that the 
problem is not a lack of money but rather its inappropriate use at the regional level.  
Other bureaucracy-related issues include high risks and corruption. High risks of 
cooperation with state authorities and of investment into forest sector are caused by 
frequent rotation of civil servants, hence instability and difficulties of developing any 
kind of cooperation with the state (P); the state not fulfilling its functions such as 
forest guard and protection, especially a problem for small and middle-size business 
(N); and too short forest leases which make significant investments such as road 
building unattractive (P). 
Foreign interviewees express their frustration with the pace of work that involves any 
interaction with state agencies, obtaining licences, permissions (e.g., permission to 
build a road to the leased forest) etc. A very slow pace and inefficiency of 
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bureaucracy are explained by corruption and the necessity of personal interest of 
bureaucracts if their work is to be accelerated (P).    
In the eyes of some representatives of business, inappropriate and semi-legal 
functioning of state agencies justifies illegal activities of other participants of the 
forest sector, such as tax evasion (P). 
7.3 NGOs and the State 
7.3.1 Enhancing Cooperation 
'Say, two years ago, there was practically no constructive dialogue – neither 
with Goskomles, nor with Minprom, nor with Minselkhoz, whereas now the 
situation is changing. There is already some dialogue and some joint 
movement further.’ (N) 
The interviewee notes that communication between state agencies and NGOs has 
been improving recently. 
NGOs (e.g., NGO SPOK in Karelia or the Russian branch of Greenpeace) put 
pressure on state agencies through mass media and open publications. 
‘[Publications] do not need to reach local population, but rather law-
enforcement agencies, law makers, federal structures... because civil 
servants are very dependent on federal structures. All ‘federals’ need from 
the regions is that they pay taxes, do not interfere when they want to build 
pipelines and stay silent, so there are no scandals. And this is a very strong 
tool. If there are scandals, ‘federals’ will change local leaders, if local 
leaders cannot cope with the situation and keep the population silent. The 
mechanism is primitive, but it works.’ (N) 
Other mechanisms of NGO-state interaction include direct contact and routine 
everyday involvement.  
‘Everyone knows Yaroshenko in Rosleskhoz. Influence of Greenpeace and 
Yaroshenko personally is certainly very strong.’ (N) 
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The quote reveals that the influence of some NGO leaders on federal state agencies is 
very significant. The interviewee notes that she ‘was impressed by how much they 
listen to him and by the attitude of people to him’ and that opinion of the above 
mentioned leader of Greenpeace Forest Programme cannot be ignored. The tools of 
NGO influence vary from tools of a radical opposition (in case of SPOK) to personal 
renown (in case of Greenpeace). 
‘A positive thing is that we have a voice. Besides, in a week’s time, we are 
going to St. Petersburg [to the International Forest Forum]. This year, we are 
not particularly welcome. But we were invited in the past years as 
facilitators and moderators of discussions...  Our director for environmental 
policy is a member of the board of Rosleskhoz and a member of the board of 
the Ministry for Natural Resources. He is regularly given the floor there.’ 
(N) 
The story of the above quoted leader of another NGO’s Forest Programme shows that 
there appears to emerge, although not a very steady, trend, namely that voices of 
NGOs become ever more heard and listened to. 
Tools that are used by NGOs to put pressure on state agencies can be classified as 
direct and indirect ones. Levers of direct influence include for instance participation 
of NGOs in the Forest Public Council (Obshchestvenny Sovet), their involvement in 
fora and discussions, etc. However, such mechanisms appear not to work well (N). 
So, NGOs turn ever more often to mechanisms of indirect influence, namely work 
with the private sector. Business is said to be more effective in negotiations with the 
state than NGOs. 
The experience of some NGOs shows that state–NGO interaction has been developing 
from antagonism (and respective tools of ‘struggle’) to positive cooperation. For 
instance, since the late 1990s, the WWF has been publishing reports about illegal 
logging and trade. These reports of the WWF triggered scandals in the Far East in 
2001 – 2002, and local authorities were about to sue the WWF. However, in 2004 – 
2005, Rosleskhoz requested the WWF’s estimating procedures, and Rosleskhoz used 
those methods to make their estimates of illegal logging as well.  
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‘I could say that I am happy, for a lot of things that were impossible very 
short time ago, happen now. Who could imagine that regulations will be 
posted on the website? Who could imagine that we shall send our 
amendments to the Forest Code to the Duma – 50 pages of text?’ (N) 
There appears to be progress in opening-up the law-making process and making it 
more transparent and collaborative. This seems to be true both for the federal and 
regional level. The WWF together with DalNIILH [Far Eastern Forestry Research 
Institute] prepared rules for the designation of Specially Protected Forest Areas, 
which were then sent to the Forestry Agency, which in turn proposed taking these 
rules into account and including them into regional Harvesting Rules. Moreover, 
representatives of the NGO give talks at parliament proceedings. The WWF provides 
financial support to some state bodies: the WWF bought fire-fighting equipment, cars 
etc for a leskhoz in Chuguyevka (P). 
Another NGO described the evolution of state attitude to model forests (projects 
developed by NGOs), in particular to Pskov Model Forest: 
‘As to our communication with Pskov authorities, at the local level, in 
Strugokrasnensky Rayon, everything would be also given a hostile reception 
at first. People would perceive it the following way: ‘A foreign company 
came with its capital, along with foreign NGOs; they must be either spies or 
god knows what…they are going to cut all our forest and leave nothing for 
us’... But once the project started to work, conflicts were resolved. And 
now, we generally have support at the local level. This concerns employees 
of the forestry sector and of the local administration.’ (N) 
The quote shows that despite initial hostility and suspicion towards foreign 
organisations, changes in perception take place and happen even in the short run not 
only at the federal or official level, but also at the very local level. There is also 
similar evidence of change (and growing support of the model forest) at the regional 
level (N). In all these situations, understanding has been achieved through ongoing 
and persistent dialogue with state officials and other stakeholders at all levels (mostly 
arranged by NGOs). 
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The situation varies across regions. In some areas, the situation has started to change 
on the regional level. One of the most successful cases of NGO-state cooperation is 
Komi Republic, where the NGO Silver Taiga has had a significant impact on regional 
policies. Regional Komi authorities supported the Model Forest, and approaches to 
forest management started to change on the level of constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation. Cooperation is also said to have progressed a lot in Khabarovsk Krai 
(unlike other Far Eastern regions):  
‘We are involved in the process of decision making. The government of 
Khabarovsk Krai has created a working group for biodiversity 
conservation… We have an official agreement with the government of 
Khabarovsk Krai about cooperation for conservation of biodiversity. It is a 
unique case of agreement between an NGO and (regional) government.’ (N) 
7.3.2 Challenges of NGO-State Cooperation 
However, the same interviews with NGOs often reflect a number of problematic 
issues related to communication of NGOs with state bodies.  
‘My tasks also include communication with state bodies and attempts to 
introduce some elements of this concept (HCVFs) into our legislation, state 
practices, forestry. I can tell you right away that we have succeeded least in 
this respect so far.’ (N) 
Recent successes of NGOs wear off against the background of deep and persisting 
problems. A number of interviewees (N) stress intransparency of decision-making and 
poor access of NGOs to the legislation-making process, their persistent attempts and 
essentially failure to introduce relevant environmental amendments to regulations in 
the process of reform.  
NGO interviewees emphasize the lack of interest for cooperation on the side of state 
bodies. Civil servants are reluctant to participate in joint seminars organised by NGOs 
and ‘come only if there are orders from someone higher up’ (N). The agencies that are 
actual decision makers (Ministry for Natural Resources, Ministry for Economic 
Development and Trade – not the Rosleskhoz), are believed to have different interests 
from NGOs (N).  
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Officials also show resistance to new and ‘imported’ Western concepts. Here is a not 
very rare perspective of civil servants on environmental NGOs:  
‘I have been in war with them all my life.... They do not have any 
information, but just tell lies all over the world that one cuts national parks 
in Karelia. There are enough national parks and strict reserves in Karelia, 
but why ban logging in all over-mature forests? Logging should be there 
anyway. Only a very rich country can afford making all their forests 
protected zones... In Europe, they have destroyed all their own forests, but 
do not want to pay us so that we preserve our forests...’ (S) 
Sometimes, state officials speak almost a different language. Thus, when a regional 
minister of timber industry (S) was asked about public participation in the process of 
forest management at the regional level and NGOs, the answer included only several 
names of timber trade and industry associations. 
Differences in perceptions and ideas are aggravated by the lack of trust between civil 
society and the state. Interviewees describe the state as someone who ‘keeps smiling 
to you but then always deceives you’ (N). The low level of trust on the side of NGOs 
is a result of previous disappointing experience of cooperation with state bodies.  
‘State bodies listen to you attentively, agree with you and then it turns out 
that the final draft of the documents in question have nothing common with 
what we have agreed on... I have a feeling that they use us to their political 
ends... Sometimes it seems to me that it [cooperation] has a decorative 
character.’ (N) 
In this respect, the current situation in Russia is not very different from international 
experiences described in (Vira and Jeffery, 2001): the state has adopted the 
participatory rhetoric, but reproduces traditional patterns of power and decision-
making. 
Disappointing experiences with sham cooperation cause some NGOs to take an 
oppositional stand and react negatively to establishment of the Forest Public Council 
(Obshchestvenny Sovet).  
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‘There is a bureaucratic law of three ‘i’s, which is also applied in this case: 
‘invite, inform, ignore’. And that’s it... Any decision of this Council is non-
binding... What is the point of such Council, to inform? But we shall inform 
you through mass media anyway.’ (N) 
The quote suggests that the Forest Public Council is regarded by some NGOs as 
of no importance, so these NGOs avoid participation in the Council’s meetings. 
Spatial and Temporal Variations 
However, it is noted that the quantity and quality of interaction of NGOs with the 
state vary between different state agencies and at different periods of time. Some local 
and regional forestry authorities are said to have proved very cooperative when the 
Forest Code was being adopted and participated in protest campaigns together with 
NGOs (N).  
‘There is a feeling that we are with Rosleskhoz on one side of the barricades 
in a certain sense. On the other side is the Ministry for Natural Resources, 
the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade, and the Government. 
The roots of the problems are not in Rosleskhoz, but higher – in some 
economic or administrative interests *not* of Rosleskhoz.’ (N) 
The stories told by several NGOs evidence a multi-layered organisation of state 
authorities who are involved in decision making about the forest sector. Leskhozes 
and officials at the local level are sometimes opposed to officials at the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade and the Ministry for Natural Resources. State 
ministries and departments also differ from each other in their interests and 
incentives. 
‘Relations of state authorities with NGOs, especially with environmental 
organisations, have been *very* manifold during the recent five years – 
‘hopping’ I would say. When Goskomekologii was abolished in 2000, under 
that minister NGOs were not allowed anywhere at all. And when a different 
minister came to the forestry service, in 2004, they suddenly supported our 
idea to create a public forest council... And activity of this council has also 
had a very uneven character.’ (N) 
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Changes in time do not necessarily happen in a consistent manner. Changes in 
attitudes, amount and depth of cooperation depend on political swings and cycles. As 
argued by some NGO representatives, civil servants in Rosleskhoz become more 
inclined to cooperation and compromises during periods of crises, when they cannot 
cope with problems without external advice. 
‘First, we start to come closer and closer to each other – and then there is a 
new governmental reform, everything changes and we end up in opposite 
corners again. We start to come closer again – and here comes another 
reform! In 2000, there was a reform, when the federal forestry service 
(which was like a ministry) was abolished. Later, there was another 
administrative reform after that… And now this forest reform has drawn us 
apart a lot, for civil servants have been so busy that they had no time at all 
for NGOs...’ (N) 
The quote indicates that difficulties of cooperation are exacerbated by instability 
of political situation and ongoing administrative changes.  
Success or failure of NGO-state cooperation depends on individual people at the local 
level (their values, beliefs, etc) and on officials in Moscow (or generally higher-
ranking structures), since interests of individual civil servants do not necessarily 
coincide. This factor explains the success of the NGO ‘Silver Taiga’ in the Komi 
Republic (N) and past failures of the NGO SPOK to build working relationships with 
the regional authorities of Karelia. 
When referring to problems of the forest reform, interviewees (N) often refer to 
individual state officials, such as the ministers for natural resources (Trutnev is 
described as being absolutely indifferent to what is going on with the forests; 
Artyukhov, as a bribetaker; Roshchupkin, as  a very talented manager). Frequent staff 
rotation in state agencies is considered a major hindrance to developing cooperation 
with NGOs (S, N).  
Conclusion 
The above chapters showed how institutional development of the Russian forest 
sector requires analysis not only in terms of social groups and individual actors, but 
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also relations (links between actors in Figure 1). This approach is close to the 
perspective of Bourdieu, his study of ‘social space’ and ‘habitus’ based on relative 
positions of actors within that space (Bourdieu, 1985). 
NGO-Private Sector 
The chapter discussed changing relationships between NGOs and private companies. 
It revealed that drivers of increased cooperation lie both within and outside the 
Russian forest sector. The former result from depletion of forests and inability of the 
state to provide necessary resources for development (skills, knowledge, etc). The 
latter include increasing embeddedness of the Russian forest sector in global markets 
and consequent dependence on requirements of the global consumer community. 
The limitations of the civil society and non-state agency in Russia are caused by 
insufficient trust and legitimacy in the eyes of broader population, conflicts of 
interests, lack of effective mechanisms of cooperation with other stakeholders. Actors 
share awareness that only through multi-stakeholder cooperation will it be possible to 
organise sustainable forest management, as the resources of separate players are 
limited. 
NGOs find dialogue with business organisations easier and more fruitful than with 
civil servants (the same applies to the attitude of private companies). At the same 
time, one cannot overestimate the role of state bodies for NGO-business cooperation: 
decisions of civil servants are often decisive for the success of such projects. Only in 
cases where different actors (including state officials) with different motivations were 
involved and where those interests and motivations combined well, was the outcome 
of joint projects in sustainable forest management successful. 
The need for the 'state' (and for the reformed state) was referred to on numerous 
occasions by representatives of both private and non-governmental sectors, both in the 
North-West and in the Far East of Russia. Major players in the forest sector recognise 
that none of them can solve existing problems on their own. 
State-Private Sector 
Cooperation in the area of environmental protection is stimulated mostly by the 
private sector, whereas the state is perceived as an inert, rigid and isolated ‘structure’ 
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with a poor feedback link to the rest of society, lack of skilled professionals, and lack 
of individual responsibility of civil servants. 
In terms of modernization and innovative development, the state is considered weak 
and failing to perform a number of its functions. Therefore, the private sector finds 
itself bound to replace the state in various roles: socio-economic development, 
support of local infrastructure and various forest management operations, including 
forest protection and fire fighting, introduction of new forestry methods. 
State–business relations are often characterized by confrontation and antagonism. In 
the eyes of companies, the state is associated with illegal activities and raider attacks. 
Companies use legal action, lobbying and cooperation with NGOs as tools in the 
‘struggle’ against the state. 
A lot of interaction between state bodies and private sector is informal or even semi-
legal. There is evidence that private logging companies are often affiliated with state 
forest management bodies or linked to particular state officials, which potentially 
causes issues with sustainability and violation of laws and regulations. This leads to 
the weak ‘state autonomy’ and low ‘state capacity’ (Skocpol, 1985), i.e. a reduced 
capacity of the state to pursue national interests and its weak power to shape informal 
institutions (Evans et al, 1985). The state appears less autonomous from Russian 
companies than from foreign companies. 
The nature of interaction between companies and state agencies is believed to differ 
from case to case and depend a lot on particular individuals in office (be it a forester 
or a governor of the region) and their personal ideas and values. There are differences 
between various state bodies: leskhozes (local state forest management bodies) are 
described as most flexible and ready-to-cooperate among state bodies, whereas state 
bodies of the national and sometimes regional level appear most rigid and least 
cooperative, which limits the scope of action at the local level. This indicates the 
ability of the state to perform both as agency and structure. 
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NGO-State 
The dialogue between NGOs and the state has been expanding recently. These 
changes occur mainly due to efforts of individual NGO leaders rather than state 
bodies. This causes a significant differentiation between regions. 
One of the biggest challenges of NGO-state collaboration appears to be not just a 
different ideology, lack of interest in environmental issues (due to resource-
orientation of the economy and politics), but also the unwillingness of the state to 
participate in any discussion or to open the process of decision-making. The gap in 
perceptions and ideas is exacerbated by the lack of trust between civil society 
organisations and the state. NGOs perceive their participation in the process of reform 
and generally their direct interaction with the state as a formality. These observations 
correspond to the theory of ‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 1974) and debates 
about political regimes adequate for maintaining environmental sustainability 
(Skollerhorn 1998; Mathews 1996). As indicated above, non-state participants of the 
Russian forest sector generally agree that democratic forms of governance and more 
inclusive procedures of decision-making may provide a better basis for development. 
This corresponds to the view of Eckersley (1992) on ecological crisis as the ‘crisis of 
participation’. 
Interaction between NGOs and the state significantly varies across state agencies and 
regions. It is also very uneven in time. Inconsistency and irregularity of cooperation is 
exacerbated by instability of political situation, ongoing administrative changes, poor 
communications between state agencies, their internal conflicts, and a high turnover 
of officials in top positions, because a great role in interaction is played by individual 
officials involved. The special role of the individual is accompanied by a lack of 
system in the Russian state and arbitrariness of policy implementation. 
The above mentioned circumstances cause a sceptical view of NGOs on the prospects 
of their future cooperation with state agencies. One expects positive change only as a 
result of active efforts of individual people or as a consequence of pressure from 
higher-ranking structures in Moscow. This can be compared to the model of Gel’man 
(2004), recognizing the importance of structural factors for explaining institutional 
path dependence, but mainly supporting the actor-oriented approach. Structural 
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factors and the ‘legacy of the past’ affect the ideologies and capabilities of actors, but 
cannot fully account for individual actors’ behaviour. 
It also showed a certain path-dependence in state-society relations and a particularly 
significant role of the state for outcomes of non-state governance projects. The 
structure is predominant, and the ‘public sphere’ is weak. The potential of new non-
state entrants in the Russian forest sector is limited because their agency is 
‘embedded’ (Granovetter, 1985) in existing social relationships. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. CONCLUSION 
Patterns of Institutional Change in the Russian Forest Sector 
In the above analysis, we have demonstrated that major current problems (as well as 
fundamental reasons for those problems) of the forest sector are typical for different 
historical periods, and that state–society relationships have similar features in the 19th 
and 21st centuries. The analysis of interviews showed that the ongoing reform, 
perceived with much criticism by non-state participants of the sector, is expected to 
result in social reproduction, rather than transformation. In the opinion of key actors 
in the sector, current state forest policy is unlikely to significantly affect social 
behaviour or basic informal institutions. 
As shown in chapter five, recent institutional development has not been entirely 
consistent in the sense that there have been multiple drivers and sources of 
institutional change, which causes numerous clashes between emerging (or newly 
implanted) and ‘old’ institutions. Particularly, such institutional conflicts have been 
taking place between state and non-state agency (or rather non-state agency and state 
structure).  
The comparative analysis of state forest reform and projects launched by non-state 
actors suggests that a major difference between them is that the state reform is 
significantly more entrenched in the ‘old’ thinking and path-dependent institutions. In 
some aspects of forest management, certification and model forests as forms of 
alternative governance have proved to be more powerful in resisting certain informal 
‘path-dependent’ institutions, and more effective than state-designed and state-
imposed institutions of law-enforcement.  
To a great extent, this can be explained through costs of potential institutional 
transformation (a concept elaborated by Polterovich, 1999). The system of decision 
making is such that the cost of institutional change born by civil servants is a key 
factor for design and implementation of reforms. Therefore the current reform of the 
forest sector has been implemented in the way that promises little success and its cost 
is mostly born by non-state actors, who are most vulnerable and immediately affected 
by changes.  
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The above analysis makes one conclude that difficulties of reform stem largely from 
relationships of state authorities with the society. Available data, set out in chapter 
seven, shows that structural institutional factors, which determine the range of choices 
available to individuals and the respective transformation of forest management 
institutions, are varied and multi-level. However, a particular role is played by 
political regime and distribution of power between individuals, state and different 
social groups. The bearing of politics on forest resource management proves to be 
particularly significant in Russia.  
Opportunities for Path-Creation 
As it has been argued by Crouch and Farrell (2004) and set out in Figure 1, there are 
two main routes for institutional path-creation and innovation:  1) ‘from within’, i.e. 
path-creation driven by strong organised interests; 2) ‘from outside’, i.e. by means of 
active exchange with global environment. As a result of post-Soviet economic, 
political and ecological transformations, both ways have become more feasible in the 
Russian forest sector. As the above analysis shows, two major drivers of change in 
today’s Russian forest sector are: 1) local ecological agency, and 2) global (societal, 
political, economic, ideological) environment.  
Organised interest in sustainable forest management has started to emerge, mostly in 
the form of new social networks and joint projects of NGOs and private companies 
(voluntary forest certification, model forests, and other forms of collaboration). It is 
the emergence / strengthening of new participants of the forest sector (compared to 
the 19th century situation) - NGOs and influential private corporations - that gives 
hope for a weakening of institutional embeddedness and for the modernisation of 
forest management. Their cooperation is also growing due to increased ecological 
agency (aggravated ecological problems). However, cooperation between state 
agencies and other participants of the sector, including the local population remains 
insignificant. Analysis shows that major sources of agency tend to lie outside the state 
structures (or at least outside federal state structures) and outside local communities. 
Agency comes mostly from the corporate and non-governmental sector, both national 
and international. The state is not always willing or able to contribute to 
modernisation and innovative development of the forest sector to the extent it is 
necessary with regard to changing domestic and international markets, as well as 
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evolution of ideas about sustainable development. Therefore, NGOs and businesses, 
who often share same values and problems, form alliances to oppose state 
bureaucracy, corruption and rigidity. In this case, the state is seen as a structure, 
unable to generate innovations. Lack of agency and organised interest among civil 
servants appears to be one of major reasons of expected state forest management 
reform failure. Non-state governance and ‘private modernisation’ seem to have more 
potential than state measures, at least in the short run. This corroborates a 
Habermasian belief in the acting individual and ‘public sphere’, as well as the recent 
theories of non-state market-driven governance (Cashore, 2002; Meidinger, 2002). 
However, as analysis of available material demonstrates, ‘private modernisation’ is 
severely limited by formal and informal institutions supported by the state. As shown 
in chapter seven, power is unevenly distributed between the state and the private 
sector. Private companies express their concern about the state exercising pressure on 
them, interfering in their management, or imposing additional socio-economic 
obligations. The overwhelming path-dependent role of the Russian state in all areas of 
social life jeopardises possibilities of innovative development through interaction with 
global environment even in conditions of increased openness and interdependence. 
The nature of state–business interaction is shaped not only by economic incentives, 
but also by politics. This allows comparison with the ‘institutionalist political 
economy’ of Chang (2002) who emphasized the importance of bringing the political 
aspect back into economic analysis. Without appropriate cooperation of civil servants, 
non-state projects and initiatives are bound to remain isolated ‘islands of change’. 
This shows that there is a need to complement the theory of ‘communicative action’ 
with studies of path-dependence and the state. Civil society and ‘public sphere’ on 
their own prove unable to secure institutional change and sustainable forest 
management. 
Further Reflections on the Theory 
Analysis of current processes in the Russian forest sector has required resort to and 
harmonization of several theoretical approaches and perspectives. Changes of actors’ 
behaviour are explained through interaction and interdependency of structure and 
agency, and concept of embedded agency. The above analysis generally agrees with 
Bourdieu’s dialectical approach to the ‘structure-agency’ dichotomy, where both 
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elements have equal weight: objective structures (the state; history of Russian state, 
society and forestry; natural resources) form the basis for subjective representations of 
agents; and at the same time, subjective representations form the structure. 
The above analysis leads us to partially agree with Habermas, who considers society 
both as structure and agency, where structure is mostly represented by the state, and 
agency by the ‘public sphere’, non-state actors. The state and non-state participants of 
the forest sector confront one another and compete for power and the right to design 
institutions. A particular role in institutional transformations is played by individuals, 
their competence in ‘communicative action’, self-organisation and self-governance as 
an alternative to coercive methods of state governance. Individual actors, if 
communicating with each other, may be capable of acting towards common goals and 
mutual social benefits. However, the above chapters also demonstrated the ‘distortion’ 
of the ‘public sphere’ in Russia: passive attitude of many participants, lack of 
democratic practices, blurred boundaries between private and public, and exercise of 
power ‘in cooperation with the state apparatus’ (Habermas, 1974: 54). As experience 
of the Russian forest sector testifies, individual agency is embedded in a social 
(institutional, economic, ideological, political, power, and discursive) and natural 
contexts. Moreover, agency is restricted by these contexts. Actors tend to be largely 
limited in their ability to produce innovations, unless necessary structural changes 
take place. These changes include: the strengthening of the public sphere (as argued 
by Habermas), modification of the economic system (Marx) or form of government 
(Durkheim) or alteration of power relations both in traditional political (macro-power 
of the state) and Foucauldian (everyday micro-powers) sense.  
The institutional framework is applied to explain complex and specifically Russian 
agency-structure interactions in the forest sector. In our analysis, we use the concepts 
of the new institutional economics (such as property rights, transaction costs, 
competition, etc). However, preliminary analysis of available data proved it necessary 
to supplement the NIE framework with two other approaches. Firstly, the impact of 
history on patterns of current transformations called for the application of concepts of 
path-dependence (North; Ostrom) and path-creation (Crouch and Farrell; 
Ebbinghaus). These frameworks have allowed the identification of several major 
path-dependent institutions that constrain transformation of the Russian forest sector, 
as well as the tracing of the historical roots of some of those institutions. The concept 
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of path-dependence is helpful in explaining why ideas of forest management that are 
popular elsewhere (such as ‘participation paradigm’; belief in the power of civil 
society and social campaigns; rejection of top-down projects) may be unfeasible on 
the Russian ground. The dissertation juxtaposed Russian practices and ideas with 
Western approaches to natural resource management. It showed the importance of 
complementing theories designed in the West with Russian conceptual frameworks. 
As the chapter six revealed, there is a clear awareness of the specificity of Russian 
practices among participants of the forest sector. The theory of path-dependence, 
previously applied to the Russian material by Hedlund (2005), has proven its 
immense relevance to explaining current changes in the Russian forest sector. The 
current development of model forests and certification shows how path-dependent 
development trajectories interact with exogenously changing environments. It shows 
that there is a potential for path-creation and, although bounded, innovation. There are 
actors within different parts of the Russian forest sector, NGOs, civil service, private 
business, who have started or may start to act as ‘embedded path creators’ (Garud and 
Karnoe, 2001). 
A ‘specific’ Russian mentality manifests itself in a certain view of forests and forest 
management, perception of law and governance regime, prospects of change, and a 
certain business and working culture. Interviewees emphasize that a number of 
existing issues are related to, in their opinion, specifically Russian objective natural 
and geographic conditions, as well as formal and informal institutions, traditional 
Russian or Soviet frameworks of thinking and behaviour and that all of these are 
closely related to each other. For instance, the abundance of natural resources is said 
to have caused lack of environmental thinking and consequently wasteful treatment of 
forests, despite the population’s dependance on those very forests. The absence of 
private property has had a similar effect on forests and, hence, a sense of 
responsibility for those resources is lacking. The latter is closely connected to the 
missing tradition of public participation in forest management or active public interest 
in forest issues, unless one is immediately affected by those. The latter, however, 
could be also in some cases explained by the level of economic development of 
certain areas where the local population is more concerned with problems of survival 
rather than sustainable environmental development. Often, it is the local population 
who are blamed for their own problems due to their unwillingness to change the 
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situation, scepticism about possible positive transformations, propensity to think only 
about ‘today’, not ‘tomorrow’ and their unwillingness to work hard.  
However, it would not be untrue to say that the special Russian ‘path’ of development 
relates most of all to the Russian state management, behaviour of civil servants and 
interaction of state and society. These include: rigidity of the state machine and its 
antagonism to any innovations, a very big role of the federal centre and hierarchy in 
decision-making, absence of democratic features, poor incentives for development or 
increasing efficiency, instability of political, economic and legal environment, 
corruption and so on. These features are said to be very ‘traditional’ for Russia and 
facilitate the inert (rather than innovative) development of economy and society. 
Moreover, these features are believed to distort realisation of various ‘Western’ ideas 
on the Russian ground and make it necessary to adapt these ideas to Russian 
institutions before implementation. 
The second approach that proved to be a necessary supplement to the NIE framework 
is the ecological one. Nature is considered a valid / fully-fledged factor (if not actor) 
in institutional change. The ecological dimension is regarded as an integral part of the 
analysis of societal development. Similarly to human ecology and political ecology, 
the collected data demands recognition of the inextricable link between the social and 
the natural in the process of institutional change. However, these theoretical 
approaches need modification when used to analyse the Russian case. Thus, in the 
analysis of the interdependence of nature and local culture, the concept of local 
culture should be understood broadly in the sense of all-Russian path-dependent 
institutions (especially political), intellectual tradition, practices of forest use as 
penetrated by the state and respective discourses. Moreover, certain concepts that may 
be important in other forest-rich countries turn out to be almost irrelevant in Russia, 
such as the concept of environmental struggles (e.g. environmental struggles of the 
poor against multinational corporations) (Martinez-Alier, 1997, 2002). My material 
demonstrates that if it is not the state who is the ‘only European’ in Russia, then it is 
the (predominantly foreign) private and non-governmental sector, but by no means 
local communities. As part of certification process and model forests, the concept of 
public participation has emerged on the agenda of interviewees. However, the local 
community is still mostly left out of ‘participation’ and does not attempt to get 
involved in forest management. Realisation of the imported multi-level governance 
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paradigm (e.g., Berkhout, Leach and Scoones, 2003) is fundamentally modified in 
Russia: the role of local agents is played not so much by local population, but rather 
by locally operating companies and possibly NGOs. 
As my interviews and observations showed, the discourse of forest as home for 
indigenous cultures is vanishing. Due to the ongoing development of the market 
economy and also due to certain ideological path-dependency (consumer attitude to 
natural resources and non-environmental priorities in state policies), the ‘regime’ of 
‘capitalist nature’ (with concomitant phenomena of commercialisation and 
‘commodification’ of nature (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006) appears to be very strong in 
the Russian forest sector. Predominant discourses reflect the extreme weakness of 
grassroot movements. 
Conflicts and environmental struggles that take place in the Russian forest sector are 
not very typical of capitalist societies. As seen in chapter seven, it is not NGOs and 
society against industry and the state, but rather NGOs and private sector against the 
state; private sector against private sector; state agencies against state agencies; NGOs 
against NGOs (the latter three types of conflicts mostly being fight for distribution of 
resources). 
The thesis has shown some limitations of the theory of non-state governance. 
Globally, and in post-Soviet Russia in particular, there is increased optimism 
concerning alternative governance systems (Edwards, 2001; Berkhout, Leach and 
Scoones, 2003; Tysiachniouk, 2006); individual agents have been shown to use 
‘structure’ as resources for institutional entrepreneurship (Mahoney and Snyder, 
1999). However, there are reasons to be cautious in making any predictions. These 
reasons lie mainly with path-dependent power relations and meta-rules of norm-
making (Ostrom, 2005) in society, as well as within non-state actors themselves (who 
need to reform themselves and to gain legitimacy in the society). Major obstacles to 
certification and model forests are found in the system of state governance and state 
forest management, which remain isolated from global developments and are opposed 
to imported institutions. The state is of primary importance for model forest and 
certification projects. This fully agrees with the ‘institutionalist political economy’ 
approach of H.-J. Chang (1997, 2002), who rejects the primacy of the market and 
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advocates the need of further studies of the state, its relationship to market and 
institutions, as well as institutional diversity of capitalist systems. 
Only an integrated approach (as reflected in the analytical framework - see Figure 1) 
which embraces an analysis of human and natural agency, as well as the ecological 
(quality, quantity and location of natural resources) and historical (economic, 
political, ideological, legal, customary, technological) embeddedness of agency will 
allow an understanding of the nature and major drivers of forest sector transformation 
in Russia. 
Directions for further research 
The results of this research could be developed in several directions: 
a) systematic and comprehensive description of ‘holons’ (core institutions of path-
dependence), and comprehensive analysis of forest legislation with respect to how 
these laws address path-dependence / how they aim to affect ‘holons’ (i.e. concrete 
policy implications) 
b) a comparison with recent institutional development, particularly certification and 
model forests, of the forest sector in other post-Soviet countries; comparison with 
Western countries during earlier periods of their development; comparative analysis 
of natural resource management under different political regimes 
c) a more detailed analysis of path creation including precedents and cases of 
successful social action in Russia; further analysis to see if there is a strong 
correspondence between changes in the forest sector and development of other sectors 
of the economy / exchequer deficit; what were the conditions when forest institutions 
developed with the fastest pace; patterns of activity in state forest policy compared to 
patterns of forest industry growth. 
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Appendix A: Locations and Respondents 
Locations 
Republic of Karelia:   Petrozavodsk, Segezha, Valday 
Leningrad Oblast’: Tikhvin; Kingisepp; Opol’ye, Opol’yevskaya volost’, Kikeritsy 
North-West 
of Russia 
St. Petersburg 
Primorsky Krai: Vladivostok (several trips), Dal’nerechensk, Dal’nerechenskiy Rayon, 
Roschino, Novopokrovka, Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon, Snezhnoe, Vostok, Dal’niy Kut 
Far East of 
Russia 
Khabarovsk Krai: Khabarovsk, Sosnovka 
Respondents 
Sector Number Organisation Position 
NGO N1 Greenpeace Russia (Moscow) Coordinator of the Forest Programme 
NGO N2 Greenpeace Russia (Moscow) Ex-participant of the Forest 
programme and ex-chairman of the 
National working group on forest 
certification 
NGO N3 SPOK (Karelia) Director 
NGO N4 The Wildlife Foundation 
(Khabarovsk) 
Chairman 
NGO N5 WWF-Russia, Moscow Head of the Forest Programme, 
previously worked for the State 
Forestry Agency 
NGO N6 WWF-Russia, Moscow Coordinator for High conservation 
value forests 
NGO N7 WWF-Russia, Moscow Forest policy coordinator 
NGO N8 WWF, Pskov Model Forest Project Leader 
NGO N9  WWF-Russia, Vladivostok Head of the Forest Programme at the 
Amur branch 
NGO N10 WWF-Russia, Vladivostok Forest certification coordinator at the 
Amur branch 
NGO N11 Environmental NGO ‘Taiga’ 
(Primorsky Krai) 
Director of the NGO;  director of the 
to-be-established National park 
‘Udege legend’ 
NGO N12 Biodiversity Conservation Centre 
(Moscow) 
Coordinator of the Forest programme 
NGO N13 IUCN (Moscow) Expert 
NGO N14 Forest Stewardship Coucil Director 
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(Moscow) 
NGO N15 BROC (Bureau for Regional 
Outreach Campaigns), 
Vladivostok 
Director; also Coordinator for the 
Russian Far East at the auditing 
company NEPCon 
NGO N16 BROC Expert 
NGO N17 Association of indigenous 
peoples of the North of the 
Khabarovsk Krai 
Expert 
NGO N18 Rainforest Alliance Training manager, TREES Program 
Private 
sector 
P1 IKEA, Swedwood Russia EHS (Environment, Health & Safety) 
Manager 
Private 
sector 
P2  UPM-Kymmene, St.Petersburg-
Tikhvin 
Environment manager 
Private 
sector 
P3 UPM-Kymmene, St.Petersburg Director, Forestry and Wood 
Sourcing 
Private 
sector 
P4 UPM-Kymmene, Tikhvin  Construction manager 
Private 
sector 
P5 UPM-Kymmene, Tikhvin Director for external relations, ex-
director of the lespromkhoz 
Private 
sector 
P6 UPM-Kymmene, Tikhvin Transport logistics manager 
Private 
sector 
P7 UPM-Kymmene, St.Petersburg Procurement director, Forestry and 
Wood Sourcing 
Private 
sector 
P8 UPM-Kymmene, Tikhvin Communications manager 
Private 
sector 
P9  UPM-Kymmene, Tikhvin Corporative Reporting and Control 
Manager, ex–acting director of the 
lespromkhoz 
Private 
sector 
P10 UPM-Kymmene, Tikhvin Forest production advisor 
Private 
sector 
P11 UPM-Kymmene, Tikhvin Planning manager, ex-head of 
production/operational department 
Private 
sector 
P12 Stora Enso Oyj, Wood Supply 
Russia 
Environmental manager 
Private 
sector 
P13 Stora Enso -Kingiseppskoye 
lesopromyshlennoe predpriyatie 
Technical director (head of the 
logging unit) 
Private 
sector 
P14 Stora Enso Deputy Director for three subsidiaries 
Private 
sector 
P15 Stora Enso, subsidiary ‘Russkiy 
les’, Tikhvin 
Head of the production and technical 
department 
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Private 
sector 
P16 Stora Enso, subsidiary ‘Russkiy 
les’, Tikhvin 
Deputy director 
Private 
sector 
P17 Stora Enso, subsidiary 
‘Terminal’, Novgorod Oblast’ 
Chief specialist on forest fund 
Private 
sector 
P18 Stora Enso, subsidiary ‘Olonets 
Les’, Karelia 
Manager 
Private 
sector 
P19 Stora Enso Oyj, St.Petersburg Quality manager 
Private 
sector 
P20 Stora Enso, subsidiary ‘Russkiy 
les’, Tikhvin 
Deputy director 
Private 
sector 
P21  Stora Enso, subsidiary Ladenso, 
Karelia 
Director 
Private 
sector 
P22 Investlesprom, Segezha Pulp-
and-Paper Plant 
Deputy director for organizational 
developments 
Private 
sector 
P23 Investlesprom, Segezha Pulp-
and-Paper Plant 
Head of the Forest resources 
department 
Private 
sector 
P24 Investlesprom, Segezha Pulp-
and-Paper Plant 
Director deputy for forest resources 
Private 
sector 
P25 Northern Logging Company 
(SLZK) 
Director general 
Private 
sector 
P26 Investlesprom, Segezha Pulp-
and-Paper Plant 
Leader of the Forestry Group 
Private 
sector 
P27 Segezha Pulp-and-Paper Plant Acting director deputy for forest, 
chief engineer 
Private 
sector 
P28 Segezha Pulp-and-Paper Plant Chief technologist (production 
manager/chief engineer) 
Private 
sector 
P29 Segezha Pulp-and-Paper Plant Head of Certification Department 
Private 
sector 
P30 Segezha Pulp-and-Paper Plant Assisstant to Director General for PR 
Private 
sector 
P31 Segezha Pulp-and-Paper Plant Director deputy for HR, ex-manager 
in the department for paper 
production 
Private 
sector 
P32 Lespromkhoz ‘Valdayles’ 
 
Director 
Private 
sector 
P33 Metsaliitto Group, St.Petersburg 
 
Development manager, 
Environmental affairs and corporate 
responsibility 
Private 
sector 
P34 Metsaliitto Group, St.Petersburg Environmental specialist 
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Private 
sector 
P35 LLC ‘Rimbunan Hijau MDF’, 
Khabarovsk 
 
General Director Deputy 
Private 
sector 
P36 Smena Trading Co, Ltd, Far East CEO; Head of Dalexportles 
Association 
Private 
sector 
P37 Dalexportles Association, Far 
East 
Executive director 
Private 
sector 
P38 Dallesprom, Far East Director Deputy for Production 
Private 
sector 
P39 Primorsklesprom, Far East Head of department 
Private 
sector 
P40 Chuguevskiy lespromkhoz, Far 
East 
Manager 
Private 
sector 
P41 JSC Les Export, Far East Deputy Director General 
Private 
sector 
P42 Leprekon (small-scale private 
logging company), Far East 
Director 
Private 
sector 
P43 Roshchinskiy lespromkhoz, Far 
East 
Director 
Private 
sector 
P44 Primorsky GOK Director deputy for forest 
Private 
sector 
P45 Europartner (audit) Forest Certification Program Director 
State S1 Government of the Khabarovsk 
Krai, Ministry of Timber Industry 
Head of division (Head of the bureau 
for foreign economic activities of the 
Ministry) 
State S2 Government of the Khabarovsk 
Krai, Ministry of Timber Industry 
Minister 
State S3 Khabarovsk Krai Government, 
Ministry of Timber Industry 
Chief Expert of foreign economic 
relations division 
State S4 Administration of Primorsky 
Krai, Forestry department 
Director 
State S5 State Forest Committee of 
Republic of Karelia 
Ex-chief forester, ex-deputy of the 
chairman 
State S6 Administration of Segezha Rayon Director deputy; also ex-employee of 
Segezha PPP 
State S7 Tikhvinsky leskhoz Director 
State S8 State Forest Committee of the 
Republic of Karelia 
Head of department 
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State S9 Ministry for Industry and Natural 
Resources, Republic of Karelia 
Chief specialist 
State S10 Administration of Opol’yevskaya 
volost’ 
Head of administration 
Academia A1 Institute of Specialists Training 
in the Field of Ecology and 
Nature Use, Khabarovsk 
Rector; also Director of Gassinski 
Model Forest 
Academia A2 Institute of Specialists Training 
in the Field of Ecology and 
Nature Use, Khabarovsk 
Vice-rector 
Academia A3 Biology-Soil Institute of the Far-
Eastern Branch of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Far East 
Head of the Forestry/Forest Science 
Department 
Academia A4 Institute for Water and 
Ecological Problems of the Far 
East, Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Far East 
Researcher, Participant of Gassinski 
Model Forest 
Academia A5 Centre for Independent Social 
Research, St.Petersburg 
Head of the ecological sociology 
group 
Academia A6 Centre for Independent Social 
Research, St.Petersburg 
Researcher 
Academia A7 Socio-Logos, Center for Social 
Analysis and Reconstruction, 
Petrozavodsk 
Researcher 
Academia A8 UNECE (Geneva), Forest 
Resources Assessment, Timber 
Section, Trade and Timber 
Division 
Researcher 
Local 
community 
L1 Udege community, Far East N/A 
Local 
community 
L2 Udege community, Far East N/A 
Local 
community 
L3 Udege community, Far East N/A 
Local 
community 
L4 Udege community, Far East N/A 
Local 
community 
L5 N/A N/A 
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Appendix B: Interview Questionnaire 
The following is a general questionnaire. In each particular case, questions are 
tailored in accordance with available information about the interviewee, and recent 
activities they have been involved in. 
In a number of cases, interviewees prefer not the Q&A format, but ask to explain the 
purpose and focus of my research first, write down the questions of my particular 
interest and then give a very detailed, monologue-format reply. 
Introduction: 
Good afternoon, my name is Olga Ulybina. I am a Russian student studying 
development of the Russian forest sector. I am originally from St. Petersburg; this is 
why it is a pleasure to come over here to conduct this research. Thank you for 
accepting to spare time to talk to me. I would like to assure you that all the 
information I will obtain through this interview will be kept in full confidentiality. 
The data will be used only for the sake of this research and will not be given to any 
third party. Please feel free to refuse answering any question or say that you do not 
know the answer if you do not have the requested information. Please feel free to ask 
for any clarification in case the question is not clear. I am hereby signing this consent 
form to ensure my abidance by the ethical rules of social science research. Can I 
record/take notes during the interview to write down your exact answers? 
Personal details:  
1. Interviewee’s name 
2. Location 
3. The sector: private company / federal / regional / local administration / state 
agency / NGO / local population / indigenous people / position in a 
company/organisation  
Say: I am interested in your opinion on what impedes or facilitates development of the 
forest sector in Russia today. Let us talk about changes that you have seen in the 
recent years in your work and in the work of your department.  
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There follows an in-depth interview where I am asking questions about changes that 
the interviewee mentions: how these changes were implemented, who initiated these 
changes, what implementation difficulties they faced on their way, who supported 
these changes, how these changes related to the existing institutions, etc. 
The following questions are asked: 
Could you possibly tell a little bit more about your job? 
Have you seen any changes in your work in the last, say, ten years?  
Are these changes totally new to the sector or did such procedures exist in the Soviet 
times (e.g. corporate social responsibility)? 
Why are these changes taking place?  
How do you benefit from these innovations? 
Question to harvesting companies / leskhozes: Why have you introduced these 
changes?  
Depending on who the interviewee is, I am also asking the following questions: 
1. Current state forest policy 
How do you see goals of the current forest reform carried out by the state? 
Who is going to benefit from the new legislation and recent changes? 
How do you benefit from the new Forest Code? 
Did you feel legislative reforms of 1993, 1997, 2004-2007 changed forestry practices?  
If yes, what in particular? In what way did practices of your company change with 
regard to these reforms? 
Why was the new Forest Code 2006 necessary? 
What are the main positive sides of the current reform? 
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Reform is still in progress. Where do you feel are the main difficulties for reform? 
How well is forest legislation enforced? 
Did you contribute in any way to the design of the new legislation? 
Did you feel your interests were taken into account in the forest reform? 
Has the number of legislative acts changed? 
Have the laws become more transparent? 
Have you seen any tangible results of federal forest programmes recently? 
2.  Forest certification 
Why have you decided to carry out certification of your company? 
What has been changed as part of certification process?  
When trans-national standards / practices are transplanted into Russia, how are they 
modified? 
In what way does certification help to deal with illegal logging? 
How was the nature of stakeholdership considered earlier and now that certification 
comes in? 
What were the main difficulties during certification process? 
Do you think certification could make up for a full-fledged forest policy and control? 
Have you found any support for certification from the regional / local authorities? 
Do you see any changes in attitudes (of the local population / business / state 
authority) towards certification? 
Does certification lead to implementation of the same practices and to the same extent 
at different companies? 
What do you expect from certification? 
Question to private companies: How would you describe your relationships with the 
local population? 
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3. Model forests 
Question to private companies and state agencies: Do you use experience of Russian 
model forests on your leased territory? If yes, in what way? If not, why so? 
How would you describe the role of model forests in Russia? 
Question to model forest organisers: Could you tell more about your negotiations with 
state agencies?  
How would you describe attitude and behaviour of the state concerning innovations 
you have been trying to introduce? 
Have you seen any differences in attitude and behaviour at the federal / regional / 
local level? 
What are the main drivers behind model forests in Russia? 
4. The Role of NGOs in the development of the Russian forest sector  
Questions to non-NGOs actors: Do you interact with NGOs? If yes, in what way? 
How do you benefit from cooperation with NGOs? 
Can you give an example when actions and protests of NGOs succeeded in bringing 
about change? 
Can you provide an example of cooperation between NGOs and state forestry bodies?  
Questions to Russian NGOs: 
How do you cooperate with international NGOs, if at all?  
What methods do you use to persuade state agencies to introduce proposed changes? 
What techniques do you use in order to influence local business? 
Is the state willing to listen to your opinion?  
Has their attitude been changing recently?  
Are there differences between regions? If so, why? 
How would you describe your relationship with the private sector?  
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5. Changes brought about by foreign companies 
What projects are currently carried out by the company in order to enhance its 
economic, social and environmental positions? 
Could you provide any examples of new methods and practices you have been 
introducing in your company in Russia? 
What did it involve to bring operations of your company in Russia in compliance with 
international standards? 
Do you see any differences in the way international and Russian timber companies 
work in Russia? 
How do you (as an international company) go about contradictions between internal 
corporate regulations and Russian legislation / common Russian practices?  
Are the innovations you introduce supported by state forestry agencies, local 
administration, NGOs, local population, other harvesting companies? 
Do you (as a foreign company) cooperate with local universities and research centres? 
Do you share your experience with other companies?  
Question to a Russian company that became a subsidiary of a foreign company: Is 
there exchange (of experience, technology, practices, knowledge, etc) with foreign 
subsidiaries of the company? 
Do staff of the company participate in educational trips, environmental training 
programmes, or exchange programmes with other (foreign) companies? 
Question about innovations introduced by foreign harvesting companies: What are the 
weak points of implemented systems when introduced in Russia? 
How strong an influence do large international (logging and timber buying) 
companies have on the Russian public authorities?  
6. Interactions, cooperation and networks 
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Do you cooperate / unite with other companies in order to implement innovations?  
How do you assess the results and impact of FLEG / FLEGT processes? 
7. Attitude of the state to non-state innovations 
Do state agencies help to implement innovations?  
How do they contribute to such projects?  
In what ways do they encourage companies to introduce responsible environmental 
and social policies? 
Does the state interfere in interaction of different non-state actors? 
Are there any changes in the state forest policy as a result of certification and 
activities of NGOs, as well as foreign companies operating in Russia? 
Question to state officials: Why are numerous forest management responsibilities 
delegated to private companies? 
Closure 
Thank you very much again for your time, I really appreciate your help in answering 
these questions and I hope that my research will eventually help point out main 
obstacles in the way of intensive and innovative development of the forest sector. I 
reassure you of the confidentiality of these answers.
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Appendix C. Major Forestry Laws 
1703 (Peter I) Order to conduct a comprehensive forest inventory along rivers 
1704, 1717, 
1718 
Decrees about inviolability strict reserves:  private logging was 
banned in certain distances from rivers, regardless of the property 
rights structure. Oak forests of some areas were designated as 
preserves and were permitted to be cut only for state needs. The 
supreme penalty for oak logging (where trees were suitable for 
shipbuilding) was death penalty, later substituted by hard labour. For 
theft of oak dead wood, one was to be sent to a penal colony. 
1719 Forest management became a jurisdiction of the Admiralty 
Collegium. A special department of forest rangers (waldmeisters) 
established. 
1722 Decree on Forest Masters – the role of forest masters introduced in 
all major forest regions.  
1722 Oberwaldmeister Instruction. Management of all forests was put 
under control of the Admiralty. Oberwaldmeister headed forest 
management and was subordinate to the Admiralty.  Immediate 
forest management was delegated to waldmeisters (appointed from 
nobility and landlords living close to the forest). The 
Oberwaldmeister Instruction also included new rules and penalties 
concerning illegal logging: for each felled tree, one was obliged to 
pay the fine of five roubles, of which two roubles went to the 
exchequer, and the other three – to the forest ranger who revealed the 
crime. Forest arson was penalised with death penalty. Corrupt 
waldmeisters and forest rangers were penalised through cutting out of 
nostrils and hard labour. 
1726 
(Catherine I) 
Oberwaldmeisters’ Instruction was repealed, and conservation areas 
were limited. 
1727, 1729 
(Peter II) 
Several forest protection acts issued - resembling those of Peter I 
1730, 1732 
(Anna 
Ioannovna) 
Waldmeisters were reinstated (as under Peter I).   
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1732 Forests were declared to be under protection within 100 versts from 
large rivers and 25 versts from minor rivers. Fines were increased, 
and death penalty for arson was reintroduced. Instruction about forest 
cultivation for the needs of the fleet, as well as Rules of ship-building 
forests management. Forstmeisters were invited from Germany. 
1762 
(Catherine II) 
 The Nobility Freedom Act, according to which gentry were exempt 
from obligatory state service. The act annihilated the position of 
waldmeisters, which used to be occupied by nobility. 
1766 Decree about a general forest survey, which resulted in the first 
reliable maps of government forest estates. 
1782 Decree granting full private property rights to private forest owners 
and thus reintroducing unlimited logging in private forests, as well as 
free timber trade (previously state monopoly).  
1786 The Draft Forest Charter - the development of scientific rules for 
forestry. The main idea was to manage forests differently depending 
on regions and tree species. Public forests were divided into three 
belts: norther, middle and southern. 
1798 (Paul I) The Forest Department was established – under the Admiralty 
Collegium. 
1798, 1799 Decrees raising fines on illegal felling and introducing immediate 
legal proceedings in cases of forest crime. Restrictions on timber 
export. Reinstated the roles of oberforstmeisters and forstmeisters. 
1802 
(Alexander I) 
The Forest Charter was adopted. It pursued three major goals: 
protection of forests; efficient organisation of timber supply; raising 
profitability of forestry in heavily forested areas without endangering 
the livelihoods of people 
1802  The Forest Department moved from the Admiralty to the Ministry of 
Finance. 
1826 Statute ‘On the new organisation of the forest division’ (O novom 
ustroystve lesnoy chasti). It established lesnichestvos (i.e. limited 
forest areas for systematic and planned forestry activities to be 
carried out by foresters), i.e. the beginning of forest management 
proper. 
1811 Department of State Properties was established, and forest 
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management was entrusted to two divisions of the newly established 
Department.  This transfer initiated the decentralisation of forest 
management: forests were separated according to specific purposes - 
for salt production industry, ship building, monasteries, cities, mining 
works, etc. So, forests were in double subordination – to forestry 
authorities (independent oberforstmeisters and forstmeisters) and 
those departments they were associated with. 
1839 
(Nicholas I) 
The Statute on Forest Corps organised the Forest Department in a 
military way. The staff of the Corps of Foresters included general, 
colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, etc. 
1888 
(Alexander 
III) 
The Resolution on the Preservation of Forests (Lesoohranitelny 
zakon). The Resolution recognised the role of the forest in protecting 
nature in the state and public interest. It included the concept of 
conservation forests. 
1917 Decree On Land, which established that forests of state importance 
were to be transferred to exclusive state use (nationalised), and all 
small forests were to be transferred to the use of communities under 
the condition that local municipalities would manage those. 
1918 The Decree on Forests, aka Main Law on Forests (‘Osnovnoy zakon 
o lese’) stated free access to forests and equal rights to all citizens to 
use forests with temporary payment of stumpage fees, and to 
secondary forest products. The Decree made provisions about duties 
and responsibilities of all citizens to contribute to forest reproduction 
and protection.  
1923 Forest Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was 
passed to deal with drought and introduced new concepts of forest 
management, such as the forest fund72.  
1943 The forest fund was divided into three groups in accordance with 
their economic and ecological value. Each group was assigned 
specific type of forest use and system of felling. 
1948 The Plan for Planting Field Shelterbelts…, aka Stalin’s Plan of 
                                                 
72
 The concept of forest fund includes area covered with wood and brush; unforested area that is 
designated for forestation; and area designated to support the needs of the forest industry 
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Nature Transformation, which triggered large-scale forestation 
(planting forest belts as windbreaks). 
1977 Principles of Forest Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics 
(Osnovy lesnogo zakonodatelstva SSSR I soyuznyh respublik) 
reflected continuation of the previous policies adopted after 1917  
1993 Principles of the Forest Legislation of the Russian Federation 
(Osnovy lesnogo zakonodatelstva RF) were designed on the basis of 
the new Russian constitution. For the first time after many decades, 
the principle of sustainability was reflected in legislation. The law 
separated management of the forest fund from management of 
operational harvesting. 
 1997 Forest Code of the Russian Federation formulated goals of forest 
management as: rational and sustainable use of forests, forest 
conservation, protection, and reclamation based on the principles of 
consistent management and preservation of biological diversity of 
forest ecosystems, and maximization of the ecological and resource 
potential of forests. 
2006 The new Forest Code of the Russian Federation revised several major 
concepts and principles of forest management prompted by the 
developing market economy. For more details please see chapter 
five.  
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Vrangel (1841), Shelgunov (1857), 
Zakonodatelnye Akty Petra I (1945), and recent legal acts as listed in the 
Bibliography. 
 
 
 
